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Abstract
Stroke is a life changing event that can result in significant negative consequences. As
such psychological disturbances may arise. In the general population anxiety is the most
prevalent mental health condition, yet it remains under-researched and under-recognised
within stroke survivors. Anxiety, is associated with decreased quality of life, increased
healthcare utilisation, and increased severity of depression. The aims of the programme of
research organised in this thesis were to establish a quantitative estimate of the prevalence
of anxiety after stroke, to determine if there were any interventions that were effective in
treating it and to uncover psychological factors that may have attributed to the
manifestation of anxiety after stroke.
Three studies were conducted. The first was a systematic review and meta-analysis
of observational studies that assessed the prevalence of anxiety after stroke. The second
study was a Cochrane systematic review of randomised control trials to examine if any
interventions were effective in treating anxiety after stroke. The third study was a
longitudinal cohort study that used the common-sense model of illness representations
(Leventhal, Meyer and Nerenz 1980) to uncover the illness beliefs held by stroke survivors,
and to evaluate whether these beliefs were associated with anxiety after stroke.
Approximately 20% of stroke survivors were found to have an anxiety disorder, and
25% experienced significant levels of anxiety symptoms. Currently, there is insufficient
evidence from randomised control trials to guide treatment of anxiety after stroke. Illness
representations were relatively stable over time. Only higher illness identity (e.g. attributing
a higher symptom burden to stroke), and having a more emotional response to ones stroke
were associated with anxiety in stroke survivors.
Several limitations in all three studies may restrict the generalisability and validity of
the findings and there are many questions that remain unanswered. However this work has
contributed substantially to the investigation into the phenomenon of anxiety after stroke
and can inform clinical guideline development, post-stroke psychological service provision
and future intervention studies.
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Preface
This thesis is organised into four main sections: introductory review chapters regarding
stroke, anxiety, and the common sense model of illness representations; a systematic
review of the prevalence of anxiety after stroke; a systematic review of interventions to
treat anxiety after stroke; and a primary clinical longitudinal cohort study investigating
illness representations held by stroke survivors and their association with anxiety.
The first three chapters (Chapters 1-3) serve as the background information for all
three studies that were carried out. The systematic reviews are described in their entirety
in two stand alone chapters (Chapters 4 & 5). The remainder of this thesis focuses primarily
on the work carried out for the empirical longitudinal cohort study. A general methods
chapter (Chapter 6) has been included which provides an outline of the research process
and an analysis plan. In depth descriptions of the more complex analytical techniques
employed in the empirical study have intentionally been placed adjacent to the results for
readability purposes (Chapter 7 & 8). The final chapter (Chapter 9) integrates findings from
all three studies, and provides a focused discussion on the strengths, limitations and
implications of the empirical study, and assesses the implications of the entire body of work.
11 Chapter One: Overview of stroke
1.1 Introduction
Stroke is a major public health concern (Mackay and Mensah 2004), and its
occurrence can have devastating and long lasting impact on the lives of the individual
affected, and those closest to them. Until fairly recently, the societal perspective on stroke
was generally fatalistic and dismissive, and the condition was simply regarded by many as an
unfortunate consequence of ageing. Since then there have been substantial changes in
health policy which have resulted in significant improvements in the way stroke care is
organised and delivered (National Audit Office 2010). This has led to decreased mortality
and improvement in stroke associated outcomes. The National Stroke Strategy,
(Department of Health 2007) published in 2007, was heralded as a “national ambition for
stroke” and proposed a series of high quality benchmarks that outlined actions and progress
measures for the next ten years. This has brought about initiatives like the Stroke –Act
F.A.S.T campaign, a public awareness campaign, which explains the key symptoms of stroke
and emphasises that it is a medical emergency requiring immediate attention whereby the
ambulance should be called. Ambulance services have changed the way in which they
respond to individuals showing signs of a possible stroke, paramedics are better trained in
recognising the signs of stroke and enhanced protocols for triaging individuals with
suspected stroke have been established. The National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) have developed guidelines advocating that all patients suspected of stroke
should be admitted directly to stroke units as there is clear evidence of benefit in doing so
(National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 2010), and more stroke patients are
accessing this service than ever before (Royal College of Physicians 2012). Additionally,
significant resources have gone into increasing the proportion of acute stroke patients
receiving neuro-imaging. This has led to an increase in the proportion of stroke patients
receiving thrombolysis (a method of breaking down clots which if administered within 3-4
hours post-stroke can arrest or significantly reduce stroke associated complications) from
1% in 2008 to 8% in 2011 (Royal College of Physicians 2012).
The improvements highlighted above are but a few that have contributed towards
saving lives and reducing levels of stroke-associated disability. Unfortunately, longer-term
2post hospital discharge services and support have not matched the progress seen in acute
services. The full impact of the stroke is often not realised until after the individual leaves
the hospital, and endeavours to renegotiate their lives (Stroke Improvement programme
2010). A lack of health information and knowledge of available resources, combined with
an inability to return to pre-stroke state and limited integration between health, social and
community services leave many stroke survivors feeling fearful, abandoned and distressed.
These issues can contribute to the manifestation of various psychological problems amongst
stroke survivors. The recognition that mental health distress can have an impact on physical
recovery and quality of life has lead to substantial investigation into post-stroke depression
and emotionalism perhaps because the manner in which they manifest is rather salient.
Anxiety on the other hand, which is the most common mental health disorder in the general
population (Kessler et al. 2009) has received relatively little attention and has remained
under-recognised within the stroke population, even though its impact may be just as
significant.
The overall goal of this thesis is to investigate the phenomenon of anxiety after stroke.
The purpose of this first chapter is to provide background information about stroke, its
associated complications, and what it means to live with it, hence highlighting the various
factors that may contribute to psychological distress, and anxiety in particular after stroke.
1.2 What is a stroke?
Stroke is defined by the World Health Organization as a rapidly developing clinical
syndrome characterised by an acute loss of focal (or global) brain function lasting more than
24 hours or leading to death with no apparent cause other than that of vascular origin
(Hatano 1976). The somewhat arbitrary cut-off of 24 hours distinguishes stroke from a
transient ischaemic attack (TIA), where symptoms and signs last for less than 24 hours.
The physiological mechanisms underlying TIA and stroke are similar, however the
aims of clinical investigation differ in approach. With TIAs the focus is primarily on rapid
identification and treatment of the underlying causes in order to prevent a recurrent or
possibly more severe event. In stroke the initial emphasis of investigation is on targeting
treatment to minimise subsequent deficit (Pendlebury, Giles and Rothwell 2009). However,
3in practice the distinction between stroke and TIA can only be made retrospectively and
may be of little importance.
1.3 Impact of stroke
Globally, it is estimated that 16 million people will suffer from a first-ever stroke
each year (Strong, Mathers and Bonita 2007). Stroke is the second leading cause of death
behind coronary heart disease, and is the leading cause of adult disability (World Health
Organization 2011; Mackay and Mensah 2004).
In England and Wales, approximately 110,000 strokes and a further 20,000 TIAs
occur each year (National Audit Office 2005). There are over 900,000 people living with
stroke, and about a third have moderate to severe disability (Pendlebury, Giles and Rothwell
2009). While generally regarded as a disease associated with ageing, approximately 25% of
strokes occur in persons under the age of 65 years. Stroke is also the second leading cause
of death, accounting for 7% of all male deaths and 10% of all female deaths (Office for
National Statistics 2011). Despite an ageing population, stroke incidence has fallen steadily
over the last 10 years, while the prevalence of stroke (the proportion who survive) has
increased (Rothwell et al. 2004; Lee, Shafe and Cowie 2011). Additionally, mortality rates
have declined significantly, with the proportion who die within one month of having a
stroke decreasing from 20% -30% in the 1990s to 12% in 2008 (Wolfe 2000; Lee, Shafe and
Cowie 2011).
The annual direct healthcare costs associated with stroke are estimated to be £2.8
billion in the UK, with an average length of stay in hospital of around 28 days (Saka, McGuire
and Wolfe 2009). Comparatively, coronary heart disease which is the leading cause of
morbidity and mortality in the UK costs £1.9 billion per year, and has an average length of
stay of seven days (National Audit Office 2005). Informal care and time spent by carers of
disabled stroke patients, along with potential loss of lifetime earnings or premature death is
said to cost another £4 billion each year (Saka, McGuire and Wolfe 2009).
1.4 Stroke subtypes and pathophysiology
Strokes are either ischaemic or haemorrhagic. Because the management of these
subtypes are so different, their clinical distinction is one of the most important and urgent
4steps in stroke management. Ischaemic stroke occurs when the blood (and glucose and
oxygen) supply to part of the brain is cut off, leading to dysfunction or death of the brain
tissue in that area (Hankey 2002). Ischaemic stroke arise due to either thrombosis (a
condition where a blood clot forms inside an artery in the brain, blocking blood flow), or
embolism (when a clot that that formed elsewhere in the body, dislodges and becomes
trapped in arteries closer to the brain). TIAs are classified as ischaemic stroke.
There are two subtypes of haemorrhagic stroke. The first, intracerebral
haemorrhage, occurs when a defective artery within the brain ruptures and fills the
surrounding brain tissues which leads to brain structures being compressed. A
subarachnoid haemorrhage differs from an intracerebral haemorrhage in that the blood
from a ruptured artery fills the space surrounding the brain (the subarachnoid space) rather
than inside of it (Hankey 2002).
Approximately 85% of all first-ever strokes are ischaemic; 10% are caused by primary
intracerebral haemorrhage, and 5% are subarachnoid haemorrhage (Rothwell et al. 2004).
Haemorrhagic strokes are generally more severe and cause higher levels of mortality
(Andersen et al. 2009).
Various systems have been developed to classify strokes. The Oxfordshire Stroke
Classification, also known as the Bamford classification is one of the most widely used
(Bamford et al. 1991). It is a robust system that is based on clinical signs and is useful for
understanding the likely underlying pathology, which can inform prognosis, and treatment
options. The four categories are: Lacunar infarct which is characterised by motor or sensory
deficits only; Partial Anterior Cerebral Infarct (PACI) which is characterised by two of the
following- unilateral or sensory loss or the face, arm, and leg, higher cortical dysfunction (e.g.
dysphagia or visuospatial disorders) and hemianopia (visual field loss); Total Anterior
Cerebral Infarct (TACI) which is defined by unilateral weakness and/or sensory deficit of the
face arms or legs, hemianopia, and higher cerebral dysfunction; and Posterior Circulation
Infarct (POCI) whose main features include either hemianopia, cerebellar dysfunction, or
loss of consciousness.
51.5 Risk factors for stroke
Risk factors for stroke can be broadly classified as modifiable and non-modifiable. A
large multi-national study found that a history of hypertension, tobacco smoking, high
waist-to-hip ratio, high fat diet, physical inactivity, psycho-social stress, depression, high
cholesterol, type 2 diabetes, and cardiac conditions (e.g. atrial fibrillation) explained 90% of
stroke-associated risk (O'Donnell et al. 2010). TIA has been proposed as a risk for
subsequent strokes, however a meta-analysis found that stroke re-occurrence after TIA
ranged only from 1-12% (Giles and Rothwell 2007).
Advanced age is the strongest non-modifiable risk factor for ischaemic stroke and
primary intracerebral haemorrhage, but is less important for subarachnoid haemorrhage.
At age 75-84 years stroke incidence is approximately 25 times higher than at age 45-54
years (Rothwell et al. 2005). Ischaemic stroke is slightly more common in men than women.
This gender difference is less marked for stroke than other cardiovascular diseases, such as
coronary heart disease and peripheral arterial disease. In the UK rates of subarachnoid
haemorrhage are slightly higher in women than in men (Rothwell et al. 2005). Racial and
social differences have also been observed. For example, stroke incidence in the UK South
Asian, Caribbean, and African populations have been found to be higher than those in the
White-British population, perhaps due to higher prevalence of certain risk factors such as
hypertension and diabetes in these groups (Pendlebury, Giles and Rothwell 2009).
Additionally, the role of genetics has been investigated for its possible influence on stroke
risk. There is some evidence to suggest that genetics and having a family history of stroke
are associated with early age of stroke onset (Schulz, Flossmann and Rothwell 2004). Even
though the contribution of genetic factors to stroke have not been conclusively established,
they remain an area of research interest (Pendlebury, Giles and Rothwell 2009).
1.6 Complications of Stroke
Many stroke survivors experience close to a complete recovery, however for others
the effects of the stroke can be catastrophic and result in having to live with some form of
residual disability or impairment. The following section highlights some of the common
longer term consequences of stroke that individuals have to manage.
61.6.1 Physical limitations
Physical impairment, problems in body function or structure including substantial
deviation or loss (World Health Organization 2002), are the hallmark of stroke deficits.
Weakness in the arms or legs is one of the most commonly occurring consequences of
stroke. Approximately 80% of stroke survivors experience some problems with movement
(Wolfe 2000). Unilateral paralysis (e.g. hemiparesis, which consists of paralysis on one side
of the body) is common (Wade and Hewer 1987; Sommerfeld et al. 2004). As a result of the
muscle weakness, spasticity may develop which may lead to pain or stiff muscles and joints.
Loss of sensation on the affected side can give rise to problems with balance which are also
common after stroke (Tyson et al. 2006). When balance is affected an individual may feel
dizzy or unsteady which could result in falls or loss of confidence when walking or moving
around. These physical problems can negatively impact on ones ability to perform routine
daily and quality of life (Clarke and Black 2005).
1.6.2 Cognitive Impairment
Approximately one third of stroke survivors experience some form of generalised
cognitive impairment (Patel et al. 2003; Pohjasvaara et al. 1997). Cognitive changes after
stroke may manifest themselves as a general slowing down in information processing, or in
changes in specific domains such as attention, memory visuospatial attention or planning
and organising language (Cicerone et al. 2000; Cicerone et al. 2005). Some individuals may
experience problems with reasoning or depending on the nature of the stroke lesion have
limited awareness or lack of insight into their difficulties (Jehkonen, Laihosalo and Kettunen
2006). As many stroke survivors are older, it should be recognised that the cognitive
impairment observed may have existed prior to stroke (Henon et al. 1997).
1.6.3 Communication problems
Communication problems are one of the most common consequences of stroke.
Approximately one third of survivors have some difficulty with speaking or understanding
(Wade et al. 1986; Pedersen et al. 1995). On initial assessment, Global aphasia (impairment
in comprehension and production of speech), Broca’s aphasia (inability to produce speech)
and Wernicke’s aphasia (inability to comprehend speech) were the most frequently
7occurring forms of language deficits after stroke (Pedersen, Vinter and Olsen 2004).
Dysarthia is a motor speech impairment that varies in severity and affects clarity of speech,
voice quality and volume, and overall intelligibility. Roughly 20%-30% of patients
experience it after stroke, and it may co-exist with aphasia (Scottish Intercollegiate
Guidelines Network 2010). Dyspraxia, another type of communication problem occurs
when the individual cannot move muscles in the correct order and sequence to make the
sounds needed for clear speech (Lofgren et al. 1998).
1.6.4 Interpersonal and social impact
Feeling a loss of a purposeful role in life is a disheartening result of stroke. A review
on the longer term consequences of stroke found that approximately 50% of stroke patients
say they have no meaningful daytime activity, and one-third of younger survivors feel
intellectually unfulfilled (Murray, Young and Forster 2007). Engaging in social activities can
become quite challenging due to the physical consequences of stroke and many stroke
survivors lack the ability to participate in routine community activities such as shopping or
attending clubs (Barton 2007). Additionally the vast majority of working age stroke
survivors do not return to work (Gabriele and Renate 2009). Some lose their ability to drive,
which for many people is an important marker of independence. For older individuals, a
stroke may be viewed as shattering planned hopes and aspirations of retirement life (Lobeck,
Thompson and Shankland 2005). Sexual dysfunction after stroke is also common, and
affects close to half of all survivors. Sexual dysfunction is linked with depression, older age,
greater physical impairment and an unwillingness to discuss and participate in sexual
activities, and while fear is also thought to be a contributing factor, this has yet to be
confirmed (Murray, Young and Forster 2007).
1.6.5 Psychological problems
Aside from anxiety, which will be discussed extensively in chapter two, there are a
range of psychological problems that can arise after stroke. Depression, which has been
most extensively investigated, occurs in approximately one third of stroke patients (Hackett
et al. 2005). While spontaneous recovery may occur, depressive symptoms may persist well
beyond the first year after stroke for a substantial proportion of individuals. Depression
8after stroke is associated with an increased risk of death and poor functional outcome
(Hankey 2002).
Apathy, is another mental health problem that may arise after stroke (Yamagata,
Yamaguchi and Kobayashi 2004) In some cases apathy is a symptom of depression but it
may also occur on its own (Hama et al. 2011), yet unlike depression which is distressing to
stroke survivors, apathy is more of a concern for caregivers.
About one quarter of stroke patients experience difficulty controlling the way in
which they express emotion in the year following a stroke (Hackett et al. 2010). This
condition is known as emotionalism, and manifests itself as abrupt crying or in some cases
uncontrollable laughter that may be triggered by a thought or being asked a question with
emotional overtones. While the outbursts may be of short duration, they can cause
considerable distress to patients and their carers, and may be a significant obstacle to
rehabilitation and social integration. Additionally uncontrollable anger or aggression which
has been found to be related to emotionalism is reported in up to a third of patients, and is
more prevalent in patients with severe motor dysfunction or dysarthria (Kim et al. 2002).
Anosognosia is a condition in which a person seems unaware of the existence of his
or her disability (American Psychiatric Association 2000). Unlike denial, which is a defence
mechanism, anosognosia occurs due to brain damage localised to specific areas (Robinson
2004). It is associated with negative prognosis, and compromises the course of recovery
and rehabilitation. A recent review estimated the occurrence of post-stroke anosognosia to
be between 10%-17%, with recovery most likely within the first three months (Orfei et al.
2007).
Loss of self-esteem may also be a concern. Self-esteem is the extent to which an
individual has a positive or negative view of themselves (Brumfitt and Sheeran 1999). One
study found that close to 20% of stroke survivors reported reduced levels of self-esteem,
which in turn was found to be associated with higher levels of anxiety and depression
(Vickery 2006). The stability of self-esteem has also been found to be associated with low
mood. Individuals with high but unstable self-esteem, or those with low but stable self-
esteem, were both more likely to suffer with symptoms of depression (Vickery et al. 2009).
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as intense displeasure, offence or exasperation. Some of the physical limitations of stroke,
the inability to participate in conversations or social settings, or being made to feel helpless
have been noted as factors that trigger anger (Kim et al. 2002). Anger is associated with an
increased risk of hypertension and depression, and may lead to taking up health harming
behaviours such as smoking.
1.6.6 Other difficulties
An exhaustive list of all problems that may arise as result of stroke is not possible.
However several other important symptoms that have been observed include fatigue
(Glader, Stegmayr and Asplund 2002), financial strain (Murray, Young and Forster 2007),
carer distress, and chronic pain (Murray, Young and Forster 2007).
1.7 Experience and satisfaction with services
Upon having a stroke, individuals have contact with several services along the stroke
care pathway including: ambulance; accident and emergency; stroke unit; inpatient
rehabilitation; early supported discharge; and specialist community stroke teams or generic
community healthcare teams. Additionally, they may receive support from voluntary sector
organisations such as Stroke Clubs, the Stroke Association and Different Strokes. A survey of
over 1700 stroke survivors found that over 80% were satisfied with the follow-up care they
received from their GP, but were much less positive about other aspects of care they had
received since being discharged from hospital (Healthcare Commission 2006). In hospital,
care was generally viewed more favourably than the care available post-discharge.
Additionally, some indicated they had trouble dealing with some of the emotional and
psychological consequences they were experiencing but nearly half of these individuals said
they had not received enough support in this area (Healthcare Commission 2006).
Subsequent national audits have also reported low ratings for psychological services
available post stroke (National Audit Office 2010).
1.8 Living with stroke
The previous sections provided an overview of the possible consequences of stroke,
and experiences with services, but what does it mean to actually have to live with this long-
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term condition? The National Stroke Strategy for England and Wales highlighted the need
for changes to the organisation and delivery of long-term stroke care once patients have
been discharged from hospital. Various pilot projects are underway with the aim of
identifying best practices that can be delivered across the entire country (Stroke
Improvement programme 2010). Quality marker 12 in the National stroke strategy
advocates for a seamless transfer of care from hospital to home (Department of Health
2007). This would entail a clear and workable discharge plan that has fully involved the
individual (and their family when applicable) and which responds to the individual’s
circumstances and needs. Quality marker 13 in the strategy proposes that a range of
services should be in place and easily accessible to support the long-term needs of
individuals (and carers). It explicitly indicates that psychological, emotional, and adjustment
supports should be available for individuals living in the community and those in care homes
as well.
While such benchmarks are a move in the right direction, the current reality is not
reflective of the advocated standards. There is significant disparity in resources and care
available depending on where in the country one resides leaving the current situation to be
described as a “postcode lottery”(McKevitt et al. 2011). Many stroke survivors indicate they
face huge challenges once discharged from hospital and many are struggling to recover and
adjust.. A recent survey of over 2200 stroke survivors indicated that they need support to
stay at home, but felt very isolated once discharged from hospital. Others had to move to
different parts of the country to access services that were not available where they lived,
and 45%- 70% reported that they did not have a clear care plan in place prior to being
discharged (McKevitt et al. 2011).
These examples highlight some of the many challenges of adjustment that stroke
survivors face. They are also contributory factors that may influence ones beliefs (illness
representations) about their stroke prognosis. The concept of illness representations
(Leventhal, Meyer and Nerenz 1980) and their possible of association with anxiety after
stroke is introduced in chapter three. Whether the transition to life after stroke is
successful is contingent on a variety of factors. In a review of biographical accounts, the
emergency treatment services, the hospital care environment including staff, community
service, and social supports were key elements that determined whether stroke survivors
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could be resilient and adapt to their situation, or whether they would spiral into a state of
psychological distress (Lincoln et al. 2012).
1.9 Summary
Having a stroke is a life changing event with complications that may lead to a range of
problems. This chapter provided an overview of stroke, and the complications that may
manifest as a result. The aim was to set the scene for understanding the issues faced by
stroke survivors which can give rise to psychological distress, and anxiety in particular, and
which may also influence the development of illness beliefs. The concepts of anxiety and
illness representations are explored in detail in the following two chapters.
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2 Chapter Two: Literature Review- Anxiety
“Anxiety kills relatively few people, but many more would welcome death as an alternative to the
paralysis and suffering resulting from anxiety in its severe forms. – Barlow 2002 p.18 (Barlow 2002)
2.1 Introduction
Changes in approach to stroke management from a fatalistic perspective with little
possibility of improvement or recovery to its recognition as a long-term condition with
rehabilitation potential, has generated interest in mental health outcomes that may occur
after stroke. Depression and emotionalism after stroke have been observed and researched
extensively (Ferro, Caeiro and Santos 2009). Anxiety disorders or clinically significant levels
of anxiety symptoms in the stroke population have received substantially less attention,
even though they are the most commonly occurring mental health problem in the general
population (Kessler et al. 2009).
This chapter will provide an overview of anxiety disorders and symptom screening,
explain why examining both is important, and describe how anxiety will be conceptualised
within the context of this thesis. Diagnostic challenges, a review of the epidemiology, risk
factors, the impact and treatment approach and options for anxiety are explored. Because
the literature on anxiety after stroke is scant, references from depression after stroke or
populations with other chronic long-term conditions are drawn on throughout. This chapter
also serves as the background for chapters four and five where systematic reviews of the
prevalence of anxiety after stroke, and interventions used to treat anxiety post-stroke are
discussed in detail.
2.2 Anxiety after stroke- overview of the disorder and symptoms
Stroke can lead to the manifestation of various psychological and emotional
disturbances (Hackett et al. 2005; House et al. 1989), however anxiety post-stroke has
received comparatively less attention than more prominent psychological conditions such as
depression.
Anxiety is a universally experienced emotion which exists on a continuum from
normal to pathological. There is no universally agreed upon definition for this state but a
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commonly accepted account describes anxiety as a diffuse state “ characterised by
unpleasant affective experiences marked by a significant degree of apprehension about the
potential appearance of future aversive or harmful events” (DiTomasso and Gosch 2002
p.12) . Fear is a prominent feature of anxiety, and the two terms are often used
interchangeably in the common vernacular. However from a phenomenological perspective
fear is deemed to have a clear object and is usually elicited by an imminent threat. In the
case of stroke survivors, this has been shown to manifest itself in several ways such as fear
of falling (Watanabe 2005), stroke recurrence (Townend et al. 2006), or returning to work
(Gilworth, Phil and Cert 2009). Anxiety on the other hand tends to be more generalised, is
not necessarily linked to a specific cue, and represents the expectation of negative events or
outcomes at some time in the future (Feinstein 2010), which goes beyond a simple fear of a
situation or object.
Anxiety disorders are a collection of mental disorders characterised by a
combination of key features that include excessive fear, worry, avoidance, or compulsive
rituals, and are associated with impaired functioning or significant distress (Canadian
Psychiatric Association 2006). Certain criteria can help identify when anxiety becomes a
problem and warrants a diagnosis as a disorder (Table 2-1). While helpful, these criteria are
based primarily on identifying anxiety in otherwise healthy individuals. Specific challenges
associated with assessing anxiety after stroke will be discussed in section 2.3.
Table 2-1 Criteria to determine when anxiety becomes a disorder
Anxiety becomes a problem, and a disorder should be considered when:
 It is of greater intensity and (or) duration than usually expected, given the circumstances of
its onset (consider context of family, societal, and cultural behaviour and expectations)
 It leads to impairment or disability in occupational, social, or interpersonal functioning
 Daily activities are disrupted by the avoidance of certain situations or objects in an attempt
to diminish the anxiety
 It includes clinically significant, unexplained physical symptoms and (or) obsessions,
compulsions, and intrusive recollections or memories of trauma
Taken from the Canadian Anxiety Management Clinical Practice Guidelines(Canadian Psychiatric Association
2006)
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A broad spectrum of syndromes is included under the anxiety disorder umbrella.
Manifested symptoms may be physical (e.g. heart palpitations, shortness of breath),
cognitive (e.g. feeling of losing control), or behavioural (e.g. avoidance of certain stimuli)
(Gelder, Harrison and Cowen 2006). The publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association 1994) saw the
acceptance of 12 distinct anxiety disorders in the formal nomenclature. They are: Panic
(with or without agoraphobia), Agoraphobia without history of panic disorder, Generalised
anxiety disorder (GAD), Social phobia, Specific phobia, Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD),
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), Acute stress disorder, Anxiety disorder due to a
general medical condition, substance-induced anxiety disorder, and Anxiety disorder not
otherwise specified. A thirteenth category, mixed anxiety-depressive disorder, was
considered for inclusion in the DSM-IV but currently resides in the appendix of disorders in
need of further study as possible additions to the DSM-V, which is expected to be released
in May 2013.
The key features of the major types of anxiety disorders are outlined in Table 2-2.
Given the heterogeneity of anxiety as a topic, the aim of this section was to provide an
overview of a working definition of anxiety and an overview of anxiety disorders in general.
However, within stroke, generalised anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder to
a limited extent, have garnered the most attention. Issues associated with diagnosis and
patterns of illness relevant to stroke are discussed in the following section.
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Table 2-2 Key features of specific anxiety disorders
Disorder Key Features
Panic disorder
(with or without
agoraphobia
- Recurrent unexpected panic attacks without any obvious situational
trigger
- Active avoidance of situations in which panic attacks are predicted to
occur
- Manifestation of physical symptoms of anxiety (e.g. sweating,
palpitations, trembling, chest pain, nausea, dizziness)
Generalised Anxiety
Disorder (GAD)
- Uncontrollable and excessive worry occurring more days than not,
about a number of everyday, ordinary experiences or activities.
Often accompanied by physical symptoms (e.g. headache or stomach
ache)
- Intolerance of uncertainty
Social phobia - Excessive or unrealistic fear of social or performance situations
- Intolerance of embarrassment or scrutiny by others
Specific phobia - Excessive or unreasonable fear of a circumscribed object or situation,
usually associated with avoidance of the feared object (e.g. driving,
walking)
Obsessive
compulsive disorder
(OCD)
- Presence of obsessions; recurrent, unwanted and intrusive thoughts,
images or urges that cause marked anxiety (e.g. doubts about
actions, contamination, thoughts of injury)
- Compulsions; repetitive behaviours or mental acts that are
performed to reduce the anxiety generated by the obsessions (e.g.
checking, washing or repeating)
Post-traumatic
stress disorder
(PTSD)
- Occurs after a traumatic event to which an individual responds with
intense fear, helplessness, or horror; patients relive the event in
memory, avoid reminders of the event, and experience emotional
numbing and symptoms of increased arousal
- Re-experiencing of trauma
Adapted from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR)(American Psychiatric
Association 2000)
2.3 Assessment of anxiety after stroke- Diagnosis and screening
Assessing anxiety in the stroke population, and indeed among many individuals with
long-term conditions is challenging. First, it is important to highlight the difference between
diagnosing anxiety and anxiety symptom screening. Diagnostic approaches rely upon
professional evaluation typically by structured or semi-structured interviews using
diagnostic criteria such as the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
16
4th edition (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association 2000) or the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10)(World Health Organization 1999). Several clinician-
administered clinical interview instruments can be used to diagnose anxiety disorders.
These include, the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) (First et
al. 2002), and the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule (ADIS-IV) (Di Nardo, Brown and
Barlow 1994). Formal clinical diagnosis has implications in terms of management and
treatment of an anxiety disorder. However, as will be discussed, the diagnostic criteria for
anxiety amongst those with stroke can be complicated by a variety of factors including the
somatic symptoms of stroke, age, and co-morbidity with other illnesses.
The diagnosis of anxiety disorders requires specialist mental health training that is
labour intensive, time consuming, and access to such expertise may not always be readily
available for stroke survivors. As a result, screening for anxiety symptom burden or the
probability of an anxiety disorder by use of a rating scale, is routinely carried out as an
alternative form of assessment in both clinical practice and research rather than in-depth
diagnostic clinical interviewing. Screening is used to identify anxiety “caseness” and is
usually a quicker way of assessing emotional state than an in-depth diagnostic interview.
Even though screening lacks diagnostic capability, the level of anxiety symptom burden in
individuals not deemed to have a disorder but identified with significant symptoms burden,
has been found to be associated with similar levels of anxiety and worry to individuals
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (Diefenbach et al. 2003). It should be noted that
regardless of whether anxiety screening (case finding) or anxiety diagnosis (case
determination) is carried out, the term anxiety is used interchangeably for both, even
though they are fundamentally referring to different concepts.
Current national clinical guidelines for stroke in the UK propose that all patients in
the rehabilitation phase of stroke should be screened for anxiety by either asking the
patient about their concerns, or by inquiring with a family member (Royal College of
Physicians 2008). However this is more ambiguous than the guidelines suggested for post-
stroke depression screening, whereby a screening protocol stratified by patient
characteristics has been developed specifying appropriate depression scales for use (Stroke
Improvement programme 2011b). It would not be possible to provide an exhaustive review
of all available anxiety screening scales, however three have been validated within the
17
stroke population and are described below. A summary of findings from these validation
studies can be found in Table 2-3.
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond and Snaith 1983) is the
most extensively used rating scale for screening anxiety symptoms in stroke survivors found
in the published literature (Campbell Burton et al. 2012). This 14 item self-report scale only
asks about psychological symptoms such as worry, restlessness, and feelings of panic
associated with anxiety. This was an attempt to avoid confounding with somatic symptoms
often present in those with long-term conditions and those of anxiety. The HADS can also
distinguish between anxiety and depression and is not just a general measure of psychiatric
distress. Overall, anxiety subscale scores range from 0 to 21, with authors recommending a
score of 8-10 as indicative of possible anxiety, and ≥11 of probable anxiety.  It has been 
suggested that using lower threshold cut-off score may be more appropriate when
screening for anxiety in stroke patients (Bjelland et al. 2002), as this would lead to increased
sensitivity in identifying individuals with substantial anxiety burden. However the focus on
the sensitivity and specificity of scales also needs to take into account the issue of anxiety
prevalence in the population. If prevalence is low, the positive predictive value of the rating
scale decreases (Table 2-3), and while treatment would not be initiated solely based on the
results of on a screening scale, rating scales are frequently used in research as a means of
estimating prevalence. The HADS is discussed in further detail in chapter six.
The General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-28)(Goldberg and Hillier 1979), and the
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck et al. 1988) are two other scales whose validity within
the stroke population has been assessed, although to a lesser extent. The General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ) is a self-administered screening questionnaire aimed at detecting
diagnosable psychiatric disorder. It focuses on an individual’s inability to carry out normal
‘healthy’ functions, the appearance of new distressing phenomena, and the relationship
between psychological illness and health. The GHQ-28 screens explicitly for four factors of
psychological mood disorder of which one is anxiety. A score >5 on the GHQ-28 is indicative
of anxiety “caseness”. A large Australian study was carried out in a population based
cohort study of all stroke cases who were four months post-stroke to validate the GHQ-28
against the DSM-III (Johnson et al. 1995) (Table 2-3). It found that a cut-off score of 4/5 had
the best trade-off of sensitivity and specificity when screening for anxiety. However they
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also noted that the sensitivity of the GHQ-28 was reduced if the prevalence of anxiety was
low.
The BAI is a 21 item self report scale designed to measure the severity of anxiety-
related psychic and physiological symptoms. Overall scores can range from 0-63, with a cut-
off score of 8/9 indicative of mild anxiety, 16/17 moderate anxiety, and 26/27 severe
anxiety. Attempts to validate its use in the stroke population have been carried out in only
one small study with 44 individuals (Schramke et al. 1998), and it was against the DSM-III-R.
The authors who used a cut-off score of 16 reported that the BAI was sensitive in identifying
anxiety disorder but lacked specificity. As a result of the small sample size and low
prevalence of anxiety disorders (6%), findings of this study are difficult to interpret.
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Table 2-3 Summary of screening performance of anxiety rating scales validated in stroke populations for identification of current anxiety
disorder
Author, Location Diagnostic system/
screening
instrument rating
scale validated
against
N Time
post-
stroke
Anxiety Prevalence* Rating
Scale
(range)
Cut-off
Value
Sensitivity
(%)
Specificity
(%)
Positive
Predictive
Value (%)
Negative
Predictive
Value (%)
(Johnson et al.
1995),
Australia
DSM-III
Non hierarchical
approach
(PAS)
66 4
months
All anxiety:19%
Agoraphobia- 18%
GAD- 5%
GHQ-28
(0-7)
3/4
4/5
5/6
79
71
50
46
56
62
28
30
26
39
88
82
93 4
months
All Anxiety:23%
Agoraphobia-19%
GAD-8%
HADS-A
(0-21)
4/5
5/6
6/7
95
80
57
38
46
56
31
31
28
96
89
82
(O'Rourke et al.
1998),
UK
DSM-IV (SADS) 105 6
months
All Anxiety: 12%
Adjustment- 2%
Agoraphobia- 7%
GAD- 2%
Specific phobia- 1%
HADS-A
(0-21)
6/7
8/9
10/11
83
50
42
68
87
92
26
34
42
97
93
92
(Sagen et al.
2009),
Norway
DSM-IV (SCID) 101 4
months
All Anxiety: 23%
GAD- 6%
OCD- 2%
NOS-1%
Panic (with agoraphobia)- 8%
Panic (without agoraphobia)-
3%
PTSD- 3%
Social phobia- 3%
Specific phobia- 9%
HADS-A
(0-21)
≥3 
≥4 
≥5 
≥7 
≥8 
≥9 
≥10 
≥11 
≥12 
96
83
78
70
52
39
35
35
26
55
65
72
83
90
95
96
99
99
39
41
44
55
60
69
73
89
86
98
93
92
90
86
84
83
84
82
(Bennett et al.
2006), UK
HADS-A ≥8 79 ~1 
month
Anxiety caseness: 22% VAMS
(0-800)
255/256 0.71 0.66 40 90
DSM-Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd & 4th edition), GHQ-28- General Health Questionnaire-28, HADS-A Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale,
Anxiety Subscale, PAS- Psychiatric Assessment Schedule, SADS- Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia, SCID- Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV GAD-
Generalised anxiety disorder, OCD- Obsessive compulsive disorder, PTSD- Post-traumatic stress disorder
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The Geriatric Anxiety Inventory (GAI) (Pachana et al. 2007) is a newer 20-item self-
report or clinician-administered scale that measures dimensional anxiety in elderly people.
It consists of 20 “Agree/Disagree” items designed to assess typical common anxiety
symptoms. The measurements of somatic symptoms with the instrument are limited, in
order to minimize confusion between symptoms common to anxiety and general medical
conditions. Research about the appropriateness of the GAI in stroke patients age 65 years
and older receiving inpatient rehabilitation is currently underway. It is expected that this
study will be completed in September 2013 (Stroke Association Current Research Projects
and Programme Grants, June 2011).
The Wimbledon Self Report Scale (Coughlan and Storey 1988) is another scale which
could have potential in identifying possible cases of anxiety. The Wimbledon scale consists
of 30 items designed to measure general mood disturbance in people with neurological or
major physical illness. It was designed to identify patient feelings and avoids enquiry about
somatic symptoms, memory and concentration problems and ability to participate in or
enjoy former activities. It also seeks to provide clinicians with knowledge of which adverse
feelings a patient is experiencing, which is useful to know regardless of whether or not these
feelings comprise a clinical level of psychological disturbance. Its sensitivity and specificity
for identifying possible cases of anxiety after stroke has not been evaluated, however it has
been found to be sensitive in screening for major and minor depression, when validated
against a structured clinical interview (Lincoln et al. 2012). However the sample consisted of
only eight stroke patients and the confidence intervals were wide so findings should be
interpreted with caution
All the aforementioned scales can be used in individuals without communication
problems, however many stroke survivors suffer from aphasia, or other language deficits. It
is worth noting that currently the visual analogue mood scale (VAMS) (Stern et al. 1997) is
the only scale whereby validation has been attempted amongst stroke survivors with
communication problems. The VAMS was validated against the HADS-A that used a cut-off
of ≥8 to assess anxiety ‘caseness’ (Bennett et al. 2006) (Table 2-3). While this appears to be
a promising tool for use in this subgroup of stroke survivors, further evaluation of cut-off
scores and assessment against a clinical diagnostic criterion are needed.
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Assessing anxiety in stroke patients is important because it identifies individuals with
potential problems and allows for an understanding of the nature of the psychological
condition in order to plan treatment and monitory changes over time (Lincoln et al. 2012).
The overall findings suggest that the standard cut-offs of the validated scales may not be
appropriate when screening for anxiety after stroke. Sensitivity of both the HADS-A and the
GHQ-28 were higher when lower threshold scores of the respective scales were used. The
disadvantage however, is that there was a substantial trade-off in specificity and the
positive predictive value of the scales when using the lower cut-off scores were not always
much higher than the probability of having anxiety in the populations examined. If the aim
is to identify as many individuals as possible who may be at risk for a serious anxiety
condition then using a lower threshold score on the validated anxiety screening scales is
appropriate. However, this approach may be inefficient where access to psychological
services are scarce, which is often the case for stroke survivors (National Audit Office 2010).
In summary, no clear trend has emerged from the existing studies suggesting further
evaluation is needed for guidance in terms of assessing anxiety after stroke when using
methods other than diagnostic interview.
2.3.1 Issues with diagnosis and screening for anxiety
Diagnosing or screening for anxiety after stroke are not straightforward processes.
One of the major issues concerning both approaches is criterion contamination, which
refers to the overlap between the physical (and emotional) symptoms of co-morbid disease.
This overlap makes it difficult to determine which symptoms should be attributed to which
condition of interest (Jeste, Blazer and First 2005). For example insomnia, poor
concentration, and low energy may be observed after stroke. The cause of such symptoms
could be attributed to either stroke, anxiety or both. This limitation further highlights the
need for in-depth diagnostic inquiry should an individual screen positive for anxiety
“caseness”.
Another challenge with establishing anxiety in stroke survivors or individuals with
long-term conditions, is that symptom presentation may differ in these groups compared
with its presentation in the general population. While evidence is not available about the
manner in which stroke patients present when experiencing anxiety specifically, a focus
22
group discussion conducted with General Practitioners (GPs) found that general outpatients,
some of whom had serious medical conditions, tended to emphasise the physical as
opposed to psychological symptoms of their (van Rijswijk et al. 2009). Also factors such as
patients age (e.g. being older), having limited verbal ability, using different language to
describe symptoms (e.g. “concerns” rather than “worry”), and difficulty remembering or
identifying symptoms increased the difficulty in recognising an anxiety disorder or
symptoms burden (van Rijswijk et al. 2009). While stroke survivors share many of these
characteristics and it is plausible that similar patterns occur in this group, several limitations
in the study design need to be taken into account. To start this was an explorative study
with only 23 Dutch GPs, many of whom expressed strong reservations about the validity and
usefulness of the DSM-IV concepts of anxiety and depressive disorders. Whether these
views are generalizable to clinicians charged with caring for stroke survivors in other
settings is unknown.
Another issue that could occur when screening for anxiety is deciding how to
distinguish between an emerging disorder and non-pathological anxious avoidance. For
example, a review of studies examining anxiety disorders in older adults concluded that
both patient and clinicians misattribute fear and anxiety symptoms to the normal process
of aging (Wolitzky-Taylor et al. 2010). While no studies have been carried out in stroke
patients on this topic, a possible example of such a misattribution would be a new-onset of
agoraphobic disorder being less obvious, and as a result undiagnosed, in a stroke survivor
who was not mobile and left their house less frequently. Similarly social phobia could be
attributed to diminished physical abilities, such as muscle weakness or vision problems that
could make a stroke survivor understandably reluctant to interact with others. Furthermore,
primary care is where many individuals present with mental health problems. However,
practitioners in these settings have expressed deficiency in their knowledge of specific
anxiety disorders, and reported difficulties accessing specialist mental health services (van
Rijswijk et al. 2009) (Wolitzky-Taylor et al. 2010).
Discriminant validity is also an issue when trying to assess the presence of mental
health disorders. The DSM uses a categorical classification system that divides mental
disorders into types based on criteria sets with defining features. The same approach is also
used when applying screening scales, in that an individual may be deemed “anxious” if they
23
score above a given threshold. This method of organising and classifying information into
unique categories is similar to the fundamental approach used in all systems of medicine.
The categorical approach to classification attempts to present all members in a diagnostic
class as homogenous. However homogeneity of presentation within anxious patients is
likely to be an exception rather than the norm, with individuals who share a diagnosis
having dissimilar defining features of the disorder. Advantages of categorical systems are
that they facilitate treatment decisions for clinicians by providing clear guidance for
determining when to intervene with an intervention (Kessler 2002). They aid researchers in
quantifying the phenomenon of interest, which is important for needs assessment research
or establishing the extent of a problem. The categorical approach also provides information
about lifetime occurrence and makes it possible to ask about discrete syndromes and obtain
information about onset and chronicity. The drawbacks of a categorical system however,
include measurement error arising from uncertainties about the threshold definitions, such
as whether the features of a given disorder are sufficient in number, duration or severity to
warrant a DSM diagnosis (Brown et al. 2001b). There is also loss of important information
regarding the severity and associated features of disorders (Kessler 2002), which can lead to
a high prevalence of individuals being assigned to the “not otherwise specified” category, or
diagnostic unreliability (Brown et al. 2001a).
A dimensional system of organisation for determining anxiety distress has been
suggested (Brown and Barlow 2005; Brown and Barlow 2009). Dimensional systems classify
clinical presentations based on quantification of attributes rather than assigning them to
categories and are useful for describing phenomena, such as anxiety, which are distributed
continuously and do not have clear boundaries. While dimensional systems increase
reliability and communicate more clinical information because they report clinical attributes
that might be sub-threshold in a categorical system, they also have many limitations
(American Psychiatric Association 2000). Dimensional descriptions are less clear-cut and are
more difficult to understand. There are currently no agreed criteria for implementing a
dimensional approach for the DSM, however research continues and there may be a greater
adoption of dimensional approaches with future versions of the DSM. The same issue
applies when using anxiety screening scales. To start, epidemiological studies would need
to be conducted to determine normative scores in the stroke population, and then the
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clinical significance of the scores would need to be established. Whether it is making a
clinical diagnosis of an anxiety disorder, or using a rating scale to determine anxiety
caseness, there is a substantial reliance on clinical judgement.
The final limitation that will be discussed in this section is a practical concern,
especially in the case of screening. Staff require training and support, and the multi-
professional nature and fast pace of stroke care may result in lack of clarity as to who is
responsible for completing screening (Morris et al. 2012). Despite guidelines advocating
that all patients be screened for anxiety, national audit data reveal that this does not occur
for over a third of stroke patients, and that psychological support services were rated as the
least satisfactory aspect of long-term care after stroke (National Audit Office 2010). Several
individual factors (e.g. knowledge of anxiety and the assessment process, knowledge about
patients, awareness of guidelines, and beliefs about effectiveness of the screening tool) and
organisational factors (e.g. support for colleagues, integration of screening assessment into
the job role, and provision of time) have been shown to affect the ability to accurately
screen for mental health problems after stroke (McGinnes 2009). An intervention study,
designed to improve rates of screening for anxiety and depression, concluded that major
improvements would require systematic protocols, and need to account for complex
environmental factors in order to be successful (Morris et al. 2012).
2.4 Anxiety after stroke and co-morbidity with other mental health
conditions
It is well established that anxiety and depression are strongly co-related.
Epidemiological research has shown that co-morbidity is the norm rather than the exception,
with co-morbidity rates ranging from 25% to 70% (Cairney et al. 2008; Moffitt et al. 2007).
There is still much debate as to whether frequent co-morbidity is a result of co-occurrence
of two commonly occurring illnesses or reflects one of them being either an
epiphenomenon or a complication of the other. For example, some have suggested that
GAD would be better conceptualised as a prodrome, residual or severity marker of a major
depressive episode as opposed to an independent disorder (Noyes et al. 1992; Clayton et al.
1991). In contrast other studies have found support for the separation of anxiety and
depressive states (Prusoff and Klerman 1974; Brown, Chorpita and Barlow 1998).
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The high level of co-morbidity of anxiety and depression, and possibility of
uncertainty of the strict categorical classification of anxiety and depression, has led some to
argue for the inclusion of a “mixed anxiety-depressive” category as a distinct diagnostic
category in future versions of the DSM. The belief is that it could have more heuristic and
clinical utility. While this may be the case, there would be some drawbacks to this new
category. For example some have argued that a mixed category could overlap too much
with other anxiety disorders, or that it could become a “wastebasket” category and
subsequently discourage more careful diagnosis of anxiety problems (Liebowitz 1993).
The topic of mixed-anxiety and depression will undoubtedly have relevance in the
stroke population. It is estimated that one-third of stroke patients have depression at some
time after stroke (Hackett et al. 2005). Perhaps due to the hierarchical diagnostic principles
that were in place until the introduction of the DSM-III-R that precluded the diagnosis of
anxiety in the presence of a mood disorder, the association between anxiety and depression
in stroke has been given little consideration. Even under the current DSM-IV, individuals
who experience generalised anxiety disorder during the course of a mood disorder are not
diagnosed with anxiety, indicating lingering remnants of the hierarchical approach to
diagnosis. Co-morbidity is of significance as it has been found to decrease social function,
and increase somatic symptom severity of both anxiety and depression, increase the risk of
suicidality relative to either condition occurring in isolation, and impede treatment
responsiveness to therapy (Lenze et al. 2000; Wolitzky-Taylor et al. 2010).
Also of interest is the chronology of anxiety and depression within stroke survivors.
Longitudinal studies in non-clinical younger and older adult samples suggest that anxiety
disorders often precede depressive disorders (Michael, Zetsche and Margraf 2007).
Additionally, anxiety tends to be chronic without spontaneous remission, whereas
depression has been found to be episodic and in some instances recurrent (Lenze et al.
2005). This was confirmed in a review of depression after stroke that found that depression
resolved spontaneously within several months in the majority of stroke survivors (Hackett et
al. 2005). Findings about anxiety after stroke are discussed further in chapter four.
How anxiety and depression are classified and researched in both the general
population and within stroke will remain a topic of debate and discussion for some time to
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come. At the time of writing this thesis, no conclusion had been reached on the topic of
formally recognising a mixed anxiety-depression category.1
2.5 How anxiety will be conceptualised in this thesis
The concept of anxiety disorders and their symptomatology is multifaceted. The
complexities include the large number of different anxiety disorders, widespread
comorbidity, a partial lack of symptom specificity from disorder to disorder, and the
influence other external factors may have on its manifestation. However, despite the
limitations of the DSM, its definition of anxiety disorder will be used. Additionally anxiety
symptoms or “caseness”, as defined by a rating scale, will be deemed to be of equal
significance.
2.6 Aetiology of anxiety after stroke
Little research has been carried out into investigating the aetiology of anxiety after
stroke. However, biological and psychological theories have been used in the context of
determining causes of mood disorders post-stroke. Their applicability to anxiety are
discussed below.
2.6.1 Lesion location hypothesis
The biomedical model approach of conceptualising disease, focuses on the
pathology, biochemistry, and physiology of a condition, and does not take into account
individual and social factors that may be relevant when dealing with long-term conditions
(Barondess 1979). In line with this approach is the lesion location hypothesis, which has
been applied in a very limited capacity in the investigation of anxiety after stroke. The
lesion location hypothesis proposes that post- stroke mental health problems are caused by
focal damage to specific areas in the brain. Investigation of this hypothesis for anxiety after
stroke has produced mixed findings. Some studies have indicated that anxiety is associated
with left hemisphere lesions, even after taking into account other factors such as age,
gender, cognitive processing ability, and distance of the lesion from the anterior pole of
1. April 30, 2012 update on the American Psychiatry Association website states that mixed anxiety and
depression will be allocated to section III in the DSM-V, which are conditions that require further research,
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=407#
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either brain hemisphere (Barker-Collo 2007a; Sharpe et al. 1990). Other studies have
looked at anxiety and co-morbidity with depression and reported that anxiety alone is
associated with right hemisphere lesions, but is associated with left hemisphere lesions
when co-morbid with depression (Astrom 1996; Robinson 2006). A study carried out in 277
stroke patients reported that lesions in the anterior circulation region were more likely to
have GAD relative to those without lesions in that area (Leppavuori et al. 2003). However,
this study did not indicate the hemisphere where the lesions were located. Another large
study in 185 stroke inpatients reported that amongst those with left hemisphere lesions,
individuals with GAD alone had significantly fewer cortical lesions than those with co-morbid
GAD and depression (Robinson 2006). On the other hand, amongst patients with right
hemisphere lesions, those with GAD alone had significantly higher frequency of posterior
lesions as compared to patients with neither anxiety nor depression. The studies suggest an
interaction between the existence of GAD and depression, with co-morbidity being
associated with left hemisphere lesions and anxiety alone associated with right posterior
lesions (Table 2-4).
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Table 2-4 Summary of studies proposing lesion location associated with anxiety after
stroke
Study & Location N Region associated with anxiety
(Barker-Collo
2007a),
New Zealand
73 Left hemisphere lesions associated with higher levels of anxiety symptoms on
the Beck Anxiety Inventory
(Sharpe et al. 1990)
UK
55 Left hemisphere lesion volume significantly associated with anxiety symptoms
on the HADS-A
(Robinson 2006),
USA
185 GAD alone associated with right hemisphere posterior lesions
Co-morbid GAD and Major depression associated left hemisphere lesions
(Astrom 1996),
Sweden
71 GAD alone significantly associated with right hemisphere lesion
Co-morbid GAD and Major depression associated with left hemisphere lesion
*Associations no longer significant after three months post-stroke
(Leppavuori et al.
2003),
Finland
277 Anterior circulation region associated with GAD, hemisphere not indicated
The lesion location hypothesis has been tested more extensively in the assessment
of depression after stroke. A systematic review that included 48 studies, of which 35 were
included in a meta-analysis, concluded there was no support for the hypothesis that the risk
of depression after stroke was associated with the location of the brain lesion even when
taking into account time since stroke (Carson et al. 2000). Currently there is also no support
for the lesion location hypothesis for anxiety after stroke.
2.6.2 Psychological models
The limitations of the lesion location hypothesis and the fact that post-stroke mental
health problems are associated with a range of psycho-social factors, has lead some
researchers to theorise about psychological aetiologies of not only depression after stroke
but also anxiety. One hypothesis proposed that anxiety after stroke could be caused by
projected hostility with resulting fear of abandonment, fear of a medical emergency, need
for attention and control over others or feeling of helplessness (Binder 1984).
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A systematic review on self-efficacy, which is “the beliefs people have about their
capabilities to produce a designated level of performance that exercise influence over events
that affect their lives” (Bandura 1994), concluded that self-efficacy was inversely associated
with depression, neuroticism, and coping post-stroke (Jones and Riazi 2011).
Cognitive theory (Beck 1985), has also been explored as a means of understanding
mental health distress after stroke (Nicholl et al. 2002; Lincoln and Flannaghan 2003), and
forms the foundation of cognitive-behaviour therapy which is discussed in section 2.11.2.
The cognitive model of emotional disorders proposes that three levels of cognition are
responsible for the aetiology and persistence of anxiety and depression (Clark and Beck
2010). At the core are “schemas” which are used to identify, interpret, categorise and
evaluate an experience (i.e. a health threat). Attitudes and beliefs form the content of these
schema and they may have pre-existed prior to the onset of the threat or developed there
after. Once activated from incoming stimuli (i.e. an illness), schema can give rise to “biased
information processing” which results in increased attention to cues seen as threatening or
dangerous and feelings of helplessness. This selective information processing can lead to
increased levels of dysfunctional anxiety. The dominance of this negativity bias ultimately
results in “negative automatic thoughts” images and memories that perpetuate a
subjectively adverse emotional state.
The common-sense self regulatory model (CSM) (Leventhal, Nerenz and Steel 1984)
has been used extensively across a range of disease groups to identify the nature and
content of illness schema, with the view that insight into these schema may assist in
developing interventions that minimise emotional distress during chronic illness. A
description of the CSM and its use in stroke receives further attention in chapter three.
2.7 Prevalence of anxiety disorders and symptoms after stroke
Globally anxiety disorders are the most commonly observed type of mental health
condition with 12-month prevalence estimates ranging between 3% and 19%(Kessler et al.
2009; Somers, Goldner and Waraich 2006; Wittchen and Jacobi 2005). However many of
these studies excluded older adults over the age of 65 years, used different operational
definitions of anxiety, or excluded certain types of anxiety disorders such as PTSD, making
these findings non-generalisable to the stroke population. Furthermore, early theories
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contended that older adults generally had more advanced coping strategies and were less
likely to suffer from anxiety disorders (Regier et al. 1988; Flint 1994). Initial studies into the
prevalence of psychological problems post-stroke seemed to support this assumption,
finding that the prevalence of anxiety after stroke was between 1% and 5% (House et al.
1991; Morris, Robinson and Raphael 1990). This was in sharp contrast to later studies that
found post-stroke anxiety prevalence rates as high as 20% or 30% (Astrom 1996; Leppavuori
et al. 2003). The large range in prevalence estimates supported the need for a systematic
review to establish a reliable quantitative estimate of this phenomenon in stroke survivors.
Such work was subsequently carried out as part of this thesis and is discussed in detail in
chapter four.
2.8 Risk factors for anxiety after stroke
In the general adult population there are numerous factors that have been found to
increase the risk of having anxiety (Table 2-5) (Vink, Aartsen and Schoevers 2008; Michael,
Zetsche and Margraf 2007). These include, but are not limited to, being female, younger
age, and having limitations in activities of daily living. However much of the research upon
which these findings are based has excluded older adults who have a greater chance of
having a significant co-morbid physical illness such as stroke. When younger and older
individuals have been compared, there is some evidence to suggest there may be
differential risk factors for anxiety across the lifespan. For example, one study that
compared older (60 years and older) with younger individuals found that social support and
earlier traumatic event exposure were associated with anxiety for both groups. However
lower income was associated with anxiety for older adults but not younger adults, whereas
female gender was associated with anxiety in younger adults only (Vink et al. 2009).
Amongst stroke survivors a small study found that within the first month after stroke
living alone was a significant risk factor for developing GAD, however by three years post-
stroke level of independence in activities of daily living and having few social contacts
became significant predictors of GAD (Astrom 1996). Another study reported that denial of
stroke in the acute phase was associated with the development of anxiety at three month
follow-up (Ghika-Schmid et al. 1999). These results should be interpreted with caution as
the sample size for both studies was small and they had substantial loss-to follow-up. As
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such, they could be biased and non-generalisable. Others have proposed that psychological
reactions to stroke are in large measure determined by an individual’s pre-morbid thought
processes, personality, and coping mechanisms (e.g. thoughts and behaviours employed by
an individual to manage stressful situations) (Folkman and Lazarus 1988). Individuals who
are predisposed to feeling distressed and who tend to be highly emotional in reaction to
stress, may be more likely to interpret or appraise their condition as overly stressful and to
feel that they lack control over it. Hence the ability to cope with a stroke per se would be
dependent on the appraisal of the event as stressful and on the capacity to utilise effective
strategies in changing one’s relationship to the situation and regard it as manageable
(Folkman and Lazarus 1988).
Table 2-5 Risk factors for anxiety in the general adult population
 Female
 Younger age
 Physical limitations in activities of daily living
 Severe chronic medical conditions
 Single/divorced/ separated
 Lower education
 Poor self perceived health
 Hypertension
 Cognitive impairment
 Dysfunctional coping
 Previous mental health problems
 Lack of social support
 Stressful life event
 External locus of control
A qualitative study found that three main themes emerged as being associated with
anxiety in stroke survivors (Lander 2009). The first was feelings of vulnerability due to
physical impairment and other people, and discrimination in the sense of being ignored or
avoided by others or being unable to access facilities. Perceptions of being dependent or
having loss of autonomy were also cited as anxiety provoking. Lastly failing to meet
expectations based on pre-stroke beliefs resulted in distress. When an individual was
unable to perform tasks they thought they should be able to, it led to them feeling
embarrassed and stupid, and some could not accept their current impaired state as being a
reflection of their true self. The stroke rehabilitation pathway itself has been found to be a
major contributor of distress (Ch'ng, French and McLean 2008). The post-stroke prognosis is
generally uncertain, and individuals may initially have a sense that they can make a full
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recovery. The vague expectations provided by healthcare professionals and the inability to
return to their pre-stroke state can be anxiety provoking.
2.9 Impact of anxiety after stroke
The assessment of anxiety after stroke is important not only because of the distress
it causes but also because it is associated with a wide range of outcomes. However its
impact has yet to be studied extensively. Limited information from one U.S. based study in
a sample of 142 stroke survivors recruited whilst in hospital found that depression after
stroke was more severe and longer lasting in those with co-morbid anxiety when assessed at
three month to two year follow-up post stroke (Shimoda and Robinson 1998). Additionally
this study also found that stroke patients with co-morbid anxiety and depression had higher
levels of impairment in activities of daily living, more cognitive impairment and fewer social
ties than those with depression alone (Shimoda and Robinson 1998). Findings from this
study should be interpreted with caution as it excluded individuals with severe
comprehension deficits and the study sample consisted primarily of individuals from a low
socioeconomic background. Additionally, the associations between anxiety and depression
which were described were only carried out for individuals who at study onset were found
to have anxiety. As this was only a small group of individuals follow-up analyses were likely
underpowered to identify other possible negative consequences of anxiety after stroke.
To date, no studies have assessed the economic cost associated with anxiety after
stroke. However, in the general population it is known that individuals with anxiety are
often high consumers of primary care services, and can make up a large proportion of the
people who overuse primary care for only vaguely defined physical complaints (Kessler and
Greenberg 2002). The significant burden that anxiety alone imposes on individuals, their
carers, the health service, and communities globally is recognised. In 2007, the overall cost
of anxiety health services in England were estimated to be £1.2 billion, with lost
employment costs (indirect cost) due to anxiety bringing the total to £8.9 billion (McCrone
et al. 2008). The indirect costs were only calculated for individuals under 65 years of age
and did not take into account the financial cost to carers and partners, or loss of
independence that can accompany anxiety disorders. Within the next 15 years these cost
are projected to rise to £2 billion and £14.2 billion respectively.
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To date no studies have investigated the combined economic effect of anxiety after
stroke. However, one U.S. based study assessed the economic impact of anxiety and
depression in a large managed care chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
population (Dalal et al. 2011). It reported that COPD patients with co-morbid anxiety or
depression were more likely to be hospitalised (OR=1.77, p<.001) or visit an emergency
room (OR=1.60, p<.001) when compared to those with COPD only. Furthermore medical
and pharmacy costs were 30% greater (p<.001) in the co-morbid group. Disaggregated
results for anxious, depressed, and co-morbid anxious and depressed COPD patients were
not provided.
The very limited evidence suggests that anxiety may place a substantial additional
economic burden on stroke survivors and their family. This is especially relevant given that
a quarter of strokes occur in people of working age, many of whom have been found not to
return to work (Gabriele and Renate 2009). With increases in the post-stroke survival rate,
it is likely that these costs will continue to increase due to a ‘cohort effect’ of the increased
likelihood of lifetime prevalence of anxiety disorder that has been observed by using
retrospective age-of onset reports that estimated lifetime prevalence as a function of age
(WHO International Consortium in Psychiatric Epidemiology 2000). Within stroke and other
long-term conditions it is proposed that anxiety has a negative influence on quality of life
(Ahlsio et al. 1984). For example a study in cardiovascular patients found that anxiety had a
greater role on quality of life even after adjusting for disease severity and physical disability
(Giardino et al. 2010). However this was a cross-sectional study, so the directionality of the
association between quality of life and anxiety cannot be established.
2.10 Approaches to treatment and management of anxiety after stroke
There are various treatment options for anxiety disorders or sub-syndromal symptoms
available for the general population. Currently the evidence base for treating anxiety
specifically within the stroke population is limited (see Chapter 5). In the UK the Stroke
Improvement Programme has adapted the stepped care approach to treating and
managing anxiety as recommended by NICE for the management of anxiety disorders in the
general adult population, and the Department of Health’s Improving Access to Psychological
Therapies (IAPT) programmes (National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence 2011).
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The current evidence-based guidelines for anxiety after stroke deal primarily with
screening and in particular during the acute phase after stroke, although it is expected that
anxiety guidelines to be published in 2012 will be significantly expanded upon (Royal College
of Physicians 2008). Anxiety can be chronic and it is anticipated that more emphasis on
long-term stepped-care follow-up will be advocated in the 2012 the Royal College of
Physicians national clinical guidelines for stroke.
The stepped care approach is based on two core principles. The first being that the
interventions on offer should be the ‘least restrictive’ that will be effective, and the second
is that there should be self-correcting monitoring and feedback systems to ensure
individuals are stepped up to more intensive interventions if they are not obtaining
sufficient benefit from the initially offered treatment (National Institute for Health & Clinical
Excellence 2011). Specific interventions on offer will be described in the next section.
Three levels of care are identified within the National Stroke Improvement
Programme (Figure 2-1) (Stroke Improvement programme 2011b). At the first level (level 1)
it recommends all patients be assessed for mood disorder using a simple brief standardised
measure, such as the HADS. At this stage some individuals may be experiencing difficulties
coping or with their perceived consequence of stroke on their lifestyle or identity. However
these feelings are not deemed to impact their ability to engage in rehabilitation. In addition
to administering a rating scale, assessment should be followed up with an interview, as
scales may be unreliable or miss certain aspects of distress. The team providing care or
follow-up services should be sufficiently competent to provide low levels of psychological
care and information about informal support or professional help when required.
Individuals at level 2 are those with mild to moderate psychological symptoms that
interfere with the rehabilitation process. A higher intensity psychological intervention may
be offered or even pharmacological medication considered. Interventions administered at
this level could be provided by non-specialist staff with supervision by a clinical psychologist
or psychiatrist. Individuals with a diagnosed severe and persistent anxiety disorder are
considered level 3. Risk for self neglect or self-harm should also be evaluated. Those
considered level 3 require the intervention of clinical psychologist with expertise in stroke
and/or a psychiatrist.
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Systematic research of the effectiveness of the stepped care approach has been
based primarily on depression studies (National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence
2011). Evidence of the use of this model in treating anxiety disorders is novel and
somewhat limited. Where patients with anxiety have been involved in stepped care
evaluation studies, they have tended to include primarily individuals with GAD as a
secondary disorder, and in certain instances have explicitly excluded individuals with certain
types of anxiety disorders such as PTSD and OCD (Richards and Suckling 2009; Richards and
Borglin 2011; Clark et al. 2009). The pilot IAPT programme that received over 7000 patient
referrals found that 55% of individuals who attended at least two sessions (including the
assessment interview) were no longer anxious, as determined by a score below a pre-
determined threshold on either a depression or anxiety rating (Clark et al. 2009). While this
was the largest evaluation of the stepped care IAPT programme, these findings have several
limitations. This was an observational study with no control site, so it is uncertain how
many individuals would have improved through spontaneous remission of psychological
symptoms. Additionally, complete case data was unavailable for over half of the individuals
who were assessed at study onset. As a result it is unclear how many individuals would
complete the treatment and meet the criteria for recovery after therapist contact had
ended, which could lead to biased findings. It was theorised that some of the patients who
completed the programme contact in the first year could have been more likely to recover,
thereby leading to an inflated success rate (Richards and Borglin 2011). The high level of
attrittion also highlights the need to improve patient engagement once a referral has been
made. Finally, the pilot sites were highly scruitinised during their first year of operation,
hence the extent to which they functioned in a ‘business as usual’ fashion could be called
into question.
Unlike other established treatment options such as cognitive behavioural therapy
which is described in the following section, the evidence base for using the IAPT stepped
care model is limited. However, despite the limitations of the research, the general
concensus has remained that stepped care is effective (Richards and Suckling 2009; National
Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence 2011) . Once it becomes more established and
available across the UK, its effectiveness for the stroke population will need to be evaluated.
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Figure 2-1 Stepped care model for psychological interventions after stroke (Adapted from
IAPT model)(Stroke Improvement programme 2011b)
The majority of the IAPT services are available only in clinics and this may not be the
best way to meet the needs of stroke survivors. The original pilot sites for the IAPT
programme found that encouraging self-referral as opposed to GP-only referrals improved
access for underrepresented groups and individuals who had been experiencing
psychological distress for longer periods of time (Clark et al. 2009). Ideally post-hospital
psychological care would be stroke specific, provided under the guidance of a clinical
psychologist and available in the community. However, the on-going shortage of such staff
as identified in recent national audits, mean that organisations will have to provide
additional professional training for staff, so they can effectively contribute to the provision
of these services.
2.11 Overview of psychological & other therapies
Various forms of psychological therapies that could be incorporated into the stepped
care approach, are available for treating anxiety. A qualitative study exploring barriers to
antidepressant use in a cohort of older adults age 60 years and older, found that
psychological therapy was generally preferred over the use of antidepressant drugs (Givens,
Level 3: Severe and persistent
disorder of mood and/or
cognition
Level 2: Mild/Moderate
symptoms of impaired mood
and/or cognition
Level 1: Sub-threshold problems'
at a level common to many or
most people with stroke
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Datta and Ruckdeschel 2006). This preference for psychological care centred around
concerns about fear of drug dependence, prior negative experiences with antidepressants,
believing antidepressants prevented the expression of natural emotions, or resistance to
viewing their psychological symptoms as a medical illness (Givens, Datta and Ruckdeschel
2006). These findings are limited in that the study did not obtain views from younger
individuals, the participants had recently taken part in a depression treatment delivery trial
and therefore may have had substantially different views about psychological treatment and
the study demographics were such that findings may not be transferable to other locales
such as the UK. Additionally, patients may be reluctant to pursue pharmacological therapy
as they may already be taking several medications and additional drug therapy could be
contraindicated. According to the stepped care approach to treating mental health
conditions, psychological interventions can be divided into two streams: Low-intensity and
high intensity.
2.11.1 Low intensity psychological interventions
Low-intensity interventions are embedded into service provision framework as a
means of increasing access to psychological treatment for people experiencing mild to
moderate anxiety (or depressive) disorders. They are integral to the stepped-care approach
and provide many of the least restrictive treatment options for people at levels one and two.
Many of these low intensity interventions are based on the principle of cognitive
behavioural therapy which is described in the following section. While there is no agreed
definition on exactly what constitutes a low intensity intervention, there is a consensus that
they generally require less healthcare professional resources and time.
Guided self –help (a self administered book, workbook, or multimedia material with
limited support from healthcare professional or paraprofessional such as a wellbeing
practitioner for three to 10 sessions), non-facilitated self-help (a book or workbook within
minimal therapist contact), and psychoeducational groups (e.g. didactic teaching delivered
to a group, may last up to six weeks) are the low-interventions with the largest evidence
base (National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence 2011).
While guided and non-guided self-help have shown moderate effects in treating
anxiety with no apparent indication of harm, there are a few drawbacks for these
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interventions (National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence 2011). There is ambiguity
about the best method of delivering guided and non-guided self-help. Participants may
need to use written material or a computer and for stroke patients this could prove
impractical. In terms of cost, guided self-help may be the most costly option depending on
the number of sessions. Additionally, written self-help resources require a certain level of
literacy, and few have been translated into other languages. Overall the quality of evidence
in the NICE review was rated as low due to inconsistencies in the comparator groups (e.g.
some studies using wait-list controls and others using treatment as usual) and some of the
trials included individuals with mixed anxiety disorders rather than specific disorders
(National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence 2011) . The effect observed for psycho-
educational interventions is classified as small, and there is a lack of information regarding
harmful outcomes or programme discontinuation. The overall quality of the evidence was
deemed low to moderate due to one of the clinical trials that formed the evidence based
being quasi-experimental (National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence 2011).
2.11.2 High intensity psychological interventions
High intensity psychological interventions are commonly used for people with
moderate or severe anxiety, and people with these disorders generally prefer such
treatments to medication (Prins et al. 2008).
The most commonly applied and researched high intensity psychological
intervention is cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). It is based on the premise that it is
possible to adjust a person’s thoughts, beliefs, attitude and expectations (cognitions) and
manner of conducting oneself (behaviours). It is ‘present-centred’ and directs the
participant to identify the current issues that are causing them distress, with the support of
a trained psychological practitioner. Individuals talk about their specific problems in a
structured manner with their therapist and may be given homework in the form of activities
to complete before their next session. CBT is characterised as structured, goal-oriented and
time-limited (approximately 10-12 sessions) (Beck 1997). CBT for anxiety in the stroke
population has not been evaluated, however it has been for post-stroke depression with no
evidence of benefit (details provided in chapter five) (Lincoln and Flannaghan 2003). It has
been suggested hat augmenting CBT with any of the following: motivational interviewing (a
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collaborative person centred form of guiding to elicit and strengthen motivation for change)
(Miller and Rollnick 2009); grief counselling; or executive skills training could prove useful
within the stroke population as it would address some of the special needs observed in this
population (Broomfield et al. 2011). This theoretical hypothesis shown in Figure 2-2 was
made specifically regarding depression post-stroke. Given the substantial co-morbidity with
anxiety, there is reason to believe this model could be equally as useful for addressing
anxiety after stroke as, CBT has been found to be effective in treating anxiety in the general
population (National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence 2011). However this model
has not been empirically tested so further work is needed.
Figure 2-2 Illustration of augmented, individually tailored CBT for depression after stroke
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2.11.3 Other therapies
The evidence base for other anxiety-related treatments has not been established,
yet the stepped care approach takes into account patient choice and preference and other
forms of therapy can be considered. An exhaustive account of all alternate interventions
will not be provided, however a systematic review of over 34 complementary interventions
found that therapies such as exercise training, which may act as a buffer for stress or trigger
the release of monoamine neurotransmitters, and relaxation therapy, which teaches
individuals to recognise the symptoms of anxiety and respond to them with a technique that
reduces arousal, have been found effective for treating anxiety (Jorm et al. 2004).
2.12 Overview of pharmacological therapies
Patient preference is an important component of the stepped care approach.
Individual motivation or inability to engage with treatment (e.g. significant cognitive
impairment that may preclude certain cognitive behavioural strategies), poor response to
non-pharmacological therapies, or limited access to psychological resources may mean that
a pharmacological approach to treating anxiety is necessary. The following section outlines
currently available evidence-based drug therapy options.
2.12.1 Antidepressant drugs
Various antidepressants, including selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs),
serotonin norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), noradrenergic and specific
serotonergic antidepressants (NaSSAs), tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) and monoamine
oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs) have all demonstrated some degree of efficacy in the treatment
of anxiety disorders (Baldwin, Anderson and Nutt 2005).
SSRIs (e.g. sertraline, paroxetine, fluoxetine) are the most commonly administered as
they have broad spectrum anxiolytic efficacy and are generally well tolerated.(Baldwin,
Anderson and Nutt 2005) For these reasons they are generally used as the first line of
pharmacological treatment approach for anxiety. Pharmacologically, SSRIs inhibit the post-
release reuptake of serotonin by presynaptic nerve terminals, hence increasing the level of
available serotonin in the brain (Craig and Stitzel 2003). Drawbacks of SSRIs are that they
may cause increased nervousness upon initiation of treatment, insomnia, or nausea. In the
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UK NICE recommends offering the SSRI sertraline first as it is the most cost-effective
(National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence 2011).
If SSRIs prove ineffective an SNRI (e.g. venlafaxine, duloxetine) can be offered as the
next line of drug treatment. SNRIs work by inhibiting the reuptake of serotonin and
epinephrine in the brain, and indirectly increase the level of available dopamine. TCAs (e.g
imipramine) and MAOIs (e.g phenelzine) are older generations of antidepressant drugs
developed in the 1950s, and for the most part have been replaced by SSRIs. The need to
follow dietary restrictions limit the use of MAOIs, and they are generally only used when
patients have not responded to, or proved intolerant of, other drug treatment options.
Currently NaSSAs (e.g. mirtazapine) are only considered for individuals with post-traumatic
stress disorder who prefer not to engage in psychological treatment (National Institute for
Clinical Excellence 2005).
Adverse side effects may arise with the use of any intervention. A limited number of
studies have examined adverse events in the stroke population but where they have
findings have generally been positive for SSRIs. A meta-analysis of 16 placebo-controlled
studies including 1320 patients found there was some limited evidence to indicate that
SSRIs were associated with decreased risk of death, and also had a relatively low fatal
toxicity index (number of poisoning deaths per million prescriptions) (Taylor 2008).
Theoretically, the anti-platelet effect of SSRIs would be expected to decrease the risk of
thrombo-embolic stroke but could increase the risk of haemorrhagic stroke. Other side
effects observed with the use of SSRIs are gastrointestinal and sleep disturbance (Baldwin,
Anderson and Nutt 2005). TCAs have been found to be associated with higher risk of
cardiovascular adverse events and also been found to be cardiotoxic in overdose (Taylor
2008).
In the general population, SNRIs when compared with placebo are associated with a
small increase in diastolic blood pressure, tachycardia, cholesterol, and toxicity compared
(Baldwin, Anderson and Nutt 2005; Taylor 2008), hence making them an unlikely candidate
for use in stroke survivors. Additionally risk of withdrawal upon discontinuation is greater
relative to SSRIs (Baldwin, Anderson and Nutt 2005).
42
2.12.2 Anxiolytics
Anxiolytics, including benzodiazepines and buspirone have been extensively studied
and found to be effective for treating various anxiety disorders. These drugs enhance the
effect of the gamma aminobutyric acid (GABA) neurotransmitter which serves to reduce the
somatic symptoms associated with anxiety such as muscle tension and insomnia. However
the role of these agents as monotherapy is controversial (Canadian Psychiatric Association
2006). Benzodiazepines may be useful for acute anxiety or agitation to help patients in
times of acute crises or while waiting for the onset of adequate efficacy of SSRIs, yet there
are concerns about possible dependency, sedation, cognitive impairment and other side
effects. Caution is advised when using these drugs in elderly patients as they may
experience more falls due to psychomotor impairment, or in individuals with a history of
substance abuse (Canadian Psychiatric Association 2006).
Buspirone is generally well tolerated. The side effects reported due to its use tend to
be mild and may include dizziness, light-headedness, headache, nausea, sweating and
nervousness (Canadian Psychiatric Association 2006).
2.12.3 Other drugs
A range of other drugs, including antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, mood stabilisers
and hypnotics, may also be used for treating anxiety. Their side-effect burden and the
currently limited evidence base for their use means they only have a small role in overall
patient management and would generally be restricted for use in patients who have not
responded to or proved intolerant of treatments with a more substantial evidence base (e.g.
antidepressants).
2.13 Summary
This chapter has provided a review of anxiety and its relevance to stroke, along with
the challenges encountered when assessing anxiety in individuals with a chronic illness. It
lays the foundation for understanding how these issues may influence the assessment of
anxiety prevalence which is discussed in detail in chapter four. The evidence base for
treating anxiety after stroke is examined in chapter five in a systematic review of
intervention studies. Although research into anxiety after stroke is in its infancy, it is
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sufficient to assume that there is a significant influence on outcome post-stroke. The
following chapter outlines the common sense model of illness representations and explains
its relevance to anxiety after stroke.
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3 Chapter Three: Literature Review: Illness Representations
“After a health threat, a personal and unique representation of illness is formed”
(Cherrington et al. 2004)
3.1 Introduction
The concept of illness refers to the experience of discomfort and suffering (Barondess
1979). Illness differs from disease, in that it is a subjective experience, and is influenced by
a host of internal and external factors, such as personal circumstances, personality, stress,
culture, and concepts held by the individual about the nature of their disease. Hence unlike
disease, which refers to the pathological condition within the body, illness represents a true
interaction between the physical and psychological (Bishop 1994). Chapter two introduced
the concept of illness schema. The onset of illness can serve as a stressor that activates the
emotional vulnerability, defined as schema in cognitive theory (Beck 1985). How an illness
(the stressor) is interpreted is important, because according to the principles of cognitive
theory, the matching of the input stimuli, with underlying illness schema, could lead to
anxiety. Consequently, individuals with the same biological condition, may have large
disparities in their experience of illness because they have different underlying illness
schema. With this in mind, the interpretation of an illness event may serve as a key
determinant in the manifestation of anxiety after stroke.
It has been proposed that the self-regulatory process is one of the best frameworks
through which the interpretation, beliefs, adaptation, and behaviours associated with an
illness can be understood (Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal 2003). Various models of self-
regulation have been developed (Croyle and Ditto 1990; Skelton and Croyle 1991). However,
the Common-Sense Model of illness representation (CSM) has been the most influential and
widely accepted model for investigating self-regulation in health (Leventhal, Leventhal and
Cameron 2001), and is the one that is focused on in this thesis.
This chapter provides a theoretical overview of self-regulation and the common-sense
model, a rationale for its use in stroke populations and a summary of findings to date. This
is the last of the literature review chapters and a summary outline of the programme of
research in this thesis and how they interrelate is also provided.
45
3.2 What is self-regulation?
Self-regulation refers to a systematic process involving conscious efforts to modulate
thoughts, emotions, and behaviours in order to achieve goals within a changing
environment (Zeidner, Boekaerts and Pintrich 2000). It consists of a dynamic system of goal
setting, developing and enacting strategies to achieve goals, appraising progress, and
revising goals and strategies. Goals, by definition, are future-oriented as they relate to how
an individual thinks about their potential and the kind of things they ultimately want to
achieve. Feedback loops play an integral role in self-regulation models, in that goals serve
as a reference value for evaluating the relative success of efforts (Carver and Scheier 1981).
Central to this system is the principle of TOTE (test, operate, test, exit). With TOTE the self-
regulatory system will test an input against a standard or reference value. Procedures will
then be operationalised to minimise the discrepancy between perception of the present
state (the input) and the reference value (goal). The process is repeated until concordance
is achieved between the input and reference value, at which point the process is terminated
(Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960).
While TOTE highlights the cognitive aspects of goal setting within the self-regulatory
process, emotional responses may also arise. Discrepancy reducing goals (approach goals)
aim to diminish differences between input and a reference value. For example, a stroke
survivor who was previously healthy may want to return to their pre-stroke level of physical
functioning, and become more actively engaged in the rehabilitation process. Discrepancy
enlarging goals (avoidance goals) on the other hand aim to increase differences between
input and a reference value. These could be thought of as ‘anti-goals’. An example would
be a stroke survivor indicating they never want to have another stroke. Within this self-
regulatory goal setting process, it has been suggested that the rate of discrepancy reduction
or enlargement in tangent with an individuals’ expectations, confidence and sense of
positivity or negativity, can play a role in the development of anxiety or depression (Carver
and Scheier 1998) (Figure 3-1).
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Figure 3-1 Affect generation based on outcome of goal setting
An in-depth account of self-regulation in its entirety as applied to behaviour and
outcomes is beyond the scope of this chapter, however the account given above provides an
overview of the key features of the self-regulatory process. The description presented in
the rest of the chapter and throughout the thesis will be restricted to the common-sense
model of self-regulation.
The Common Sense Model (CSM) specifically addresses the self-regulation that occurs
during the adjustment and maintenance of behaviours relating to an illness (Leventhal,
Nerenz and Steel 1984). Its strength is that it captures both behavioural and emotional
processes, and takes into account that these may change over time. Furthermore, the
model reflects the ways in which people represent illnesses to themselves.
The CSM hypothesises that individuals are active problem solvers motivated to resolve
the threat of illness (Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal 2003). The “goals” that they are striving
towards, are in regards to the somatic experiences, competencies and emotions that are evoked
from the biological and psychological self. The strategies and procedures that occur during self-
regulation (i.e. health behaviours, emotional regulation) are a result of the interpretation given
to the somatic and emotional experiences that arise during illness. In addition to providing a
framework for the self-regulatory process, the CSM also provides information about the content
of what is being regulated, in that it has identified at least five illness perceptions that coalesce
to form illness representations which operates within an individual’s pre-existing cognitive
illness schema (Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal 2003). This content which forms an illness
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perception or representation, will influence procedures for dealing with the illness threat.
While the terms illness perception and illness representation are often used interchangeably,
perception refers to a single belief or cognition about an aspect of the illness (e.g. the symptoms
of this illness will not last long), whereas representations refer to mental models which may
include other constructs such as perceived vulnerability optimism, and self-efficacy (Weinman et
al. 1996; Diefenbach and Leventhal 1996).
3.3 Overview of the common-sense model of illness representations
The common-sense model of illness representation (CSM), emerged from a series of
studies investigating fear communication intended to influence health behaviour change
(Leventhal 1970). These studies showed that high fear messages provoked more fear in
individuals, and were more effective in changing attitudes toward a recommended health
action than low fear messages. However both the fear and the attitudinal change were
transient and generally did not exceed 24 to 48 hours. These studies also found that health
actions only occurred when participants exposed to the fear message received a second
message that facilitated the development of an action plan (e.g. provision of a health
information leaflet). The combination of an action plan and a high or low fear message
produced action over a period of days and sometimes weeks, and as subjective feelings of
fear and fear induced attitude change faded within 48 hours, it became clear that the
actions were linked to some changed way of thinking about or representing the health
threat, and not solely the fear of the threat itself. These findings led to the conclusion that
individuals create their own common-sense models or representations of their illness in
order to make sense of and address their problems. They also realised that the
representations influenced subsequent coping responses to deal with the threat (Leventhal,
Meyer and Nerenz 1980). Leventhal and colleagues subsequently extended their research
to see if their theory would have applicability amongst individuals suffering from real life
chronic diseases and conditions (Leventhal, Nerenz and Steel 1984).
3.3.1 Structure and content of the common-sense model
The CSM proposes that incoming stimuli (e.g. a health threat) will result in parallel
processing of the phenomena. First is the perceived reality of the health threat (cognitive
representations), and the second is the emotional reaction to the threat (emotional
48
representations) (Figure 3-2). People will act as common-sense scientist when constructing
representations of an illness threat, and these representations will generate goals for self-
management, and puts forward a process for goal attainment and a criteria for evaluating
response efficacy (Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal 2003).
There are three central tenets underlying this model (Diefenbach and Leventhal 1996).
First the individual is an active problem solver both seeking information and acting to test
hypotheses about the meaning of their somatic sensations (symptoms) and physical
condition and the relevance of these meaning to media and interpersonal messages about
health risk. Second, the illness representation is the central cognitive construct that guides
coping and the appraisal of action outcomes. Third, the representations are highly
individualised and will not necessarily be in agreement with medical facts.
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Figure 3-2 The common-sense model of illness representations
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On the cognitive level internal and external stimuli will activate pre-existing schema
that decode the incoming information based on prior health and illness experience
(Diefenbach and Leventhal 1996). How this information is decoded will in turn determine
the nature of the illness representations that develop. When the stimulus is an internal,
somatic cue, its meaning or representation will depend on its similarity to schematic
structures of prior illness episodes or that of a disease they imagine they might have. For
example, an individual experiencing numbness or weakness in their arm may interpret this
as a sign they are having a stroke because of their knowledge of the F.A.S.T (Face, Arms,
Speech, Test) stroke public awareness campaign, which identifies theses as signs of a stroke.
Research has consistently shown that the matching process between incoming
stimuli and pre-existing schema will give rise to an individual forming cognitive
representations around five distinct domains around their beliefs about the illness: identity,
timeline, control, cause, and consequence studies (Diefenbach and Leventhal 1996; Lau,
Bernard and Hartmann 1989; Lau and Hartmann 1983). The identity domain involves the
label or name given to the condition and the symptoms that an individual associates with
the condition. People like to have a label for their symptoms, however once a label has
been given, they are more apt to interpret diverse symptoms as evidence of the label. For
example, individuals diagnosed with hypertension became increasingly more likely to report
that their blood pressure was symptomatic the longer they were in treatment, even though
hypertension is generally an asymptomatic condition (Meyer, Leventhal and Gutmann 1985).
The timeline domain connects the stimuli with an expected timeframe. It answers
questions such as whether the health condition is acute, chronic or cyclical (e.g. How long
will the symptoms of my stroke last? Are stroke symptoms predictable or do they change
over time?). Beliefs about timeline will be re-evaluated as time progresses, and it has been
suggested that “Inside every chronic patient is an acute patient wondering what happened”
(Brown 2002). The cure/control dimension addresses beliefs about whether the condition
can be kept under control or cured and the degree to which the individual can play a role in
achieving this. Essentially it is a measure of empowerment regarding performance of coping
behaviours (e.g. “If I take this medicine it will help cure my illness”) or with the efficacy of
treatment (e.g. “Taking this medication will be effective in relieving the symptoms of my
illness”) (Hagger and Orbell 2003). The causal domain refers to views about aetiology,
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which may be biological, psychological or environmental. These representations will be
based on information obtained from personal experiences as well as the opinions and
discourse with significant others, health professionals and media sources, reflecting issues
such as stress, environmental pollution, and other pathogens. Beliefs about one’s condition
may not necessarily be based on medical facts. Finally, the consequence domain deals with
an individuals’ attempts to anticipate the repercussion on various aspects of their life such
as their social circumstances, finances or, personal experience.
In parallel with the cognitive representations described, an illness threat will also
evoke emotional representations, which may include feelings such as distress, fear or anger.
Sticking with the F.A.S.T example, feelings of numbness or weakness in an individuals’ arms
may illicit feelings of fear or panic. Hence both the cognitive recognition of the stroke
symptoms and the emotional response would result in the identification of a coping strategy,
such as calling an ambulance. If an individual did not make the association between their
symptom experience being a sign of a stroke, they could opt for a different coping strategy,
such as going for a rest, or even denying the symptoms were present.
Research into the CSM also indicates a pattern of inter-correlations between the five
core cognitive domains, which provides evidence for their construct and discriminant
validity. In a number of patient groups, inter-correlations between the domains were strong
and significant but did not exhibit correlations of a magnitude that was indicative of
conceptual overlap (Weinman et al. 1996; Moss-Morris et al. 2002). Additionally, the
correlations showed systematic and logical patterns of association. Illness identity was
strongly and negatively associated with the control domain but positively associated with
beliefs about serious consequences and chronicity. This would suggest that individuals who
viewed their illness as being highly symptomatic (strong illness identity) would also see their
condition as chronic, uncontrollable, and having a serious consequence on their life.
Analogously, individuals who viewed themselves as having a high degree of control over
their condition would view their illness as being less chronic, with fewer serious
consequences. However, observed inter-relationships have not always followed a logical
trend. In one patient group perceptions of chronicity were inversely associated with
seriousness (Heijmans and de Ridder 1998).
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3.3.2 Heuristics for validating self-regulation cognitions
The information characterised within each of five domains of the CSM is represented
in both abstract (semantic) and concrete (perceptual or experiential) form. From their
research, Leventhal and colleagues indentified a number of rules or heuristics involved in
converting stimuli into representations (Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal 2003). They
propose that heuristics are used for ongoing interpretation of the stimuli generated by the
illness threat, and efforts to control them. This leads to an increasingly elaborate
representation of the illness threat over time.
The rule of symmetry refers to the pressure to connect what may be an abstract
illness experience with concrete labels. The inverse is also true, in that there is a need to
identify symptoms once given a label (illness identity). Evidence of the symmetry rule was
provided by a study examining medical compliance of patients with hypertension, and in a
laboratory study with individuals who reported more physical symptoms such as headache
and tenseness after they were led to believe that their blood-pressure was high (Baumann
and Leventhal 1985; Baumann et al. 1989). An illness label drove the selective search for
“common-sense” symptoms based on underlying illness schema.
The second rule is the stress-illness rule. Stress-illness self-evaluation appears to
include an assessment of one’s ongoing reaction to environmental events. It involves
answering the question “Am I sick or am I stressed?” The attribution of symptoms to a
medical condition occurs when no stressful life-event is present, however if a stressful event
is present, the attribution moves toward stress and away from illness (Diefenbach and
Leventhal 1996). The extent of the shift is moderated by the type of symptoms. Symptoms
which are clear signs of disease or injury are not subject to stress attributions. For example,
unilateral weakness in limbs or paralysis would likely be seen as more attributed to stroke,
as opposed to less descript symptoms such as fatigue or joint stiffness. Two conditions limit
the application of the stress-illness rule: the nature of the symptoms; and the duration of
the stressor (Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal 2003). The failure of a symptom thought to
be attributable to stress to respond to treatment will raise questions about a benign stress
interpretation and activate social communication and care seeking (Mora et al. 2002).
Individuals have also been found to seek information from close associates in attempts to
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validate their personal hypotheses about the nature of their symptoms experience (Zola
1973).
The final rule highlighted in the process of evaluating illness representations is the
age-illness rule. It concerns the response to the question “Is this symptom a sign of aging or
an indication of illness?” The normal aging process leads to a variety of physical changes,
and the distinction between ageing compared with illness related changes becomes more
important as one ages. Data showed that care-seeking behaviour was unaffected by age
attributions when symptoms were novel and sudden in onset, however symptoms that were
familiar and gradual in onset were attributed to age and less likely to promote care seeking
(Prohaska et al. 1987).
While three rules for validating illness cognitions have been outlined, there are likely
other factors that influence the construction of illness representations. For example, testing
positive for a condition and perceiving a disease to have a higher prevalence has been
shown to be inversely associated with beliefs about its consequences (e.g. the disease is less
serious if everybody has it) (Skelton and Croyle 1991).
3.3.3 Factors that influence illness representations
The process involved in developing an illness representation model, mounting a
coping response, and experiencing and coping with emotional reactions to the threat do not
occur in a vacuum. The model of representation is influenced by a variety of factors, such as
personal disposition and cues from social environment.
Individual history can play a significant role in shaping the problem-solving process.
Prior illnesses can generate memories which have a major impact on the representation of
current somatic stimuli and can also contribute to shaping emotional responses and coping
procedures. These memories can operate automatically, creating experiences of dread and
powerful emotional reactions without an individual consciously thinking about it
(Diefenbach and Leventhal 1996). In addition to illness history, an individual’s somatic self
provides a backdrop in which symptoms of a new condition are evaluated against. This
backdrop is also influenced by biological and genetic factors, and psychological dispositions,
although biological and genetic characteristics are likely to influence illness representations
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only if they are salient and known to the individual. For example the impact of stroke based
on family history could impact the illness representations only after the individual has been
made aware of its potential influence (e.g. through the experience of a close friend or family
member with a stroke).
Illness representations are also influenced by the social and cultural context.
Contrasts in illness beliefs become more apparent when comparative studies are done
across cultures. For example a Taiwanese study found that only physical symptoms of
depression were described since psychological illness is highly stigmatised in Chinese culture,
and individuals within this culture were less able to communicate their emotional states in
comparison to individuals from Western cultures (Kleinman 1980). However, this is not a
phenomenon that is unique to non-western cultures. One European study found that when
patients were depressed they presented to their GP with complaints of physical symptoms
(van Rijswijk et al. 2009). Feelings of shame and stigma associated with a mental health
diagnosis were offered as reasons why individuals tended to deny the psycho-social nature
of their symptoms. Such studies show that culture and perceived social acceptability can
determine which symptoms are more likely to be reported among those with health
conditions. If reporting somatic symptoms is seen as more acceptable than psychological
symptoms, the former will be incorporated in the illness representations (e.g. Identity
domain) and the latter excluded. Second, the symptomatic focus could establish
expectations for treatment. When mental health problems are somatised, patients would
expect a somatic treatment and would fail to recognise and respond to treatment for the
underlying psychological causes (Diefenbach and Leventhal 1996).
Demographic factors such as age, gender and living arrangements, have also been
shown to influence illness perceptions. For example, older individuals are less likely to delay
care seeking after symptom onset, as they prefer to resolve uncertainty and worry and are
perhaps more cognisant of the frailty of their health (Leventhal et al. 1995). Some studies
have reported that women tend to report more symptoms associated with their illness than
men (Bishop 1994). Additionally, the symptom experience of an illness has been found to
be greater for individuals who live alone relative to those who were married or living with
others (Pennebaker 1982).
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3.4 Coping strategies
Coping with stroke can challenge the stroke survivor’s self-concept and contribute to
change in personal identity. The CSM model makes an explicit link between illness
representation and coping strategies. It proposes they guide the selection of procedures to
eliminate or control potential or ongoing threats (Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal 2003).
Coping can take many forms, however two broad categories have been defined: approach
coping (e.g. going to a doctor, talking to friends about emotions); and avoidance coping (e.g
denial, wishful thinking) (Ogden 2000).
An extensive review of coping strategies, models and procedures is beyond the
scope of this chapter, however Ogden (2000) highlighted three approaches to coping that
were relevant in her review of illness representation: coping with a diagnosis (Shontz 1975);
coping with the crisis of illness (Moos and Schaefer 1984); and adjustment to physical illness
and theory of cognitive adaptation (Taylor 1983).
Shontz (1975) proposed that individuals will go through a state of shock upon
receiving a diagnosis of a chronic disease. After this they will have an encounter reaction
that is characterised by disorganised thinking and feelings of loss, grief, helplessness and
despair. The final stage of in this model of coping was identified as retreat, at which point
the individual would deny the problem and its implications and retreat into the self. Shontz
proposed that once in the retreat stage, the individual could gradually deal with the reality
of their diagnosis.
In the illness as crisis model (Moos and Schaefer 1984) three phases of the coping
process were identified. The first phase consisted of cognitive appraisal whereby an
individual appraises the seriousness and significance of the stimuli. The appraisal will be
influenced by various factors such as knowledge, previous experience and social support.
Following the cognitive appraisal adaptive tasks are used as part of the coping process.
These tasks will be general (e.g. preserving a reasonable emotional balance after being
diagnosed with a serious condition) and illness related (e.g. dealing with symptoms
experienced). Following the used of adaptive tasks, it is proposed that the individual will
adopt one of three coping skills. Appraisal focused coping involves attempts to understand
the illness and represents a search for meaning. Problem focused coping consists of
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confronting the problem and reconstructing it as manageable. The last strategy is emotion
focused coping whereby the individual seeks to manage emotions, and maintain emotional
equilibrium.
The final model of coping that will be described in this section is the adjustment to
physical illness and theory of cognitive adaptation (Taylor 1983). It suggests that coping
with a threatening illness consists of three processes: a search for meaning (e.g. knowing
what caused the illness), a search for mastery (believing the illness is controllable), and a
process of self-enhancement (feeling they are better off than other people with the illness).
Taylor (1983) argued that these three processes are central for developing and maintaining
illusions and that these illusions should be considered a process of cognitive adaptation. In
this model the individual is seen as self-regulatory and as motivated to maintain the status
quo.
Although the CSM proposes a direct link between illness representations and coping,
findings in the literature are mixed. A systematic review that identified and classified
categories of coping behaviours and strategies examined in illness representation research,
showed identity and consequence constructs were significantly and positively related with
avoidance/denial, and expressing emotions (Hagger and Orbell 2003). On the other hand,
the control/cure domain was not associated with avoidance/ denial or expressing emotions,
but was significantly associated with problem-focused coping, and cognitive reappraisal.
However 14 of the 28 relationships identified between illness representation dimensions
and coping strategies were non-significant.
Although these findings call into question the relationships outlined in the CSM, it
has been argued that the lack of consistent associations between cognitive representations
and coping behaviours may be more of a function of the inadequacy of measures used to
assess coping rather than a misspecification of the CSM itself (Hagger and Orbell 2003). The
coping measures used in the studies examined were criticised for their excessive generality
and failure to account for individual differences in coping styles, goals, and perceptions of
success.
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3.4.1 Coping and stroke
A few studies have assessed coping strategies and their affect on outcomes in stroke
survivors. A qualitative study looked at the meaning stroke survivors gave to their stroke
(appraisal) and coping strategies (Rochette et al. 2006). It found that seven appraisal themes
(unpredictability, feeling overwhelmed, feeling out of control, threat, turning point,
acceptance/resignation and future prospects), and five coping themes (active and passive
compensation, escape, change in how the situation is perceived, and the use of resources)
emerged during the process of adapting to stroke. They concluded that the fear of another
stroke served as a source of motivation for adopting active coping strategies.
In another qualitative study, stroke survivors described coping strategies that centred
around social support, active behavioural strategies, and cognitive strategies (Ch'ng, French
and McLean 2008). Positive re-interpretation, and acceptance of their stroke were cited as
coping strategies that helped these individuals feel better. Coping using positive
reinterpretation has been associated with more positive mood after stroke (Boynton De
Sepulveda and Chang 1994). On the other hand avoidant coping such as denial, has been
linked to depression in stroke survivors (King et al. 2002). Relaxation, use of humour, and
comfort gained from religious beliefs are other cognitive coping strategies found to be
helpful for stroke survivors (Ch'ng, French and McLean 2008).
3.5 Rationale for investigating illness representations in stroke survivors
Illness represents a fundamental threat to survival and well being, with few life events
more capable of eliciting anxiety and fear. When an individual has a stroke, they are likely
to develop a pattern of beliefs about their condition, or they may already have pre-existing
ones. For example, a study in hospitalised patients found that the majority believed that
having a stroke (even a minor one) was tantamount to, or worse than death (Hanger et al.
2000). Such views could be key determinants of behaviour directed at managing illness (e.g.
willingness to engage in rehabilitation), and could also have an influence on other health
outcomes such as mental health status or quality of life.
Despite their importance, an individual’s views of their illness or symptoms are rarely
sought in medical interviews or in interactions with other health professionals (Petrie and
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Weinman 2006). The components of the CSM have been outlined above, yet the fascinating
aspect of this concept is the diversity that can be observed within the same patient group,
and these representations could lead patients with similar medical conditions along very
different trajectories. On the other hand, illness representations are also dynamic in nature,
and are amenable to change in response to shifts in patient progress, environment, and
personal circumstances. A study carried out in patients with cardiovascular disease found
that a cognitive-behavioural intervention individualised to alter their perceptions about
their disease was effective in producing positive changes in the patients views of their
condition (Petrie et al. 2002). They also found that the intervention resulted in patients
feeling better prepared for leaving hospital, and were more likely to return to work.
At its core the CSM seeks to ask the basic question “Does it matter what patients
think?” Examining illness representations is valuable for both furthering understanding of
illness-related coping, and gaining insight into their influence on health related outcomes
such as anxiety or depression. From a practical perspective, knowledge of illness
representations in stroke survivors could prove useful for informing the stepped care
approach for managing psychological distress. Additionally, an understanding of illness
representations also has the potential to contribute to the management of other health
related outcomes that arise due to stroke, such as physical recovery, social relationships, or
quality of life if any associations are observed
3.6 Assessing Illness Representations
In their original work, Leventhal and colleagues often used in-depth, semi structured
interviews that focused on the individuals’ concrete illness experiences in order to elicit
their representations. While this approach was very valuable, it was also very time
consuming, produced large variations in the quantity and quality of information, and it was
impossible to generalise data from these qualitative interviews beyond the study sample.
Individuals are rarely asked about their illness representations in clinical settings but
would usually be happy to discuss their ideas if the invitation is welcoming and they do not
feel they are being tested on their knowledge (Petrie and Weinman 2006). Some
suggestions for possible opening questions are “Many patients develop their own ideas
about their illness and I would be interested in discussing these with you”, which could be
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followed up with specific questions such as “What are the main consequences of this illness
for you?”
In response to the drawbacks of informal assessment, the illness perception
questionnaire (IPQ) and its subsequent revised version (IPQ-R) were developed (Weinman et
al. 1996) (Moss-Morris et al. 2002). They provide a straightforward assessment of the major
components of illness representations and can be tailored to specific illnesses or medical
conditions without losing psychometric validity. The IPQ-R has been used across a range of
illnesses (Hagger and Orbell 2003). This questionnaire is discussed in detail in chapter six. It
should be mentioned that some criticism has been levelled at the use of quantitative scales,
as their reporting tends to provide descriptive accounts of the different illness domains in
isolation of each other (Clatworthy et al. 2007). This has resulted in moving away from
obtaining rich idiographic accounts of illness representation, towards a nomothetic scientific
approach.
A more recent and different approach to assessing illness representations is the use
of patient drawings (Petrie, Jago and Devcich 2007). Thus far drawings have been used in
illnesses where individuals can easily visualise their pathology. A study in patients with
myocardial infarction found that the size of damage drawn by patients on their heart was
associated with a slower return to work and more negative representations of their
condition, and was a better predictor of these outcomes than biological markers of the
heart condition (Broadbent et al. 2004). Three month longitudinal follow-up of this patient
cohort found that an increase in the size of the heart damage drawn was an indicator of
poorer recovery in terms of increased heart focused anxiety, complaints of ill health, worry
about having another myocardial infarction, and higher use of healthcare. Once valid
methods for assessing drawing are developed, their use in determining illness
representations could have applications for stroke, especially for individuals with
communication deficits.
3.7 Illness representations and chronic illness
Taking into account the role of the CSM is relatively novel concept within stroke
research and the body of evidence is still in its infancy. However comprehensive work has
been carried out in numerous other groups with long-term conditions (Kaptein et al. 2003;
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Scharloo and Kaptein 1997). A selective review of over 30 studies examining illness
representations found that different illness representations emerged as important
correlates or predictors of outcomes in different chronic diseases. The illnesses examined
were, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, neurological diseases (these included
Huntington and Alzheimer disease, traumatic brain injury, and multiple sclerosis), cancer,
and cardiovascular disease (Kaptein et al. 2003). Findings from neurological studies found
that identity and timeline representations were associated with depression and poorer
functional status. Alternatively, in cardiovascular disease cure/control beliefs were strongly
correlated with cardiac rehabilitation attendance. Strong illness identity was associated
with greater sexual dysfunction, and a belief about serious consequences was related to
decrease in recreational and social activities. Additionally older patients also perceived less
control over their disease.
3.8 Illness representation and stroke
A search of Medline (1951-August 2012), EMBASE (1947-August 2012), AMED (1985-
August 2012), PsycINFO (1806 – August 2012), and CINAHL (1960- August 2012) combining
various terms for illness representation and stroke found five studies using a structured
questionnaire to examine the relationships between illness representation and outcomes in
the stroke population. The results from the search are summarised in Table 3-1. Four
studies (Twiddy, House and Jones 2012; Dinsmore et al. 2010; Ford 2007; MacLeod,
Abdullah and Wilkinson 2010) were based on the CSM and used the illness perception
questionnaire, while the other (Johnston et al. 1999; Morrison, Johnston and Mac Walter
2000) examined the role of control beliefs using the Recovery Locus of Control (RLOC) scale
(Partridge and Johnston 1989). The RLOC measures the role of control cognitions in
recovery, which differentiates between having an internal locus of control (e.g. believing
circumstances are controlled by ones personal behaviour) or an external locus control (e.g.
believing circumstances are controlled by external forces or chance).
Two of the studies (Dinsmore et al. 2010; MacLeod, Abdullah and Wilkinson 2010)
using the CSM were reported only as conference abstracts and are summarised in Table 3-1.
Another study (Ford 2007) was a cross-sectional unpublished doctoral thesis study with the
primary aim of investigating the association between illness representations and depression
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in first-time stroke patients. Forty patients were recruited in the early stages post stroke (2-
6 weeks), and significant bivariate correlations between illness identity, chronicity,
consequence and emotional representations with depression were reported. This study
also found that believing a stroke would have a substantial consequence on ones life was
significantly associated with increased anxiety. As patients were recruited shortly after
stroke, this study was able to uncover early understandings of the event. Limitations of this
study are its small sample size which could result in biased and unstable estimates, and its
cross-sectional design means that causal relationships could not be determined. The final
study (Twiddy, House and Jones 2012) carried out a longitudinal assessment in patient and
carer dyads and assessed various relationships between individual and interpersonal illness
representations about stroke and patient levels of distress. These findings suggest that
negative illness representations of both patients and carers were associated with distress.
This was the first study to examine the impact that carers beliefs may have on stroke
patients, and the longitudinal design allowed for predictive relationships to be examined.
However the small sample size meant that several independent analyses had to be
conducted, and all illness representations could not be included in one model.
In the study using the recovery locus of control, physical recovery, depression and
anxiety were predicted over time (Johnston et al. 1999; Morrison, Johnston and Mac Walter
2000). At one-month post stroke, they found that control beliefs were significantly
associated with both anxiety and depression. However six months later, after controlling for
baseline levels of anxiety, perceived control was not a significant predictor of distress. It is
unclear whether the perceived control reference group was internal or external, and this
study suffered from large losses to follow-up so result findings may be biased.
In summary these studies seem to indicate there is some association between illness
representation and mental health conditions in stroke survivors. However the focus has
rarely been on anxiety, even in studies that have used assessment tools where it is
measured. Two of the studies were available as conference abstracts only, so the full
findings could not be explored. Additionally, few studies employed a longitudinal design,
and where they have the sample size has been small, meaning that causal relationships
between illness representations could not be adequately investigated. The larger study that
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had a longitudinal design used an alternative framework for assessing illness beliefs to
assess the relationships with anxiety after stroke.
63
Table 3-1 Summary of studies investigating illness representation in stroke populations
Author,
Location
Aim Sample Methods Measures Findings
(Dinsmore et
al. 2010)
Conference
abstract
Ireland
To examine the quality of life
and illness perceptions in
stroke patients at two different
health centres
N=203
Recruited will in
hospital
Longitudinal
with baseline
and 12 month
follow-up
post-stroke
IPQ-R, SEIQoL-
DW, HADS,
SSQOL, SISE,
RLOC, MSPSS
Positive illness perception was important in
determining increased QoL, positive internal
locus of control and self-esteem increased QoL
and an increase in perceived social support and
decreased anxiety and depression increased
QoL
(Ford 2007)
UK
[unpublished
thesis]
To investigate the association
between illness perceptions
and depression after stroke
N=40
73 yrs (mean age)
58% female
98% White
Recruited 2-6 weeks
post-stroke
Cross-
sectional
survey
IPQ-R, HADS,
MMSE
Depression
Significant association with Illness identity
(rs=.32), Chronic timeline (rs=.45),
Consequences (rs= .55), and emotional (rs= .40)
representations
After adjustment for clinical and demographic
factors only consequence representations
significant predictors of depression (β=.427, 
p=.002)
Anxiety
Significantly associated with consequence
(rs= .39) representations
(Johnston et
al. 1999;
Morrison,
Johnston and
Mac Walter
2000)
UK
To investigate if illness
cognitions predicted recovery
from stroke, depression, and
anxiety, and to determine if
association was mediated by
exercise as a coping response
N=71
Recruited within 3
weeks post stroke
Mean age 69 yrs
51% male
Longitudinal
survey with
follow-up at 1
& 6 month
post-discharge
RLOC, Exercise
coping scale,
HADS, Barthel
Index
Control cognitions significantly associated with
anxiety ((r=-.47, p<.001) and depression (r-.43,
p<.001) 1 month post stroke
In a multiple regression analysis, perceived
control was not a significant predictor of
anxiety or depression at six months, after
controlling for anxiety and depression at 1
month
(MacLeod, To assess patients perception N=120 with TIA or Cross- Brief-IPQ, Median scores for*:
64
Author,
Location
Aim Sample Methods Measures Findings
Abdullah and
Wilkinson
2010)
European
Stroke
Conference
Abstract
UK
of the significance of TIA and
their beliefs and attitudes to
secondary prevention
interventions
minor stroke
(modified Rankin
Scale score 0-1)
sectional
survey
Beliefs about
Medicines
Questionnaire,
Adherence to
secondary
prevention
medications
-perceived consequence (mean 4.88, SD=2.67),
-emotional representation (mean 4.9, SD=3.4),
-personal control (mean 4.0, SD=3.2)
Stronger beliefs for:
-treatment control (mean 7.7, SD=2.1)
* scores range from 0-10
Concluded that patients do not regard TIA as
having important implications for their future
health and feel they do not have personal
control over the condition. Many only seek
medical advice as a result of external pressure.
(Twiddy,
House and
Jones 2012)
UK
To determine if patient and
carer distress were associated
with illness representations
N=42 stroke patient
and partner dyads
Recruited within 2
months post stroke
Mean age 65 yrs
(patients)
Longitudinal
survey with
baseline and 3
month follow-
up
IPQ-R, GHQ-28,
Barthel Index,
Significant
Others Scale
Baseline:
Patient coherence inversely associated with
their distress score (β=-3.38, p=.04), however 
carer coherence significantly predict patient
distress (β=2.61, p=.05)  
Three month follow-up:
Higher patient illness identity (β=.73, p=.02), 
consequence (β=8.37, p<.001), emotional 
(β=6.69, p=.01), and psychological cause 
(β=3.69, p=.02) at follow-up were significant 
predictors of distress at follow-up. Discrepancy
was also a significant predictor of distress at
follow-up (β=-7.73, p=.04) 
GHQ-28: General Health Questionnaire (28 items), HADS: Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, IPQ-R: Illness Perception Questionnaire- revised version, MMSE: Mini-
Mental State Examination, MSPSS: Multiple Perceived Social Support Scale, QoL: Quality of Life, RLOC: Recovery of Locus of Control, SEIQoL-DW: Schedule for the
Evaluation of Individual Quality of Life Direct Weighting, SISE: Single Item Self-Esteem, SSQOL: Stroke Specific Quality of Life Scale
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3.9 Critique of the Common-Sense Model
The explosion of research using the common-sense model indicates a keeness to
determine how illness representations may influence both coping and outcomes in a diverse
range of chronic disease (Hagger and Orbell 2003). However some limitations of the model
have been observed. The premise that illness representations influence coping, and that
coping is related to outcomes (i.e. coping model as required mediator) has been challenged.
Research currently seems to indicate that illness representations may be associated with
outcomes (e.g. mental health, health behaviour) independently of coping (Hagger and
Orbell 2003). However some have argued that the lack of success in testing the impact of
coping could have more to do with the available coping measures which some say assess
coping styles, rather than specific actions and procedures as is intended in the CSM.
Another criticism is the current quantitative direction that research into illness
representations has taken. As outlined in section 3.6 several quantitative tools have been
developed in an attempt to make research in the field generalisable beyond the specific
participants involved. While such a move was needed to test concepts empirically, this has
shifted from the original intent of garnering a common-sense understanding of the personal
health beliefs held by an individual. Cluster analysis has been proposed as a method to help
establish a middle-ground between the qualitative and quantitative approaches to
investigating illness representations (Clatworthy et al. 2007). Rather than looking at
individual illness schema, cluster analysis enables the identification of groups of individuals
who share similar beliefs, and the utility of the SRM in predicting outcome from these
beliefs can still be tested.
It is highly probable that various factors influence the pathway from representation to
outcome. However the SRM does not make specific predictions about the role of the
interaction with other variables. This consideration is vital especially when carrying out
research in samples drawn from established disease populations, such as attendants at
hospital out-patient clinics (e.g. stroke patients going for follow-up appointments), as they
are likely to be exposed to material designed to affect their disease knowledge or coping
strategies. In the case of stroke survivors they are usually provided with information
brochures from the Stroke Association or may be asked about how they are dealing with any
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effects of the stroke by their GP or stroke consultant. This leads to another weakness of the
CSM, in that much of the research has been carried out in non-stroke populations. Stroke is
different from many other diseases in that it is an acute event, with the potential to have
long-term consequences in all domains of physical, social, and mental functioning.
Subsequently, the representations observed in the stroke population may differ from those
observed in other illness groups.
3.10 Summary
 The common-sense model of illness representations is a framework which seeks to
identify the cognitive beliefs and emotional interpretations that influence health
behaviour and outcomes
 Representations around illness centre around five core cognitive domains:(Identity,
Timeline, Control/cure, Cause, and Consequence
 An individual will draw on a series of rules for validating their representation model
 Representations are influenced by a range of internal and external factors
 The CSM proposes a direct link between coping strategy, and between coping
strategy and health behaviour or outcome, however this relationship has not always
been supported in the research literature
 Illness representations have been found to be associated with a range of outcomes
in several groups with long-term conditions, however evidence is scant in stroke
3.11 Overview of research questions addressed in the thesis
The first three chapters have sought to highlight the detrimental impact of stroke with
a focus on the psychological consequences of anxiety in particular. The concept of illness
representations was introduced, and an outline of their influence on health behaviours, and
outcomes such as mental health distress established. The literature review chapters
highlighted that published work regarding anxiety and stroke was scant. As a first step, it
was decided that it was a priority to establish the extent to which anxiety after stroke was a
problem, and to identify literature that addressed how anxiety after stroke could be treated.
The last phase of this research programme grew out of an interest in understanding
whether health beliefs were associated with anxiety after stroke. Three separate but
associated studies were carried out to answer relevant questions. The following sections
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provide a brief overview of the work that will be presented throughout the rest of the thesis.
Specific details about design and methodology and findings are included in following
chapters.
3.11.1 Study 1: What is the prevalence of anxiety after stroke?
A systematic review of observational studies was conducted to estimate the
prevalence of anxiety after stroke. At the time of commencing the PhD no such work had
been conducted. This review is discussed in detail in chapter four.
3.11.2 Study 2: What interventions are effective in treating anxiety after stroke?
A Cochrane systematic review of randomised clinical trials was carried out to identify
high quality studies of interventions used to treat anxiety after stroke. This review is
discussed in detail in chapter five.
3.11.3 Study 3: Are illness representations associated with anxiety after stroke?
This was an empirical study that sought to identify whether illness representations
were associated with anxiety after stroke. A cross-sectional baseline analysis and a
longitudinal follow-up analysis were conducted. The specific questions under investigation
in this study were:
1. Are there any differences in illness representations between anxious and non-
anxious stroke survivors at baseline?
2. Are illness representations at baseline associated with anxiety levels at baseline?
3. Does the prevalence of anxiety, and anxiety symptom severity in stroke survivors
change over time?
4. Do stroke survivors change their illness representations over time?
5. Do illness representations predict anxiety level at follow-up in stroke survivors?
The methods for the empirical study are described in chapter six, and the results in chapters
seven and eight. The final chapter discusses the limitations of the empirical study, along
with clinical and research implications for the future.
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4 Chapter Four: Study 1- Frequency of anxiety after stroke:
A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Observational
Studies
4.1 Introduction
This systematic review was the first of three studies in the programme of research
encompassed in this thesis. It sought to quantify the prevalence of anxiety after stroke
based on findings in the research literature and collate information about correlates of
anxiety after stroke. A comparative narrative account with a high quality systematic review
of depression after stroke is provided and research gaps highlighted. The overall findings
are summarised and recommendations for future work considered.
4.2 Rationale for review
Anxiety can have severe consequences on the course of physical recovery, and
quality of life post stroke (Schultz et al. 1997; Ahlsio et al. 1984). Previous estimates of the
frequency of post-stroke anxiety ranged from 1 to 65% (House et al. 1991; Macniven et al.
2005). Even though there was a lack of consistency in the findings, anxiety after
neurological disease and especially stroke remained a relatively neglected topic (Kanner and
Barry 2003; Annoni et al. 2006). Despite this, clinicians and patients continued to report
anecdotally they believed it to be an under-recognised concern. There was much
uncertainty regarding the extent to which anxiety after stroke was a problem, however
previous attempts to synthesise the phenomenon have taken a narrative rather than a
systematic approach (Ferro, Caeiro and Santos 2009).
Systematic reviews are considered to be the highest level of evidence within the
research framework, and are the best way to synthesise the information that is available for
a specific topic (Evans 2003). They differ from the traditional literature or narrative reviews
in that they are led by a protocol developed prior to the commencement of research, and
adhere to rigorous standards and processes that result in the work being replicable. A well
conducted systematic review will address some of the issues with reporting biases that are
present in non-systematic methods of reviewing evidence. Systematic reviews are
undertaken when there are substantive questions, and primary studies appear to yield
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disparate results (Hemingway and Brereton 2009). Given the contrast in findings regarding
the prevalence of anxiety after stroke, it was important to undertake research that had the
potential to yield a unbiased, and impartial summary of the existing research evidence on its
occurrence. It was also recognised that such a review had the potential to enhance the
profile of anxiety within the wider context of stroke research.
4.3 Aim of review
The primary aim of this review was to summarise all available information regarding
the prevalence of anxiety disorders, and anxiety symptom “caseness” as derived from
scores on anxiety scales, after stroke. Whether estimates varied based on the diagnostic or
screening tool used, or select study quality criteria indices were also investigated. A
secondary aim was to collate and describe information about the correlates of anxiety
reported in the studies included in the review.
4.4 Methods
This review was guided by the following principles of systematic reviewing (Khan et al.
2003). These include: framing the question, identifying relevant work, assessing quality,
summarising the evidence, and interpreting the findings.
4.4.1 Inclusion/ Exclusion Criteria
The review included data from observational studies published in journal articles,
abstracts, and conference proceedings involving populations or groups of patients who had
a clinical diagnosis of ischemic or haemorrhagic stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA),
and were diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, or assessed for anxiety symptoms on a rating
scale such as the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Studies were excluded if
they:
1. were intervention studies because the participant eligibility requirements for
clinical trials tends to result in a very select subset of the general stroke
population being included. The prevalence of anxiety estimated in this group
could be significantly higher or lower than would be expected if a less biased
method of case ascertainment were used;
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2. were limited to patients with subarachnoid haemorrhage as these individuals
have a substantially different management strategy from individuals with
ischaemic stroke;
3. used a non-specific measure of psychological distress not designed to screen
for anxiety, as these are not appropriate for establishing anxiety and could be
estimating other forms of mental health distress, such as depression or
suicidality;
4. involved retrospective recruitment or reporting of mood because this could
result in participant recall bias (Raphael 1987);
5. used a convenience sample as this form of sampling only allows individuals
who are available and known to the researcher to be included and is
considered to be an extremely biased method of sampling (Freedman et al.
2009) ;
6. reported anxiety as a continuous outcome without providing categorical
assessment as it is not possible to obtain the proportion of individuals with
anxiety when it is reported in this way; or
7. measured anxiety by proxy, as a third party’s perception of anxiety could be
different to that of the stroke survivor.
Non-English language papers that were potentially eligible based on their title or abstract
were translated, and were included in the review if deemed to have met the eligibility
criteria.
4.4.2 Study identification, data extraction and quality appraisal
Electronic searches in MEDLINE, EMBASE, PsycINFO, Allied and Complementary
Medicine, CINAHL, and Proquest dissertation databases were conducted using the terms
“stroke” or “cerebrovascular disorders” or “cerebrovascular accident” in combination with
“anxiety disorders”, or “adjustment disorders”, or “neurotic disorders”, or “mental
disorders”, or “worry”, or “fear”. Search terms were combined with the “explode” feature
and no language restrictions were put in place (see Appendix A for detailed search strategy).
One reviewer (ACB) developed and conducted the initial search from database inception to
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March, 2010 and later updated it up to March, 2011. Reference lists from included studies
were checked for other studies that may not have been found in the database search.
One reviewer (ACB) screened and identified studies against the selection criteria,
and a second reviewer (PK) conducted a random check of approximately 10% of titles and
abstracts to assess the reliability of initial screening. Independent data extraction by ACB
and PK was performed for all eligible studies. Information about study design, setting, and
patient characteristics was recorded. When relevant data was missing (e.g. the study used a
rating scale that measured anxiety but did not report findings in the publication) study
authors were contacted in order to obtain the pertinent information.
A number of consensus statements have been published to encourage high quality
reporting in empirical research, which include the Quality Reporting of Meta-Analyses of
Randomised Controlled Trials (QUOROM) (Moher et al. 2000), the Meta-Analysis of
Observational Studies (MOOSE) (Stroup et al. 2000), and the Strengthening Reporting in
Observational Studies (STROBE) (von Elm et al. 2007) statements. These statements were
primarily designed to assist study authors when writing up findings from their studies,
rather than individuals looking to assess the validity of what they were reading. Another
issue is that some of these statements have produced checklists that are quite lengthy,
making their use challenging when trying to synthesise large volumes of information. Study
quality was assessed using a modified version of the Quality Assessment Tool for Systematic
Reviews of Observational studies (QATSO)(Wong, Cheung and Hart 2008). This is a short,
easy to use checklist that attempts to strike a balance between the number of inter-study
items that are assessed, but is still simple and practical to use. Hence, while the ability to
provide comparisons on a range of study items is lost, it does address the issue of non-use
of quality appraisal tools that has been observed in systematic reviews of observational
studies (Mallen, Peat and Croft 2006). Each study was evaluated based on their method of
participant recruitment, instrument used to measure anxiety, proportion of eligible patients
who participated, proportion lost to follow-up (if applicable), and adequacy of descriptive
details about the study populations. Table 4-1 shows the indices used to assess the quality
of the observational studies included in this review.
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4.4.3 Data synthesis
Studies were grouped into four categories based on method of case ascertainment.
These were categorised as: Population-based studies, which attempted to recruit all stroke
survivors in a particular geographical area over a given period of time. These studies were
regarded as the least biased method for identify cases in cohort studies; Hospital- and
rehabilitation-based studies recruited in-patients, or those attending rehabilitation facilities.
Lastly community-based studies recruited patients not in hospital or rehabilitation facilities,
with no attempt to include all stroke cases in the geographical area (e.g. only patients from
select general practices were included). Studies were also stratified by three time periods:
the “acute phase” (defined as less than one month post-stroke), “mid-term phase” (one to
five months post-stroke), and “long-term phase” (six or more months post-stroke).
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Table 4-1 Indicators used to assess study quality
Criteria Question asked to assess criteria Possible
score
Was the
recruitment of
Stroke Patients
biased?
Criteria for enrolment was obtained patients enrolled in a pre-
defined consecutive manner (e.g. consecutively admitted hospital or
rehab patients, randomly selected patients from a GP’s register)
Yes
Probability sampling used (for example simple random, systematic,
stratified random, cluster, or two-stage and multi-stage sampling,
population study)
No
Was the
measurement of
anxiety objective?
(Internal Validity)
Clinical interview administered with DSM or ICD diagnosis of anxiety Yes
Validated anxiety measure (e.g HADS, Beck Anxiety Inventory, GHQ
30, 28 and 12. Wimbledon Self-Report Scale)
Possible
Non-validated anxiety screening measure (e.g. single question, self-
report)
Uncertain
Did the Study report
a response rate
and/ or number lost
to follow-up?
Response rate and/or loss to follow-up reported Yes
Response rate and/or loss to follow-up NOT reported No
Was the Response
rate greater than or
equal to >60%
AND/OR the loss to
follow-up less than
or equal to 40%?
Response rate (≥ 60%) and/or loss to follow-up (≤ 40%) Yes
Response rate (<60%) and/or loss to follow-up (>40%) No
Insufficient information provided to determine response rate and/or
lost to follow-up
Unclear
Sufficient core data
elements included
to describe the
population
(Core elements are
Age, Gender, and
Level of Disability)?
(External Validity)
The proportions for at least two core data elements included in the
population description:
(Gender, Age distribution, physical disablity) Other elements such as
Stroke subtype, Marital status, Cognitive capacity, Employment
status, Physical functioning may also be included)
Yes
Less than two core data elements of patient characteristics are
included in the population description:
No
Funding body for
the study may have
biased the results
that are reported?
Potential for reporting bias exists based on source of funding Yes
No obvious potential for biased results based on source of funding No
Author declared
conflict of interest
may have biased
the results that are
reported?
No obvious potential for conflict of interest Yes
Conflict of interest could bias results that were reported No
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4.4.4 Meta-Analyses
Meta-analyses were conducted to estimate a pooled estimate of the prevalence of
anxiety after stroke. Meta-analyses provide a quantitative approximation of the
phenomenon under investigation, and are based on combining “pooling” the information
obtained from studies included in the systematic review. There are different philosophical
principles that underlie meta-analyses, which have resulted in two methods of analyses.
The respective methods are known as fixed effects and random effects model.
The fixed effect method of analysis is based on a mathematical assumption that
there is an underlying “fixed” or overall rate and that every study is trying to estimate this
rate (Borenstein et al. 2010). Under this assumption, if every study were infinitely large,
each would yield an identical result. This is the same as assuming there is no statistical
heterogeneity among the studies. Fixed effect models give more weight to larger studies
with smaller standard error. Some have argued against the fixed-effect model because it is
implausible that the studies collected in a systematic review could represent the actual
sample of infinitely large pool of all possible studies that could ever be done (Bonett 2009).
The random effects method proposes that there is a distribution of true prevalence
and the aim is to estimate the mean of this distribution (Borenstein et al. 2010). The
random effects method gives a more equal weighting to all studies in that larger studies lose
influence while small studies gain influence, and study weights are based on within-study
and between-study variance. The confidence interval for the summary measure tends to be
wider than the fixed effect model unless there is no between-study variance, in which case
the fixed effect and random effects model will yield the same result. The random effects
model was used in this study because its underlying assumptions were more likely to fit the
actual sampling distribution, it did not impose a restriction of assuming a common
prevalence, and it allowed for conclusions to be generalised beyond the sample of studies
included in the review. The meta-analyses findings are displayed graphically in a forest plot.
The concept of heterogeneity was introduced when describing the fixed and random
effects models. Heterogeneity refers to the variability observed when bringing studies
together. This can occur due to clinical diversity (e.g. differences in participants or different
methods of assessing the outcome of interest), or methodological diversity (e.g. differences
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in study design). Heterogeneity is measured statistically with the chi-square (X2) test. Chi-
square assesses the likelihood that the observed differences between the studies is due to
chance. A low p-value (or a large chi-squared statistic relative to its degree of freedom)
provides evidence of heterogeneity. In combination with the chi-square test, the I-square
(I2) statistic provides an estimate of the percentage of the observed differences between
the studies which is not due to chance. Possible I-square values range between 0% and
100%, and it is considered substantial when values are greater than 50% (DerSimonian and
Laird 1986).
Given the potential for a variety of factors (both those identified a priori, and those
that remain unknown) to contribute to the heterogeneity of the findings,
Several meta-analyses were conducted that stratified studies along the following
characteristics:
1. anxiety disorder diagnosis vs. anxiety symptoms as assessed by a rating scale, in
order to evaluate if symptom screening resulted in differential estimates of
prevalence;
2. source of study population (i.e. population, hospital, rehabilitation, or
community), as it was thought that clinical cohorts could have different rates of
anxiety as opposed to population samples that include well and unwell
individuals;
3. an interaction between source of study population and time post-stroke, in order
to compare this review with a systematic review of the prevalence of depression
after stroke;
4. First stroke vs. recurrent stroke, as having a previous stroke could result in the
event being seen as more (or less) anxiety provoking given the individual would
have some familiarity with having a previous stroke;
5. the proportion of eligible individuals that participated in the study, as studies
with greater lost to follow-up could be providing different prevalence estimates.
Studies using the DSM-III criteria were excluded from the pooled result as this
classification system adheres to a strict hierarchical rule no longer used in practice, whereby
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anxiety is not diagnosed in the presence of depression. For studies that used rating scales,
whatever threshold score for anxiety ‘caseness’ had been selected by the primary
researchers was accepted. In studies that measured anxiety over more than one time point,
the earliest measurement from each study was used in the meta-analysis for calculating the
overall prevalence estimate. This was considered to be the most robust approximation, as it
would have the largest sample size, and the most complete data. In the event that presence
of anxiety was evaluated by both clinical diagnosis and anxiety rating scale, the clinical
diagnosis estimate was selected for inclusion in the main results. Where multiple rating
scales were administered (e.g. general anxiety distress measure such as the HADS and a
scale screening for a particular type of anxiety disorder such as the Posttraumatic Diagnostic
Scale), the general anxiety distress measure was reported and included in the overall results.
4.4.5 Assessing publication bias
Various forms of bias are possible that can influence the findings of a systematic
review and meta-analysis. The aim of this systematic review was not to establish a causal
relationship (e.g. is anxiety cause by stroke), and as such some of the types of biases
reported in other types of systematic reviews would not be applicable in this case (e.g.
blinding of participant and assessor). However it was thought that publication bias could be
a likely problem. Reporting biases arise when the dissemination of research findings is
influenced by the nature or direction of results (Sterne, Egger and Moher 2008). For
example clinical trials that show a significant ‘positive’ effect are more likely to be published,
more likely to be published rapidly, more likely to be published in English, more likely to be
published more than once, and more likely to be published in high impact journals that are
read and cited by others. The equivalent scenario for prevalence studies could arise, if
studies that found a phenomenon to exist in a large number or people were more likely to
be published than studies finding the inverse. Publication bias can be assessed by looking at
the asymmetry of funnel plots. If there is no asymmetry, it is expected that larger studies
with more events would lie close to the top of the line drawn for the pooled estimate and
smaller studies would have only a little dispersion around the pooled estimate. Upon visual
inspection this should produce a triangular shape or inverted funnel.
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4.4.6 Other analyses
Correlates of anxiety reported from the included studies were assessed. This section
was limited to a descriptive examination of factors that may have a significant association
with anxiety after stroke. The correlates examined were reported in at least five studies.
This was in line with a previous systematic review of the predictors of depression post-
stroke (Hackett and Anderson 2005). Additionally a descriptive account focusing on the
prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder and symptoms was also carried out.
4.4.7 Statistical software
RevMan version 5.1 was used for all meta-analyses (The Nordic Cochrane Centre
2011).
4.5 Results
The search produced 21,432 references, of which 50 publications (from 41 studies)
met the inclusion criteria in March 2010. Nine studies were translated, however only two
(Ibrahimagic, Sinanovic and Smajlovic 2005; Watanabe, Koseki and Sudo 1984) met the
inclusion criteria. An updated search run in March 2011, found three additional studies,
giving a total of 44 studies in this review (Figure 4-1).
Ten studies which could have potentially contributed to the review findings were
excluded as authors were unavailable to provide necessary information. Reasons for
exclusion were: reporting anxiety as a continuous outcome (Ma, Zhang and Peng 2005;
Zhang 2005; Lucev, Tadinac and Lucev 2007; Lee et al. 2009), using a rating scale that
measured anxiety but not reporting anxiety findings (Matuja, Rwiza and Lweno 1993; Oladiji
et al. 2009; Deng et al. 1999; Radziuviene et al. 2009), reporting only patients with co-
morbid anxiety and depression (Huang 2009), reporting only correlations between anxiety
and another variable (McFarlane, Hobbin and Kneebone 1987), an unpublished thesis that
was not accessible (Beadle-Lindsay 1998) (Appendix A).
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Figure 4-1 Search flow diagram
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4.5.1 Study characteristics
4.5.1.1 Population-based studies
Five studies were found that included a total of 1,054 stroke survivors from a base
population of 1,199,782 (House et al. 1991; Sharpe et al. 1990; Wilkinson et al. 1997; Ueki et
al. 1999; Sturm et al. 2004; Paul et al. 2006; Burvill et al. 1995). Three studies were limited
to those with first ever stroke (House et al. 1991; Wilkinson et al. 1997; Sturm et al. 2004),
one excluded those with subarachnoid haemorrhage (Ueki et al. 1999), and all excluded
people with major cognitive impairment, dementia or communication difficulties. Anxiety
was assessed one month to five years post-stroke, and 60%-100% of eligible individuals
participated. The mean age of participants ranged from 66-71 years, with males
representing 51%-64% of the sample. All studies were based on assessments from patients
enrolled in a local stroke registry system (Table 4-2).
4.5.1.2 Hospital, rehabilitation, and community based studies
There were 20 hospital based studies (Astrom 1996; Donnellan et al. 2010; Field,
Norman and Barton 2008; Fure et al. 2006; Ibrahimagic, Sinanovic and Smajlovic 2005;
Knapp and Hewison 1998; Leppavuori et al. 2003; Li 2006; Moon et al. 2004; Morris,
Robinson and Raphael 1990; Morrison, Johnston and Mac Walter 2000; Morrison et al. 2005;
Sagen et al. 2010; Sampson et al. 2003; Schultz et al. 1997; Stone et al. 2004; Townend et al.
2007; Raju, Sarma and Pandian 2010; Zhao 1999; Merriman, Norman and Barton 2007)
which included a total of 2,163 patients. Anxiety was assessed two days to five years post-
stroke. The proportion of the eligible patient population participating in the studies ranged
from 52%- 89%, participation was not reported in six studies (Ibrahimagic, Sinanovic and
Smajlovic 2005; Li 2006; Moon et al. 2004; Morris, Robinson and Raphael 1990; Watanabe,
Koseki and Sudo 1984; Zhao 1999) and could not be accurately determined in one study
(Schultz et al. 1997). The mean age of participants in hospital based studies ranged from 53-
73 years, and males represented 49%-70% of the sample. Mean age was not reported in
two studies (Moon et al. 2004; Sampson et al. 2003), and the gender distribution was not
available in one study (Sampson et al. 2003).
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Fourteen rehabilitation based studies which included 2,200 patients were also
included in this review (Barker-Collo 2007b; Bergersen et al. 2010; Carod-Artal et al. 2009;
D'Alisa et al. 2005; De Wit et al. 2008; Gangstad, Norman and Barton 2009; Ghika-Schmid et
al. 1999; Giaquinto, Spiridigliozzi and Caracciolo 2007; Kuptniratsaikul et al. 2009;
Masskulpan et al. 2008; Langhorne et al. 2000; Macniven et al. 2005; Sembi et al. 1998;
Tang et al. 2002; Vickery 2006). Anxiety was assessed 10 days to 5 years post-stroke and
31%-100% of eligible patients participated in the studies although the proportion of the
eligible population participating in the study was unclear in one study (D'Alisa et al. 2005)
The mean age of the study populations ranged from 52-76 years, but was not reported in
one study (Gangstad, Norman and Barton 2009). The proportion of the study population
who were male in the rehabilitation based studies ranged from 45%-64%, but was not
reported in three studies (Gangstad, Norman and Barton 2009; Ghika-Schmid et al. 1999;
Sembi et al. 1998).
There were five community-based studies (Ahlsio et al. 1984; Bruggimann et al. 2006;
Gillespie 1997; Lincoln et al. 1998; Visser-Keizer et al. 2002) which included 343 patients.
Anxiety was assessed one month to two years post-stroke and 52%-82% of the eligible
population participated in the studies with one study (Visser-Keizer et al. 2002) accounting
for a third of the stroke participants in this group of studies. The mean age of the study
samples ranged from 51-76 years, and the proportion who were male ranged from 59%-67%.
The participant eligibility criteria for hospital, rehabilitation and community based
studies were variable. Reasons for exclusion included subarachnoid haemorrhage, previous
stroke, TIA, presence of other neurological co-morbidities, pre-existing psychological
problems, aphasia, and lack of competence in the native language where the study was
being conducted. Table 4-2 includes a full summary of the studies included in this review.
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Table 4-2 Summary of studies included the systematic review of the prevalence of anxiety after stroke
Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
Oxfordshire
Community Stroke
Project (OCSP)
(House et al. 1991)
UK
Population/
Longitudinal
cohort/
All 1st ever
stroke entered
in registry/
Nov 1981-Oct
1986
I: 1st ever stroke
(CT)
E: recurrent
stroke, TIA
93% 71 yrs
45%
89 DSM-III (GAD) 1m 1.1 (0-3)
96% 119 6m 0.8 (0-3)
97% 112 1y 0
Oxfordshire
Community Stroke
Project (OCSP-II)
(Sharpe et al. 1990)
UK
80% 62% male 60 DSM-III-R
Anxiety (ALL)
Agoraphobia
GAD
Simple phobia
Panic disorder
2-5y 20(10-30)
8.3 (1.3-
15.3)
5.0 (0-11)
5.0 (0-11)
2.0 (0-5)
Perth Community
Stroke Study (PCSS)
1995 (Burvill et al.
1995)
Australia
Population
based/
Longitudinal
cohort/
Ideal case
finding
method/
1995-1996
I: 1st ever or
recurrent stroke or
TIA (WHO dfn)
60% 73 yrs (56%) 294 DSM-III*
Anxiety (ALL)
Agoraphobia
GAD
4m
19 (14-23)
16 (12-20)
3 (1-5)
South East London
Stroke Study (SELSS)
(Wilkinson et al.
Population/
Longitudinal
cohort/
I: 1st ever stroke in
persons <75
including those
70% 71 yrs
median
(54%)
96 HADS-A≥ 8 5y 31(22-41)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
1997)
UK
All strokes
recorded in
register/
1989-1990
who did not
survive initial
event
North East
Melbourne Stroke
Incidence Study
(NEMSIS)
(Sturm et al. 2004;
Paul et al. 2006)
Australia
Population/
Longitudinal
cohort/
Ideal case
finding method
May 1996-Apr
1999
I: 1st and recurring
stroke (WHO dfn,
CT or MRI)
Unclear Unclear 475 IDA-A
(score 9-15)
3m 13 (10-16)
498 1y 10 (7-13)
201 2y 11 (6-15)
424 5y 8.5 (6-11)
Hachiman Stroke
Registration System
(HSRS) (Ueki et al.
1999)
Japan
Population/
Cohort/
All strokes
entered in
registry/
Jan-Dec 1987
I: All strokes 66% 66 yrs (64%) 47 GHQ-60-≥3 out of 
7 on anx subscale
2.5y 43 (29-57)
(Astrom 1996)
Sweden
Hospital/
Longitudinal
cohort/
Consecutive/
Oct 1979-Jan
1981
I: Ischemic,
hemorrhagic & TIA
(CT)
E: Congenital
mental handicap
72% 73 yrs (61%) 71 DSM-III-R(GAD) 2wk 28 (18-39)
78% 70 3m 31 (21-42)
83% 66 1y 24 (14-35)
86% 57 2y 25 (13-36)
86% 48 3y 19 (7.7-30)
(Donnellan et al.
2010)
Ireland
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
I: 1st or recurrent
stroke (WHO dfn,
CT) & FAST ≥14, & 
Abbreviated
53% Range 20-
98 yrs (51%)
107 HADS-A≥8 1m 33 (24-42)
107 1y 32 (23-41)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
admissions/
Not stated
Mental Test score
≥8  
E: TIA, SAH,
traumatic
intracranial
haemorrhage,
dementia,
extreme critical
illness
(Field, Norman and
Barton 2008)
UK
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
Nurse
approached all
patients
meeting
inclusion
criteria/
Year not stated
E: Cognitive
impairment,
aphasia, acute
medical problems
89% 72 yrs
(53%)
81 HADS-A≥11 <1m 21 (12-30)
(Fure et al. 2006)
Norway
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Dec 2000-Jan
2002
I: Stroke (CT)
E: TIA, moderate
to severe aphasia,
consciousness
64% 69 yrs (63%) 178 HADS-A≥8 1wk 26 (20-33)
(Ibrahimagic,
Sinanovic and
Hospital/
Longitudinal
I: Ischemic stroke
(CT) and able to fill
Not stated 65 yrs (50%) 40 Zung≥50 2 days 30 (16-44)
40 2wk 25 (12-38)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
Smajlovic 2005)
Bosnia
cohort/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Year not state
out self report
questionnaire
(Knapp and Hewison
1998)
UK
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Year not stated
I: Stroke within
past month,
sufficient language
and cognition to
undertake long
interview, named
carer also willing
to participate,
living
independently
pre-stroke
Not stated 69 yrs (53%) 30 HADS-A≥8 <1m 47 (29-65)
30 1m post
discharge
27 (11-43)
30 6m post
discharge
30 (14-47)
(Leppavuori et al.
2003)
Finland
Hospital/
Cross-sectional
cohort/
onsecutive
enrolment/
Year not stated
I: Ischemic stroke
(MRI)
E: SAH, ICH, no
clinical
neurological
examination,
severe apasia,
refusal of
psychiatric
examination
57% 71 yrs (51%) 277 DSM-IV (GAD) 3-4m 21 (16-26)
(Li 2006)
China
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
I: Cerebral
infarction
Not stated 53 yrs (53%) 91 HADS-A>9 Not
reported
31 (21-40)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
Random
selection/
2000-2002
(Merriman, Norman
and Barton 2007)
UK
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
In-hospital and
postal-mailout
to discharged
patients/
Year not stated
I: ≥18 yrs & 1-12
months post
stroke, able to
complete self-
report
questionnaire
E: Dysphasia,
acute medical
problems
52% 74 yrs (56%) 102 HADS-A≥11 1-12m 20 (12-27)
(Moon et al. 2004),
South Korea
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Feb- Jun 2002
I: Stroke (MRI) Not
reported
Mean age
unknown
(62%)
69 BAI≥22 2m 49 (37-61)
(Morris, Robinson
and Raphael 1990),
Australia
Hospital/
Longitudinal
cohort/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Year not stated
I:Ischemic &
Hemorrhagic
(WHO DFN, CT)
E: Aphasia,
however two
individuals with
minimal deficit
included
Not
reported
71 yrs (51%) 99 DSM-III 2m 3.0 (0-6.4)
56 1y 5.4 (0-11)
(Morrison, Johnston Hospital/ I: residual 89% 69 yrs (51%) 101 HADS-A≥11 <1m 24 (15-32)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
and Mac Walter
2000; Morrison et al.
2005)
UK
Longitudinal
cohort/
Recruitment
over 13 months
for patients
admitted to
hospital/
Year not stated
disability, pass
screening test for
cognitive and
communication
problems
89% 78 2m 21 (12-29)
93% 71 6m 23 (13-32)
86$ 38 3y 26 (12-40)
(Raju, Sarma and
Pandian 2010)
India
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
Patients who
had completed
≥1 month 
follow-up/
Nov 2008-Feb
2010
I: 1st ever Ischemic
& Hemorrhagic
stroke (WHO dfn,
CT or MRI), ≥1 
month post-stroke
E: history of
psychoactive
substance abuse,
dementia,
psychiatric co-
morbidity, aphasia
81% 54 yrs (70%) 162 HADS-A≥11 1.5y 11 (6.3-16)
(Sagen et al. 2010)
Norway
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Jan 2003-Jun
2005
I: Ischemic or
hemorrhagic
stroke
E: TIA, aphasia,
psychosis, MMSE
<20, terminal
illness
57% 65 yrs (59%) 104 DSM-IV
Anxiety (ALL)
GAD
PTSD
Social phobia
Panic with Ag.
Panic without Ag.
Agoraphobia
without Panic
4m
23 (15-31)
5.8 (1.3-10)
2.9 (0-6.1)
2.9 (0-6.1)
7.7 (2.6-13)
2.9 (0-6.1)
3.9 (0-7.5)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
OCD
Anxiety NOS
1.9 (0-4.6)
1.0 (0-2.8)
(Sampson et al.
2003)
UK
Hospital/
Case-control/
Recruit from 6
stroke units/
Year not stated
I: Ischemic or
hemorrhagic
stroke
E: Cognitive
impairment,
dysphasia, too
physically unwell
or terminal illness,
MRSA infection
69% Not
reported
54 HADS-A≥10 Not
reported
26 (14-38)
(Schultz et al. 1997)
USA
Hospital/
Longitudinal
cohort/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Years unclear
I: Stroke Unclear 58 yrs (57%) 142 DSM-IV (GAD) Acute
phase
19 (13-25)
77 3m 22 (13-31)
79 6m 25 (16-35)
70 12m 11 (4.0-19)
66 2y 18 (8.9-27)
(Stone et al. 2004)
UK
Hospital/
Nested cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Year not stated
E: Severe stroke
with high risk of
death, dementia,
aphasia, cognitive
impairment,
patients living
alone, carer
unable to talk with
researcher
71% 72 yrs
median
(60%)
89 HADS-A≥8 1m 20 (12-29)
(Townend et al. Hospital/ I: Ischemic or 83% 76 yrs (49%) 125 HADS-A≥9 5 days 4.8 (1.1-8.6)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
2007)
Australia
Longitudinal
cohort/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Mar-Sep 2004
hemorrhagic
stroke
E: Dysphagia,
MMSE<20,
reduced level of
consciousness
95% 112 1m 8.0 (3.0-13)
92% 105 3m 14 (7.6-21)
(Watanabe, Koseki
and Sudo 1984)
Japan
Hospital/
Cross-
Sectional/
Random
selection/
Year not stated
E: aphasia,
dementia
Not
reported
57 yrs (57%) 35 TMAS 6m 51 (35-68)
(Zhao 1999)
China
Hospital/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Year not stated
I: 1st ever stroke
(Chinese Cerebral
Vascular Disease
Symposium of
1995 Dfn)
E: Aphasia, mental
disorder, epilepsy,
mental
retardation,
cerebral trauma
Not
reported
63 yrs (61%) 206 Zung SAS≥50 1m 18 (13-24)
(Barker-Collo 2007b)
New Zealand
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
Sectional/
Consecutive/
Not stated
I: Ischemic,
Hemorrhagic (CT)
E: Aphasia, non-
native language
speaker
81% 52 yrs (55%) 73 BAI≥26 3m 21 (11-32)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
(Bergersen et al.
2010)
Norway
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
Sectional/
Mail-out all
patients/
1998-2001
I: Ischemic, ICH,
SAH
E: Aphasia
64% 58 yrs (64%) 162 HADS-A≥11 2-5y 17 (11-22)
(Carod-Artal et al.
2009)
Brazil
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Jul 2007-Jun
2008
I: Ischemic &
hemorrhagic
(Clinical dx and
radiological
findings)
E: TIA, subdural
haematoma,
dementia, aphasia,
severe disability
due to previous
neurological
disorder
77% 56 yrs (52%) 300 HADS-A≥11 20m 24 (19-29)
(D'Alisa et al. 2005)
Italy
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Not stated
E:MMSE <24,
Aphasia
unclear 63 yrs (60%) 73 HADS-A≥11 5y 21 (11-30)
(De Wit et al. 2008)
England, Belgium,
Switzerland,
Rehabilitation/
Longitudinal
cohort/
Consecutive
I: 1st ever stroke
(WHO criteria- CT),
RMA-GF≤11 
and/or Leg Trunk
95% 70 yrs (53%) 491 HADS-A≥8 2m 25 (21-29)
95% 478 4m 23 (19-27)
92% 467 6m 21 (18-25)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
Germany enrolment/
Mar 2002- Sep
2004
function ≤8  
and/or Arm
function ≤12 
E: neurological
impairments, pre-
stroke BI<50,
subdural
hematoma,
admitted to rehab
centre ≥6 wks 
post-stroke
(Gangstad, Norman
and Barton 2009)
UK
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
All patients
attending clinic
approached
meeting
inclusion
approached/
Study
conducted over
6 months
E: Cognitive
impairment
100% Not
reported
15 HADS-A≥11 14m 6.7 (0-19)
(Ghika-Schmid et al.
1999)
Switzerland
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Year not stated
I: 1st ever stroke
only (CT or MRI)
72% 60 yrs (not
provided)
31 HAM-A>14 3m 29 (13-45)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
(Giaquinto,
Spiridigliozzi and
Caracciolo 2007)
Italy
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
2004-2005
I: 1st ever stroke
only (CT or MRI)
E: TIA, SAH,
previous stroke
but not TIA,
admission to
rehab>3 weeks
post-stroke,
severe co-
morbidity, mental
or comprehension
impairment
81% 70 yrs
(46%)
132 HADS-A≥6 10 days 42 (33-50)
(Masskulpan et al.
2008; Kuptniratsaikul
et al. 2009)
Thailand
Rehabilitation/
Longitudinal
cohort/
National
registry from
consecutive
enrolled
patients/
Mar-Dec 2006
I: Stroke patients
≥18 yrs 
E: Severe medical
comorbidities,
Inability to
communicate,
dementia,
schizophrenia or
present psychotic
episode
Not stated 62 yrs (59%) 327 HADS-A≥11 ~24 days 5.8 (3.3-8.4)
77% 251 2m 26 (20-31)
(Langhorne et al.
2000)
UK
Rehabilitation/
Prospective
longitudinal
cohort/ Multi-
centre
I: Stroke (WHO
dfn) within 7 days
of onset
71% 76 yrs (52%) 220 Single Question 6m post
discharge
34 (28-40)
82% 181 18m post
discharge 44 (37-51)
86% 155 30m post
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
consecutive
enrolment/
7 months
discharge 49 (41-57)
(Macniven et al.
2005)
UK
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
2 week audit of
all patients on
ward/
Year not stated
E: Language
problems
57% 68 yrs (47%) 17 HADS-A≥8 58.5 days 65 (42-87)
(Sembi et al. 1998)
UK
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
Recruited from
3 rehab sites/
Jan 1995-Apr
1996
I: >18 yrs with 1st
ever stroke or TIA,
able to complete
self-report
questionnaire
E: Dysphasia
77% 66 yrs (%
male not
reported)
61 HADS-A≥11 18m 15 (5.9-24)
(Tang et al. 2002)
Hong Kong
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Jun 1999-Aug
2000
I: 1st ever stroke
(CT)
E: TIA, SAH, history
of neurological
impairment,
comprehension
and
communication
deficits, length of
stay <2 wks
31% 71 yrs (45%) 157 DSM-III-R 25 days 0.6 (0-1.9)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
(Vickery 2006)
USA
Rehabilitation/
Cross-
sectional/
Sample of
admitted
patients/
Year not stated
I: Stroke
E: history of co-
morbid dementia,
non-stroke
neurological
process, acute
delirium, severe
psychiatric
disturbance
90% 69 yrs (45%) 141 AMAS ≥65 20 days 7.8 (3.4-12)
(Ahlsio et al. 1984)
Sweden
Community/
Cross-
Sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Jan-Dec 1979
I: CI, TIA, SAH (CT)
E: Severe
disability, aphasia,
dementia
55% 71 yrs,
(60%)
53 Self Report 2y 26 (15-38)
(Bruggimann et al.
2006)
Switzerland
Community/
Cross-
sectional/
Consecutive
enrolment/
Year not stated
I: 1st ever Ischemic
or Hemorrhagic
stroke
E: NIHSS>3, history
of psychiatric
illness, neurologic
co-morbidity
52% 51 yrs (67%) 49 HADS-A≥8 1y 24 (12-37)
(Gillespie 1997)
UK
Community/
Cross-
sectional/
Registry
mailout to
discharged
I: Stroke (WHO
dfn)
E: Communication
difficulties,
cognitive
impairment,
68% 69 yrs (66%) 44 HADS-A≥9 7m 25 (12-38)
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Study name or
author,
year published
Location
Setting/
Design/
Recruitment/
Year of study
Inclusion (I)/
exclusion (E)
% Eligible
participatin
g
Mean age
(%male)/
N Criteria Time Post
Stroke
Percent with
Anxiety
(95% CI)
patients/
Year not stated
significant co-
morbidity, recent
experience of
major life event
unrelated to
stroke
(Lincoln et al. 1998)
UK
Community/
Cross-
sectional/ 74
GP practices/
Aug 1994-Aug
1996
I: Stroke (WHO
dfn)
82% 76 yrs (67%) 84 HADS-A≥11 1m 26 (17-36)
(Visser-Keizer et al.
2002)
Netherlands
Community/
Cross-
sectional/
350 GP clinics/
Year not stated
I: 1st ever ischemic
stroke (CT)
E: neurologic or
psychiatric history,
history of alcohol
or drug abuse,
insufficient
language and
cognitive ability to
allow assessment,
aphasia
61% 67 yrs (59%) 113 HADS-A≥6 3m 14 (7.7-21)
AMAS: Adult Manifest Anxiety Scale, CI: Cerebral Infarction, CT: Computer Tomography used to diagnose stroke, DSM: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, FAST: Frenchay Aphasia Screening Test , GAD: Generalized Anxiety Disorder, HADS-A: Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale Anxiety
Subscale, HAM-A: Hamilton Anxiety Scale, ICH: Intracerebral Hemorrhage, IDA-A: Irritability Depression and Anxiety Scale, Anxiety subscale, MMSE: Mini
Mental State Examination, MRI: Magnetic Resonance Imaging used to diagnose stroke, NIHSS: National Institute of Health Stroke Scale, OCD: Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder, PTSD: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder SAH: Subarachnoid Hemorrhage, TIA: Transient Ischemic Attack, TMAS: Taylor Manifest Anxiety
Scale, WHO DFN: World Health Organization definition of stroke, Zung SAS: Zung Self Rating Anxiety Scale
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4.5.1.3 Measurement and assessment of anxiety
Clinical diagnoses of anxiety disorders were made in eight studies in accordance with
different versions of the DSM. The DSM-III (American Psychiatry Association 1980) was used
in three studies (House et al. 1991; Burvill et al. 1995; Morris, Robinson and Raphael 1990),
while three studies(Astrom 1996; Sharpe et al. 1990; Tang et al. 2002), used the DSM-III-
R.(American Psychiatric Association 1987). The Oxfordshire Community Stroke Project
(OCSP) used the DSM-III-R for its long-term follow-up assessment so it is included in both
the DSM-III and DSM-III-R categories. Another three studies (Leppavuori et al. 2003; Sagen
et al. 2010; Schultz et al. 1997), used the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 1994).
Table 4-3 provides an overview of the eight different standardised scales that were used to
identify anxiety symptoms. One study used a single question measure (Langhorne et al.
2000), and another used a series of five researcher developed questions to identify anxiety
(Ahlsio et al. 1984).
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Table 4-3 Synopsis of rating scales used to measure anxiety symptoms
Screening tool Details No.
studies
Suggested threshold
scoring
Cut-off
scores
reported
from studies
Adult Manifest
Anxiety Scale
(AMAS)(Reynolds,
Richmond and Lowe
2003)
Self report scale with 36 to 44
items. Total number of anxiety
items endorsed is summed and
converted to an age-referenced T-
score
1 Age dependent T-score ≥65 
Beck Anxiety
Inventory (BAI)(Beck
et al. 1988)
Self-report 21 item scale that
discriminates between anxiety
and depression. Possible score
ranges from 0-63.
2 0-7 minimal
8-15 mild
16-25 moderate
26-63 severe anxiety
≥16, >22 
General Health
Questionnaire-60
(GHQ-60)
(Goldberg D and
Williams P 1988)
A 60 item scale used to screen for
various aspects of psychiatric
distress. Includes an anxiety
subscale.
1 Determined by
researcher
≥3  out of 7 
on anxiety
subscale
Hamilton Anxiety
Rating Scale (HAM-
A)
(Hamilton 1969)
Clinician administered 14 item
scale designed to assess anxiety
symptoms not specific to any
disorder, however widely used as
an outcome measure of GAD in
therapeutic trials. It measures
specific anxiety symptom clusters
that are both psychic and somatic
(e.g. tension, insomnia,
respiratory). Possible scores
range from 0-56
1 <17 mild
18-24 mild to
moderate
≥25 severe anxiety 
>14
Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale,
Anxiety subscale
(HADS-A)
(Zigmond and Snaith
1983)
Self-report 14 item scale divided
into two subscales, used to screen
for psychic anxiety and
depression symptoms in medically
compromised patients. Possible
score ranges from 0-21 on each
subscale.
25 0-7 minimal
8/9 possible anxiety
disorder
10/11 probable
anxiety disorder.
≥6, ≥8, ≥9, 
≥10, ≥11 
Irritability
Depression and
Anxiety, Anxiety
subscale (IDA-A)
(Snaith et al. 1978)
Self report scale with 5 items
anxiety subscale. Possible scores
range from 0-15
1 0-8 minimal to mild
9-15 moderate to
severe anxiety
≥9 
Taylor Manifest
Anxiety Scale (TMAS)
(Taylor 1951)
Clinician administered 50 item
scale. Possible scores range from
0-50 with higher score indicative
of higher levels of trait anxiety.
1 14/15 indicative of
anxiety, differential
sex based thresholds
recommended
>23 for
males, >26
females
Zung Self Rating
Anxiety Scale
(William and Zung
1971)
Self report 20 item scale with
measures of state and trait
anxiety. Possible scores range
from 20-80
2 20-44 normal
45-59 mild to
moderate
60-74 severe
75-80 extreme
≥50 
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4.5.2 Anxiety Prevalence
4.5.2.1 Anxiety disorders
Overall prevalence of anxiety disorders after stroke was 18% (95%CI 8%-29%,
[I2=97%, p<0.001]). Although the Perth Community Stroke Study (PCSS) used the DSM-III it
did not apply the hierarchical diagnostic rule, so it has been included in the meta-analysis.
One study (Tang et al. 2002) with an unusually low prevalence estimate contributed all of
the heterogeneity of the I2 statistic, and the prevalence of anxiety disorders excluding this
study was 20% (95%CI 18% - 23%, [I2=0%, p=0.65]).
Three studies (Sharpe et al. 1990; Sagen et al. 2010; Burvill et al. 1995), measured
different types of anxiety and found that phobic disorders (range 13-16%) then GAD (range
3-6%) were the two most common. One study also reported that 3% of their study sample
had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Sagen et al. 2010). Three studies (Astrom 1996;
Leppavuori et al. 2003; Schultz et al. 1997) looked exclusively at GAD after stroke, with all
three reporting a prevalence of approximately 20%. One study that looked exclusively at
GAD, differentiated between primary GAD and GAD due to stroke (Leppavuori et al. 2003),
and found that just over half of the anxiety cases received a primary diagnosis.
4.5.2.2 Anxiety symptoms assessed by rating scale
The overall frequency of anxiety symptoms or ‘caseness’ as assessed by rating scale
was 24% (95% CI 21%-28%, [I2=91%, p<0.001]) (Figure 4-3). The prevalence of anxiety
symptoms post-stroke did not differ significantly from that of anxiety disorder after stroke
(X2=1.16, df=1, p=0.28).
The HADS-A was the most commonly utilised rating scale for assessing anxiety
‘caseness’, having been used in 74% of studies (Table 4-3). The majority of these studies
used a HADS-A cut off of 8/9 or 10/11 to define ‘possible’ or ‘probable’ anxiety. Studies
using a lower cut-off on the HADS-A reported statistically significant higher prevalence rates
relative to those using the ‘probable’ threshold: ([28%, 95%CI 19-36] vs [19%, 95%CI 13-
24%], I2= 79%, p=0.03).
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Figure 4-2 Prevalence of anxiety disorders after stroke (random effects model)
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Figure 4-3 Prevalence of anxiety symptoms after stroke (Random Effect Model)
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4.5.3 Time Course, Co-morbidity and clinical factors
As the rates of anxiety reported by clinical interview and rating scales did not differ
statistically, all data were combined to assess the prevalence of any type of anxiety in the
remaining analyses. An analysis stratified by time post-stroke and source of population was
conducted to compare findings from this review with a previously published review on
depression after stroke which is discussed in section 4.6.1. Table 4-4 shows there was there
was a non-significant increase in the prevalence of anxiety over time. Overall frequency was
20% (95% CI 13%-26%, [I2= 96%, p<0.001]) in the acute phase; 23% (95% CI 19%-27%, [I2=
84%, p<0.001]) 1-5 months post-stroke; and 24% (95%CI 19%-29%, [I2=89%, p<0.001]) 6
months or more post-stroke. The acute phase rehabilitation and midterm population based
study subgroups had the lower anxiety prevalence, relative to the other stratified sub
groups (Table 4-4). There were no differences in anxiety prevalence when stratified by
source of study population, with pooled prevalence estimates ranging from 21 to 25%.
Table 4-4 Anxiety prevalence estimates by time post-stroke and source of study
population
n- number of
studies,
N- number of
participants
% with anxiety
(95%CI)
Random Effects
Model
I2 Significance of
heterogeneity
Less than one month n=12; N= 1525 20 (13-26) 96% <.001
Hospital studies n=8, N= 768 13 (4-21) 97% <.001
Rehabilitation studies n=4, N= 757 24 (15-33) 90% <.001
1-5 months n=19; N= 3001 23 (19-27) 84% <.001
Population n=2, N= 769 15 (9-21) 80% 0.02
Hospital n=10, N= 1189 24 (18-30) 85% <.001
Rehab n=5, N= 846 28 (21-34) 67% 0.02
Community n=2, N= 197 20 (8-31) 77% 0.04
≥ 6 months n=22, N= 2797 24 (19-29) 89% <.001
Population n=4, N= 701 26 (7-45) 98% <.001
Hospital n=8, N= 652 26 (18-34) 81% <.001
Rehab n=7, N= 1298 21 (16-26) 76% <.001
Community n=3, N= 146 25 (18-32) 0% 0.97
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Three studies examined the time course of anxiety within individual stroke patients.
The Collaborative Evaluation of Rehabilitation in Stroke across Europe study (De Wit et al.
2008) found that 40% of patients with anxiety two months after stroke, remained anxious
four months later, and 7-11% of patients not anxious at two months became so two to four
months later. The population-based Perth Community Stroke Study (Burvill et al. 1995)
found that 16% of patients with anxiety disorder at four months post-stroke, remained
anxious eight months later. A similar trend was observed in a small study by Astrom
(Astrom 1996), who reported that after three years post-stroke 62% of patients with early
onset GAD had not recovered, however the small sample size from this last study mean
results should be interpreted with caution.
Three studies (Burvill et al. 1995; Sembi et al. 1998; Leppavuori et al. 2003) reported
pre-stroke mood disorders and found that approximately one third of patients with post-
stroke anxiety had a history of pre-stroke mood or anxiety disorder. Ten studies reported
co-morbidity of anxiety and depression (Astrom 1996; Barker-Collo 2007b; Bergersen et al.
2010; Donnellan et al. 2010; Leppavuori et al. 2003; Macniven et al. 2005; Sagen et al. 2010;
Schultz et al. 1997; Fure et al. 2006; Burvill et al. 1995), and found that 17-80% of those with
anxiety also had depression. No study reported whether stroke patients received any form
of treatment for their anxiety. Additionally, two population-based studies with community-
matched controls found no difference in anxiety prevalence rates between stroke and non-
stroke patients (Burvill et al. 1995) (House et al. 1991).
Data were stratified by studies conducted in samples of first-ever stroke only, and
compared with studies whereby individuals with recurrent strokes were included. Thirteen
studies included those with first ever stroke only, while 29 studies consisted of individuals
who had one or more strokes. No significant difference was observed in the prevalence of
anxiety between those with first ever stroke [21% (95% CI 13-28%), I2=97%] compared to
those with recurrent stroke [25% (95%CI 21-29%), I2= 90%], X2=0.81, df=1, p=0.37].
4.5.4 Quality of evidence
Table 4-5 provides a summary of the quality indices of each study included in the
review. The following sub-section describes their influence on the observed prevalence of
anxiety after stroke.
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Table 4-5 Summary table of quality of evidence
Author Unbiased
recruitment
Internal
Validity
Response
Rate Reported
Response
≥60%
External
Validity
Funding source
reported
No
conflicts
Ahlsio 1984 x ? √ x √ x √
Astrom 1996 x √ √ √ √ √ √
Barker-Collo 2007 x ** √ √ √ x √
Bergerssen 2010 x ** √ √ √ √ √
Bruggiman 2006 x ** √ x √ √ √
Carod-Artal 2009 x ** √ √ √ x √
D'Alisa 2005 x ** x ? √ x √
DeWit 2008 x ** √ √ √ √ √
Donellan 2010 x ** √ x √ x √
Field 2008 x ** √ √ √ x √
Fure 2006 x ** √ √ √ x √
Gangstad 2009 x ** √ √ √ x √
Ghika-Schmid 1999 x ** √ √ √ x √
Giaquinto 2007 x ** √ √ √ x √
Gillespie 1997 x ** √ √ √ x √
HSRS 1999 √ ** √ √ x x √
Ibrahimagic 2005 x ** x ? x x √
Knapp 1998 x ** x ? √ √ √
Kuptniratsaikul 2008 x ** ? √ √ √ √
Langhorne 2000 x ? √ √ √ √ √
Leppavuori 2003 x √ √ x √ √ √
Li 2006 x ** x ? √ x √
Lincoln 1998 x ** √ √ √ √ √
Macniven 2005 x ** √ √ √ x √
Merriman 2007 x ** √ x √ x √
Moon 2004 x ** x ? x x √
Morris 1990 x √ √ √ √ √ √
Morrison 2000/05 x ** √ √ √ √ √
NEMSIS 2004 √ ** √ √ √ √ √
OCSP 1990/91 √ √ √ √ √ √ √
PCSS 1995 √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Raju 2010 x ** √ √ √ √ √
Sagen 2010 x √ √ √ √ √ √
Sampson 2003 x ** √ √ x x √
Schultz 1997 x √ √ x √ √ √
SELSS 1997 √ ** √ √ √ √ √
Sembi 1998 x ** √ √ √ √ √
Stone 2004 x ** √ √ √ √ √
Tang 2002 x √ √ x √ √ √
Townend 2007 x ** √ √ √ √ √
Vickery 2006 x ** √ √ √ x √
Visser-Keizer 2002 x ** √ x √ √ √
Watanabe 1984 x ** x ? √ x √
Zhao 1999 x ** x x √ x √
√- Yes x- No ?- Unclear **- Possible
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4.5.4.1 Method of recruitment
Method of recruitment into studies was variable (Figure 4-4). Estimating post-stroke
anxiety prevalence from individuals enrolled in a comprehensive registry system established
in a geographic locale was considered the gold standard method of recruitment. Five
population based studies used this method. The majority of studies (n=25) used
consecutive patient recruitment strategy, whereby all patients admitted to hospital or
rehabilitation unit over a specified period of time were eligible for participation in the study.
There was variability in other methods of recruitment into study that included postal
questionnaires (n=3), random selection (n=2), selective GP practices (n=2), a selective
approach such as recruiting patients who completed more than one month of rehabilitation
(n=4), clinical audit (n=1), and case-control study (n=1). One study(Sembi et al. 1998) did
not explicitly describe the method of recruitment (Figure 4-4).
Prevalence rates were similar across all methods of recruitment with the exception
of two Chinese studies (Li 2006; Watanabe, Koseki and Sudo 1984) using random selection
and one UK study (Macniven et al. 2005) which was a clinical audit reporting higher
prevalence estimates.
Figure 4-4 Anxiety prevalence stratified by method of recruitment
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Not described (n=1)
Case-control (n=1)
Audit (n=1)
GP practice (n=2)
Selective (n=4)
Postal (n=3)
Consecutive (n=24)
Random (n=2)
Registry (n=5)
% with anxiety (Random effects model)
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4.5.4.2 Diagnostic or Screening tool
Multiple versions of the DSM and various anxiety symptom rating scales were used
among studies. Due to the hierarchical exclusionary principal whereby anxiety was not
diagnosed in the presence of other mood disorders, diagnosis of anxiety disorders was
lowest among studies using the DSM-III. The prevalence estimates based on the Adult
Manifest Anxiety Scale, and the Irritability Depression and Anxiety scale, were lower as well
(Table 4-6).
Table 4-6 Anxiety prevalence stratified by diagnostic/ rating scale
Diagnostic/
Rating Scale
N- number of
studies,
N- number of
participants
% with anxiety
(95%CI)
Random Effects
Model
I2 P for
heterogeneity
DSM-III N=2, n= 188 1.7 (0-3.5) 0% 0.35
DSM-III-R N=4, n=582 16 (3-30) 97% <.001
DSM-IV N=3, n= 523 21 (17- 24) 0% 0.74
HADS-A ≥6 N=2, n= 245 28 (1-55) 96% <.001
HADS-A ≥8/9 N=10, n= 1226 28 (19-36) 92% <.001
HADS-A ≥10/11 N=13, n=1613 19 (13-24) 87% <.001
AMAS N=1, n= 141 7.8 (0-27) - -
BAI N=2, n= 142 35 (8-63) 91% <.001
GHQ-60 (≥3 on 
anxiety subscale)
N=1, n= 47 43 (29-57) - -
HAM-A N=1, n= 31 29 (13-45) - -
IDA-A N=1, n=475 13 (10-16) - -
TMAS N=1, n= 35 51 (35-68) - -
Zung N=2, n= 246 22 (12-33) 55% 0.14
AMAS: Adult Manifest Anxiety Scale, BAI: Beck Anxiety Inventory, DSM-III: Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders Third Edition, DSM-III-R: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders Third Edition-Revised, DSM-IV: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
Fourth Edition, GHQ-60: General Health Questionnaire-60, HADS-A: Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale-anxiety subscale, HAM: Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale, IDA-A: Irritability Depression and
Anxiety Scale-anxiety subscale, TMAS: Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, Zung: Zung Self Rating Anxiety
Scale
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4.5.4.3 Response rate and lost-to follow-up
A response rate greater than or equal to 60% participation by the eligible population
was considered satisfactory. The majority of studies (n=29) had recruitment rates whereby
60% or more of the eligible population was included in the study. Nine studies did not
achieve the 60% criteria, and the rate was unclear in six studies. Prevalence estimates
varied based on the proportion of eligible participants that participated in studies. There
was no significant difference in prevalence between studies with satisfactory participation
compared with studies where less than 60% of the eligible population participated: (21%,
95%CI 17-25%) vs. (25%, 95%CI 13-37%), X2= 0.46, df=1, p=0.53. However, studies whereby
it was unclear how many of the eligible patients participated in the study, had significantly
higher anxiety prevalence (32%, 95%CI 23-40%).
For longitudinal studies loss to follow-up less than 40% was deemed adequate for
maximal quality assessment score. None of the studies with longitudinal follow-up lost
more than 40% of their sample at the subsequent time-point.
4.5.5 Publication bias
A few small studies (Knapp and Hewison 1998; Macniven et al. 2005; Moon et al.
2004; Ueki et al. 1999; Watanabe, Koseki and Sudo 1984)with larger standard error
contributed substantially to the funnel plot asymmetry. The funnel plot revealed more
asymmetry amongst studies with lower cut-off scores on the HADS scale relative to those
using the ‘probable’ threshold, indicating possible publication bias in favour of studies with
higher prevalence estimates (Figure 4-5).
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Figure 4-5 Funnel plot of anxiety prevalence stratified by method used to assess anxiety
4.5.6 Correlates of anxiety after stroke
Investigating anxiety was rarely a primary aim of the studies included in this review
and factors that may have be associated with anxiety were inconsistently reported. The
variables correlated with anxiety and described in this section are those that were reported
in five or more studies.
4.5.6.1 Activities of daily living
Findings were mixed for activities of daily living. Three studies (Leppavuori et al.
2003; Astrom 1996; Fure et al. 2006) reported a significant negative correlation and four
studies (Morrison et al. 2005; Sagen et al. 2010; D'Alisa et al. 2005; Masskulpan et al. 2008)
found no significant association with anxiety after stroke.
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4.5.6.2 Age
There was no significant association observed between age and anxiety after stroke
in 6 of 8 studies (Astrom 1996; Barker-Collo 2007b; Leppavuori et al. 2003; Li 2006; Sagen et
al. 2010; Fure et al. 2006), however two studies (Carod-Artal et al. 2009; Raju, Sarma and
Pandian 2010) reported significant negative correlations between age and anxiety.
4.5.6.3 Depression
There was a significant positive association between depression and anxiety in all six
studies (Schultz et al. 1997; Carod-Artal et al. 2009; Gillespie 1997; Kuptniratsaikul et al.
2009; Leppavuori et al. 2003; Morrison et al. 2005) in which it was assessed.
4.5.6.4 Gender
There was no significant association observed between gender and anxiety after
stroke in five of seven studies (Astrom 1996; Barker-Collo 2007b; Carod-Artal et al. 2009;
Leppavuori et al. 2003; Sagen et al. 2010), however two studies (Schultz et al. 1997; Li 2006)
reported a significant positive asociation between being female and having anxiety after
stroke
4.5.6.5 Lesion location
There was no significant association observed between stroke lesion location and
anxiety after stroke in 5 of 6 studies (Sharpe et al. 1990; Astrom 1996; Barker-Collo 2007b;
Fure et al. 2006; Ghika-Schmid et al. 1999; Leppavuori et al. 2003).
4.5.6.6 Quality of life
Four of five studies (Moon et al. 2004; Ahlsio et al. 1984; Donnellan et al. 2010;
Kuptniratsaikul et al. 2009; Raju, Sarma and Pandian 2010) found a significant negative
correlation with quality of life.
4.5.7 Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after stroke is not well established in research
or clinical practice. However as it is an emerging area of interest, the findings from the
studies where it was examined have been summarised separately.
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This review found five studies (Bruggimann et al. 2006; Field, Norman and Barton
2008; Merriman, Norman and Barton 2007; Sampson et al. 2003; Sembi et al. 1998) that in
addition to administering a global measure of anxiety distress such as the HADS, also
examined the occurrence of post-traumatic stress symptoms. These stress symptoms will
be referred to using the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) label. However it is
acknowledged that a PTSD rating scale does not diagnose this mental health condition and
only gives an indication of individuals who could be considered for additional investigation
by a mental health professional (e.g. psychiatrist or psychologist). Three different rating
scales were used to measure PTSD:
1. The Impact of Event Scale (IES) (Horowitz, Wilner and Alvarez 1979) assesses
intrusive thoughts and avoidant behaviour associated with PTSD.
2. The Post-Traumatic Distress Scale (PDS) (Foa et al. 1997) assesses all the DSM-IV
criteria for PTSD.
3. The Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Checklist- specific (PCL-S) (Weathers, Litz and
Herman 1993) is a 17 item self-report scale that corresponds to the DSM-III-R
symptoms of PTSD.
One study(Sembi et al. 1998) administered the IES and the Penn Inventory of PTSD (Penn)
(Hammarberg 1992) scale and then followed up patients scoring within the PTSD-symptom
range on either scale with a clinician administered PTSD scale (CAPS).
Prevalence of PTSD symptoms as assessed by a rating scale ranged from 6-31%.
The one study (Sembi et al. 1998) that followed up nine patients scoring within the PTSD
symptom range with a clinician-administered interview, found that six (66%) could be
defined as having PTSD. This represented 10% of the overall study sample. The pooled
prevalence estimate of PTSD symptoms was 12% (95% CI 9%- 16%), I2= 76%, p=.002.
All five of these studies conducted correlation analyses to identify clinical factors
that were potentially associated with PTSD symptoms. Given the limited number of studies,
no clear conclusions could be drawn. However age and gender were consistently reported
in all five studies. Findings were mixed for age with two studies (Field, Norman and Barton
2008; Sampson et al. 2003) reporting a significant negative correlation between age and
PTSD, and three studies finding no association. A similar trend was observed with gender.
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Two studies (Sampson et al. 2003; Bruggimann et al. 2006) reported a significant positive
correlation between female gender, whereby no association was observed in the remaining
three studies (Table 4-7).
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Table 4-7 Summary of studies assessing PTSD after stroke
Study author,
Year published
N Criteria Time post
Stroke
Percent with
PTSD
Factors Associated with
PTSD
(Bruggimann et
al. 2006)
49 IES 1 yr 31% (+): Female gender, Anxiety,
Depression, Subjective trauma
(n.s.): Neurological deficit,
memory score, Lesion location,
Age
(Field, Norman
and Barton 2008)
81 PDS <1 mos Mean = 9.32,
SD=8.73
(+):Anxiety, Depression,
Negative cognitions about self
& the world
(-): Age
(n.s.): Gender, Marital status,
Education, #of previous
strokes, Time since stroke,
Consciousness at time of
stroke, Self blame
3 mos Mean = 11.9,
SD=10.47
(Merriman,
Norman and
Barton 2007)
102 PDS 1-12 mos 16%
(Mean = 11.22,
SD=4.30)
(+): Previous stroke, cognitive
appraisal, Anxiety, Depression,
Negative affect
(-): Time since stroke
(n.s.): Age, Gender, Marital
status, Lesion location, Barthel
Index
(Sampson et al.
2003)
54 PCL-S Not
reported
6% (+): Female gender, Barthel
Index, Length of hospital stay
(-): Age
(Sembi et al.
1998)
61 IES 18 mos 21% (+): Anxiety, Depression,
Negative affect
(n.s.): Gender, Age, Lesion
location, pre-stroke medical or
mental health problems,
alcohol consumption, Time
since stroke, Barthel Index
Penn 7%
CAPS 10%
CAPS: Clinician Administered PTSD scale, IES: Impact of Event Scale, PCL-S: Post Traumatic Distress
Scale, PDS: Post-Traumatic Distress Scale, Penn: Penn Inventory of PTSD
(+): Significant positive correlation p<.05, (-)Significant negative correlation p<.05, (n.s) No significant
association
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4.6 Discussion
This is the first known systematic review of anxiety prevalence after stroke. Anxiety
disorders diagnosed by interview and anxiety symptoms assessed by rating scale occurred in
20-25% of patients at any time after stroke. Phobic disorders and GAD were the most
common types of anxiety however this finding is based on data from only three studies.
Similar prevalence has been observed in individuals other long-term conditions (Dissanayaka
et al. 2010; Frasure-Smith and Lesperance 2008; Murphy et al. 2012), however the
prevalence of anxiety amongst stroke survivors is higher than the 7% to 14% which has been
observed in the general older adult population (Gum, King-Kallimanis and Kohn 2009;
Ritchie, Artero and Beluche 2004)
The HADS was the most widely used rating scale for assessing anxiety symptoms.
Validation of the HADS using different scoring thresholds has already been discussed in
chapter two. However just to reiterate, the sensitivity for detecting anxiety disorders using
the HADS-A in stroke patients using the ‘probable’ cut-off score of 10/11 ranges between
0.35 and 0.52 (O'Rourke et al. 1998; Sagen et al. 2009), and is only marginally better when
using the lower ‘possible ’score of 8/9. As a result the overall prevalence of anxiety
‘caseness’ could have been underestimated. On the other hand, the higher threshold has a
higher degree of specificity, hence the proportion of individuals defined as anxious are more
likely to represent genuine cases of significant anxious distress. The fact that there was such
variability in cut-off scores likely contributed to the high levels of statistical heterogeneity
observed in the pooled estimate of anxiety symptoms. However the alternative would have
been to exclude a subset of studies which would be less than ideal. This highlights the need
for further investigation into clinically relevant scoring thresholds that are appropriate for
identifying individuals with substantial anxious distress who could benefit from some form
of interventional support.
The prevalence of anxiety after stroke appears to increase somewhat over time,
however the increase was not found to be statistically significant. It is possible that the lack
of significance could be due to the stratified time-periods chosen a priori, however post-hoc
analysis selecting different time-points did not show a significant increase over time either.
With the exception of rates being lower in rehabilitation studies during the acute phase post
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stroke, no other significant difference was observed based on the setting in which
participants were recruited. A hypothesis is that the lower rate observed in the acute
rehabilitation studies could be due to the structured supportive environment, or the notion
that patients deemed appropriate for rehabilitation may be less disabled and less likely to
be anxious. Given that anxiety prevalence beyond the acute phase is the same amongst
rehabilitation patients as in other groups of patients, it is perhaps indicative of a negative
shift in these patients’ perception of their rehabilitation potential and chances of returning
to their pre-stroke functional level.
There is insufficient information to determine whether the anxiety reported was a
consequence of stroke, as the majority of studies only made cross-sectional assessments
and did not consider the presence of pre-stroke anxiety levels in their assessments. Also,
other factors that could impact the validity of prevalence estimates, such as medication use,
the presence of cognitive or communication impairment, or previously having an anxiety
disorder were not systematically investigated.
Despite having stratified analyses by study population and timing there was
significant heterogeneity in the pooled estimates which impacts on the generalisability and
interpretation of findings. Few studies differentiated between ‘first-ever anxiety’ and
‘current anxiety’ making it impossible to determine whether the differences in estimates
represent genuine discrepancies or were due to measurement error or methodological
differences. Second, the variation in type of stroke, stroke severity, and inconsistency of
diagnostic tools and rating scales also contributed to the heterogeneity of the pooled
estimate. The review relied on studies being catalogued in major search databases,
however authors of studies whereby it was obvious that anxiety would have been assessed
(e.g. HADS scale administered) were contacted for their anxiety data if it was not included in
their publication. There was some evidence of possible publication bias in that small studies
with larger standard error were found to yield higher prevalence estimates. It must be
noted though that the relationship between sample size and prevalence is not causal. These
studies may in fact have been drawn from populations that genuinely had higher levels of
anxiety. Given the methodological variability in studies this is just as plausible an
explanation. Additionally some studies were not included in the review as their data were
unavailable and the influence this would have on the overall findings is unknown. With the
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exception of the HADS and the BAI, the other scales used in these studies have not been
validated in stroke populations, so their sensitivity and specificity are uncertain in this
patient group. The HADS focuses on the psychic symptoms of anxiety and any physical
indicators of anxiety not attributed to stroke have not been taken into account.
That none of the studies included in this review, included individuals with severe
communication disorders, really underscores the need to develop anxiety assessment tools
appropriate for this patient sub-group so they can begin to be included in future research.
Other researchers have highlighted this as a research need (Kneebone and Lincoln 2012).
To date a visual analogue mood scale found to be adequate in identifying depression post-
stroke, has proved insufficient in screening for anxiety (Bennett and Lincoln 2006).
4.6.1 How does this review compare with other systematic reviews on
psychological problems after stroke
A well conducted and frequently cited systematic review of 51 observational studies
found that approximately 33% (95% CI 29-36) of individuals experience depression at some
point after stroke (Hackett et al. 2005). This review will be referred to as the “Hackett
review”. Findings were stratified along the same time-periods and by the same method of
case ascertainment as this review show that depression prevalence after stroke is higher:
 Depression [32%, 95% CI 19-44%] vs. anxiety [20%, 95% CI 13-26%] less than one
month post stroke
 Depression [34%, 95% CI 20-39%] vs. anxiety [23%, 95%CI 19-27%] 1-5 months post-
stroke
 Depression [34%, 95%CI 29-39%] vs. anxiety [24%, 95%CI 19-29%] six months or
more post stroke
However, interpretation of this finding is difficult as it would be expected that a significant
portion of individuals with depression also have anxiety and this is not taken into account in
the depression prevalence studies. Additionally, unlike findings from the anxiety review,
whereby anxiety prevalence was not higher amongst stroke survivors than in controls, the
Oxfordshire Community Stroke Project study (House et al. 1991) found the frequency of
depression was double that amongst stroke survivors than in matched population-based
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controls. The trajectory of depression appears to differ as well. The Hackett review
suggests that depression tends to resolve spontaneously within several months of onset in
the majority of stroke survivors. The time course for anxiety in the few studies where it was
assessed suggests it is more persistent in nature than depression. Depression co-morbid
with anxiety was not reported in the Hackett review so no comparisons could be made.
Lastly, because there was substantial methodological heterogeneity observed in both
reviews makes the cross-comparison of findings challenging.
A systematic review of 20 studies on predictors of depression after stroke generated
from the group of studies identified in the Hackett review was also carried out (Hackett and
Anderson 2005). Age and gender were the two most commonly examined predictors of
depression, as they were reported in 17 studies. Age was only associated with depression in
four (24%) studies, and female gender in ten (58%) studies. Physical disability was
investigated in 11 studies and was found to be associated with depression in nine (82%) of
them. Having a personal history of depression was associated with depression after stroke
in 5 of 8 studies. Additionally lesion location was not found to be significantly associated
with depression as an association was observed in only 1 of 9 studies. However due to the
paucity of well-designed studies with sufficient size to build stable multivariate models this
review was only able to show that depression was correlated with certain factors.
No published systematic review was found on the prevalence of emotionalism after
stroke, however it is estimated to affect between 20% and 25% of survivors in the first six
months after stroke, and tends to decline in frequency and severity over the first year
(Hackett et al. 2010). However even one year post-stroke up to 15% of survivors have been
found to still be suffering with persistent and severe problems of emotionalism (Hackett et
al. 2010). Stroke survivors describe feeling distressed and embarrassed, and thereby may
engage in social avoidance or isolation which could impair overall quality of life (Hackett et
al. 2010). This could potentially give rise to other mental health problems such as anxiety
and depression.
4.6.2 Clinical and Research Implications
There is a high prevalence of reported psychological problems post-stroke. Taking
into account that certain segments of the stroke population have not been included in the
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review, the actual prevalence has likely been underestimated. Current guidelines for
psychological care after stroke propose screening for anxiety within the first six weeks,
however findings from this review show that anxiety was prevalent at time-periods well
beyond six months. It is likely that stroke survivors would benefit from screening for anxiety
throughout the entire rehabilitation pathway, and the presence of a more psychologically
aware staff. Recent audits and surveys have found stroke survivors rated psychological
services as unsatisfactory, and the ratio of psychologist to stroke patient population was
well below the advocated minimum level, with some areas having very limited access to
psychological support (National Audit Office 2010; McKevitt et al. 2011). Measures in place
to improve access to psychological therapies and build psychological competency in non-
specialist trained psychological or psychiatric staff will hopefully address the needs of stroke
survivors.
Also of interest will be for future studies to examine the phenomena of anxiety and
depression concurrently. The pervasive use of mood scales, such as the HADS, could
facilitate an evaluation of the impact on patients with anxiety in addition to depression, as
there could be differential risk factors and outcomes for those with anxiety only, depression
only, and co-morbid anxiety and depression after stroke. However the design of most
studies does not allow for any conclusion on this issue.
4.7 Summary
This review shows there has been a substantial number of studies that have assessed the
frequency of anxiety disorders or symptoms after stroke. However information about
timing of onset, risk factors and outcomes remains scant as investigating anxiety was rarely
a primary objective of any of the included studies. Most studies tended to examine the
phenomena of anxiety and depression in isolation. Given the variability in cut-off scores
used in research studies, clear guidance on the appropriate point to screen for anxiety is
needed, as this would reduce, at least marginally, the heterogeneity among future studies
and provide more clarity for clinicians about treatment.
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5 Chapter Five: Study 2- Cochrane systematic review of
interventions used to treat anxiety after stroke
5.1 Introduction
The systematic review in chapter four quantified the extent to which anxiety after
stroke is a problem. This chapter presents findings from a Cochrane systematic review on
the effectiveness of interventions used to treat anxiety after stroke. Cochrane reviews are
an international source of high quality, reliable health information that is readily
disseminated to large audiences. These reviews facilitate choices that clinicians, patients,
and policy makers face, and their structured easy to read format ensure that the
information is appropriate for diverse audiences. The findings from this review have been
published by the Cochrane Collaboration (Campbell Burton et al. 2011).
5.2 Rationale for review
Treatments for anxiety after stroke have received minimal attention both in clinical
practice and research, relative to other post-stroke psychological conditions. Systematic
reviews were previously carried out to assess the effectiveness of interventions used to
treat depression and emotionalism when they occur after stroke (Hackett et al. 2008;
Hackett et al. 2010). Despite there being a variety of treatment options available for anxiety,
no equivalent systematic review had been conducted for anxiety post-stroke. Anxiety has
been shown to increase the risk and severity of depression, and also has a negative
influence on quality of life (Shimoda and Robinson 1998). Hence, treatment of anxiety could
reduce the risk of subsequent depression and its associated adverse consequences, along
with the unpleasant experience associated with anxiety.
5.3 Aim of review
The primary aim of this review was to assess the effectiveness of pharmaceutical,
psychological, complementary or alternative therapy interventions in treating anxiety
disorders or symptoms in stroke patients.
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The secondary aim was to identify whether any of these interventions for anxiety had
an effect on quality of life, disability, depression, social participation, caregiver burden or
risk of death.
5.4 Methods
The following section describes the methods used to carry out this systematic review.
Certain sections describe the specific contributions of the members of the review team and
uses their initials. A glossary of names can be found in Appendix B.
5.4.1 Inclusion/ Exclusion Criteria
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) where the primary aim of the intervention was
to treat anxiety in individuals with a clinical diagnosis of stroke (Hatano 1976) were eligible
for inclusion in this review. As there was no existing evidence base for treating anxiety after
stroke, non-randomised studies were not included as they are more likely to provide biased
information about the effectiveness of an intervention (Higgins and Green 2008). There was
no restriction on the basis of language or study location. It was expected that eligible trials
would compare the effect of an intervention plus usual care against placebo, a different
intervention, or different doses or frequency of interventions. Trials had to have a placebo
or standard care control arm otherwise they were not eligible for inclusion.
All stroke patients enrolled into a RCT had to have either a clinical diagnosis of an
anxiety disorder according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (e.g.
DSM-III (American Psychiatry Association 1980),DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association
1987), DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 1994)) or similar diagnostic criteria. Stroke
patients in RCTs deemed to have significant levels of anxiety symptoms as established by a
pre-defined cut-off score on an anxiety screening tool as determined by the researcher(s),
were also eligible. There were no restrictions on age distribution or gender. Studies with
mixed populations of ischaemic or haemorrhagic stroke were eligible but studies assessing
treatment effect in an exclusively subarachnoid haemorrhage patient population were
excluded, as the characteristics, treatment, and management of these patients are
substantially different to other stroke patients. Studies treating stroke patients for other
conditions such as depression, cognitive impairment or physical disability were also
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ineligible, unless it could be determined that all patients had co-morbid anxiety upon
enrolment into the trial and treatment of the anxiety was one of the main objectives of the
trial.
RCTs of pharmaceutical interventions administered to stroke patients compared with
placebo or standard care were evaluated. The purpose of administering the drug had to be
to treat anxiety. Trials where drugs were administered for other purposes such as neuro-
protection were excluded. Trials of psychological interventions compared with placebo or
standard care, which aimed to treat anxiety were eligible for inclusion. It was expected that
these types of interventions would have a clearly defined psychological component, be
structured, delivered and supervised by trained staff, and be time-limited. Interventions
whose purpose was simply to provide information or educate patients were excluded. Trials
such as occupational therapy or stroke support co-ordinator visitation were excluded unless
they had a definitive psychological component aimed at treating anxiety.
5.4.2 Outcome measures
The primary outcomes of interest were:
1. the proportion of stroke patients without a clinical diagnosis of an anxiety disorder
according to the DSM(American Psychiatric Association 1994) or another standard diagnostic
classification system at the end of scheduled follow-up; OR
2. the proportion of stroke patients scoring outside the anxiety symptom range (as defined by
study author); or the change score from baseline on an anxiety rating scale or via self-report
at the end of scheduled follow-up.
The following secondary outcomes were also of interest.
1. Co-morbid depression, as diagnosed by DSM or determined by a depression rating scale
such as the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)(Beck, Ward and Mendelson 1961), or the
Hamilton Depression scale (HAM-D) (Hamilton 1960).
2. Quality of life as measured on scales such as the 36-item short form questionnaire (SF-36)
(Ware, Snow and Kosinski 1993).
3. Social activities as measured on scales such as the Frenchay Activities Index (Wade and Legh-
Smith 1985).
4. Activities of daily living as measured on scales such as the Barthel Index (Mahoney and
Barthel 1965).
5. Principal caregiver burden as measured by scales such as the Zarit Caregiver Burden
Interview (Zarit, Rever and Bach-Peterson 1980).
6. Any adverse consequence as a result of treatment for anxiety such as drug tolerance, co-
dependence on counsellor or death. We also recorded loss to follow-up rates in different
arms of trials as a possible indicator of treatment acceptability.
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5.4.3 Search strategy
The trials register of the Cochrane Stroke Group (October 2010), CENTRAL (The
Cochrane Library 2010, Issue 4), MEDLINE (1950 to October 2010), EMBASE (1947 to
October 2010), PsycINFO (1806 to October 2010), Allied and Complementary Medicine
database (AMED) (1985 to October 2010), Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health
(CINAHL) (1982 to October 2010), Proquest Digital Dissertations (1861 to October 2010),
and Psychological Database for Brain Impairment Treatment Efficacy (PsycBITE) (2004 to
October 2010) were searched. See Appendix B for the search strategies used in various
databases.
In attempt to identify additional published, unpublished, and ongoing trials the
ClinicalTrials.gov (U.S. National Institutes of Health 2012), the Stroke Trials registry (The
Internet Stroke Center 2012) and Current Controlled Trials (Springer Science+Business
Media 2012) websites were also searched. Conference proceedings from the UK Stroke
Forum (2006 to 2010), European Stroke Conference (2001 to 2010), and the International
Stroke Conference (2007 to 2010) not already searched by the Cochrane Stroke Group Trials
Search Co-ordinator were also reviewed. Science Citation Index Cited Reference search was
used for forward tracking of relevant articles, and bibliographies of identified trials were
reviewed. Experts known to members of the review team, or researchers with proficiency
in psychological issues in stroke populations identified by scanning authors of relevant
publications were contacted. The Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry, which
includes the large majority of research-based pharmaceutical companies was contacted to
request information about any relevant unpublished trials. However, there is compulsory
registration of trials on public domain sites such as Clinicaltrials.gov and controlled-
trials.com, therefore, making it unlikely that additional trials would be found.
The search did not exclude publications based on language. Translation was
arranged for all potentially relevant non-English reports. For review of the search strategy
see Appendix B.
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5.4.4 Study selection and data extraction
For this part of the review, two reviewers (ACB and PK) independently screened all
reports yielded from the searches of electronic databases, and excluded citations that were
clearly irrelevant based on title and abstract. ACB retrieved the full text of the remaining
articles and reviewed them for inclusion based on the eligibility criteria. If a consensus
could not be reached between ACB and PK, a third member of the review group (DG) would
have been consulted for adjudication. However, this was not necessary.
Two reviewers (ACB and JM) independently extracted data from included studies
onto a paper extraction form where key information from studies was recorded. If
information was missing, ACB attempted to contact the study authors, either by telephone
or email, to request the missing data. Once the data extractions were reconciled, ACB
entered them into Review Manager 5. The following core data elements such as details
about the study design, methods, information about participants and outcomes for analysis
were recorded. In the event that relevant data were missing, attempts were made to
contact the study author.
5.4.5 Analysis
All the analysis for this review was carried out by ACB. Study bias was assessed in
accordance with the Cochrane Collaboration’s tool for assessing risk of bias (Higgins and
Altman 2008). This instrument evaluates the sequence generation, allocation concealment,
blinding (of participants, personnel and outcome assessors), incomplete outcome data,
selective outcome reporting and other unspecified types of bias (e.g. conflict of interest).
Biases from each study were summarised qualitatively and their potential impact on the
findings were described. It was decided a priori that the longest time point post
intervention initiation would be reported in the event the outcome was measured multiple
times.
Several factors can contribute to the heterogeneity of studies and observed effect size.
Subgroup analyses were planned on certain clinically relevant factors, such as specific type
of anxiety disorder (e.g. GAD or social phobia), length of time treatment was administered,
or length of time since stroke at entry into the trial. In order to assess the robustness of
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findings, sensitivity analyses examining the degree to which they influenced the effect size
were intended and would include studies whereby allocation concealment, double blinding,
and fidelity to administered intervention were executed to the highest standard.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Results of search
The search yielded 3486 unique titles Figure 5-1. Ten papers were retrieved for full
text review. Additionally, 13 systematic reviews found in the search were reviewed for any
possible additional citations. However, no new references were found using this method.
5.5.2 Included studies
Two trials with a total of 175 randomised participants met the inclusion criteria
(Wang et al. 2005; Zhang, Zhang and Wang 2005). Table 5-1. shows a summary of the
included studies. Neither trial had a placebo control arm, but compared the intervention
group to standard care. Additionally both studies used the Hamilton Anxiety Scale (HAM-A)
to evaluate the presence of anxiety (Hamilton 1969). The Hamilton Anxiety Scale is a rating
scale developed to quantify the severity of anxiety symptoms, and is often used in
psychotropic drug evaluation studies. It consists of 14 items, each defined by a series of
symptoms. Each item is rated on a five-point scale, ranging from zero (not present) to four
(severe). Total scores on the HAM-A can range from 0 to 56. A score of 14 or more is
suggestive of clinically significant anxiety.
5.5.2.1 Trial one (Wang 2005)
The first trial evaluated the effectiveness of the selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitor (SSRI) paroxetine, and the combination of paroxetine and psychotherapy. Eighty-
one first-ever stroke patients who met the Chinese Classification and Diagnostic Criteria of
Mental Disorders (CCMD-3) criteria for anxiety and depression were randomised to one of
the three groups. The first group (27 patients) received 20 mg of paroxetine per day, while
the second group (27 patients) received the same amount of paroxetine per day along with
psychiatrist administered supportive psychotherapy for 30 to 60 minutes once per week. A
parallel control group with 27 patients received routine treatment only. The study authors
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did not specify the length of time the participants were post-stroke at time of recruitment.
Patients who were in a coma, aphasic, had severe cognitive dysfunction, other serious
diseases or those who had been prescribed depression or antipsychotic medications in the
three months prior to the onset of the trial were excluded. The interventions were carried
out for six weeks and the HAM-A and the Hamilton Depression Scale (HAM-D) scales were
used to assess the severity of anxiety and depression symptoms at baseline and at the two,
four and six week time points during the treatment. Scores on the Barthel Index measuring
activities of daily living were also assessed at all time points. Mean ages of participants
were as follows: 62.4 years drug only group, 64.0 years in the drug plus psychotherapy
group, and 63.2 years in the standard care group.
5.5.2.2 Trial two (Zhang 2005)
The second trial examined the effect of the anxiolytic drug buspirone hydrochloride
against standard care. Ninety-four stroke patients with co-morbid anxiety and depression
according to the CCMD-3 were recruited into the trial. Individuals with unstable conditions
were deemed ineligible; however, no description of unstable conditions was provided.
Buspirone was administered for four weeks to those in the intervention arm of the study. It
was provided at 20 to 30 mg per dose during the first week, and then at 40 to 60 mg per
dose during the second week. No information was provided about the amount
administered during the third or fourth week. Anxiety and depression were measured using
the HAM-A and the HAM-D scales at the baseline, and at two and four weeks during the
intervention. The mean age of participants was 57.8 years for the intervention group, and
59.2 years for the control group. No other secondary outcome of interest was reported.
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Figure 5-1 Search flow diagram
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Table 5-1 Summary table of included studies
(Wang et al. 2005) (Zhang, Zhang and Wang 2005)
Location China China
Participants 81 first ever stroke with co-morbid anxiety & depression
Group 1: n=27 Group 2: n=27 Group 3: n=27
52% male, 52% male, 52% male
mean age 62 yrs mean age 64 yrs 63 yrs
94 patients with co-morbid anxiety & depression
Group 1: n=47 Group 2: n=47
64% male, mean age 58 yrs 61% male, mean age 59 yrs
Interventions Group 1: paroxetine 20mg daily + standard care
Group 2: paroxetine 20mg daily+ psychiatrist administered
individual supportive psychotherapy (30-60 mins)+ standard care
Group 3: standard care only
Duration: 6 weeks
Group 1: buspirone hydrochloride 20 to 30 mg daily in first
week, 40 to 60 mg in second week + routine care
Group 2: routine care (no description of routine care
Duration: 4 weeks
Outcomes of Interest
Anxiety HAM-A: Mean score ± sd
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Baseline: 14.0 ± 2.8 13.9 ± 2.9 13.8 ± 2.8
6 wks: 5.4 ± 1.7 3.8 ± 1.8 12.8 ± 1.9
HAM-A: Mean score ± sd
Group 1 Group 2
Baseline: 22.7 ± 5.2 22.5 ± 4.3
4 wks: 6.5 ± 3.1 12.6 ± 3.4
Depression HAM-D: Mean score ± sd
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Baseline: 18.2 ± 1.4 18.8 ± 3. 18.0 ± 1.3
6 wks: 10.1 ± 1.1 8.9 ± 1.2 17.5 ± 1.1
HAM-D: Mean score ± sd
Group 1 Group 2
Baseline: 24.6 ± 4.7 23.4 ± 5.3
4 wks: 8.3 ± 2.8 13.4 ± 2.7
Activities of
Daily Living
Barthel Index: Mean score ± sd
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Baseline: 60.9 ± 23.9 62.0 ± 23.1 61.5 ± 24.3
6 wks: 84.3 ± 8.4 90.2 ± 7.3 78.3 ± 15.0
Not measured
Notes: Exclusions: coma, aphasia, severe cognitive dysfunction, other
serious diseases,
depression or antipsychotic medications within 3 months, allergic to
paroxetine, or bipolar disorder
Exclusion: patients with unstable conditions
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5.5.2.3 Intervention effectiveness
In the absence of any placebo-control group and because of generally poor
description of the study processes, a meta-analysis was not conducted. The effectiveness of
the interventions compared with standard care are described.
Trial one found that both paroxetine, and paroxetine plus psychotherapy reduced
the severity of anxiety symptoms as measured by the HAM-A when compared with standard
care. The mean HAM-A anxiety scores at baseline in the drug only, drug plus psychotherapy,
and standard care groups were 14.0 ± (standard deviation (SD) = 2.8), 13.9 (SD =2.9) and
13.8 (SD = 2.8) respectively. At six weeks the mean anxiety scores were significantly lower
in the two intervention groups relative to the controls 5.4 (SD = 1.7), 3.8 (SD = 1.8) in the
drug only, and drug plus psychotherapy groups, but remained at 12.8 (SD = 1.9) in the
control group. Relative to the standard care group, this represents a 58% and 71% lower
mean anxiety score in the paroxetine, and paroxetine plus psychotherapy groups,
respectively. These differences were statistically significant (P < 0.01). A similar trend was
observed for mean depression scores as measured by the HAM-D. The possible range on
the HAM-D is zero to 54, with higher scores indicative of more severe symptoms. Mean
depression severity scores were 18.2 (SD = 1.4), 18.8 (SD = 3.1), and 18.0 (SD = 1.3) at
baseline in the paroxetine, paroxetine plus psychotherapy, and standard care groups,
respectively. While no change was observed in the control group after six weeks (mean 17.5,
SD = 1.1), both the drug only and drug plus psychotherapy groups had significantly fewer
depression symptoms (mean 10.1, SD = 1.1, and mean 8.9, SD = 1.2), respectively. This was
also the only trial that reported changes in functional status as measured by the Barthel
Index of activities of daily living (ADL). It found that ADL improved significantly in all three
groups of patients but the greatest improvement was observed in the drug plus
psychotherapy group, followed by the drug only group, with the standard care controls
having the least improvement.
Trial two found that buspirone hydrocholoride was effective in reducing anxiety
symptoms when compared with standard care. Four weeks after drug initiation the mean
anxiety score on the HAM-A decreased from 22.7 (SD = 5.2) to 6.5 (SD = 3.1) in the
intervention group. This was a significantly larger decrease than seen in the standard care
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group (P <0.01) where the mean anxiety score decreased from 22.5 (SD = 4.3) to 12.6 (SD =
3.4) after four weeks. The mean in the intervention group was 50% lower than those
receiving standard care only. Buspirone was also effective in significantly reducing
depression symptoms as measured on the HAM-D in the intervention group compared with
the controls. The mean depression score in the intervention group decreased from 24.6 (SD
= 4.7) to 8.3 (SD = 2.8) and from 23.4 (SD = 5.3) to 13.4 (SD = 2.7) in the standard care group.
5.5.2.4 Adverse events
No participants were lost to follow-up in the Wang et al trial. However, in Zhang
(2005) trial, both the intervention and control groups lost 23% of their participants.
Reasons given for drop out in the intervention group were unsatisfactory treatment effect,
drug side effects, and subsequent prescription of benzodiazepines. Recurrent stroke, having
benzodiazepines prescribed, and withdrawal were reasons given for loss to follow-up in the
control group.
5.5.2.5 Bias in included studies
Cochrane systematic reviews consider several risk of bias indices that may influence
heterogeneity of study results. Selection bias refers to systematic differences between
baseline characteristics of the groups being compared. It is based on two concepts: a)
sequence generation, a specified rule for allocating interventions to participants which
should be based on some type of chance or random process, and b) allocation concealment,
which is a system that prevents foreknowledge of forthcoming allocations. Wang et al
(2005) stated that they used simple random sampling, and Zhang (2005) indicated that they
used a random number list for participants who met the inclusion criteria, however the
randomisation process was not described in either study.
Blinding is the procedure that prevents study participants, caregivers, or outcome
assessors from knowing which trial arm a participant has been allocated to. Neither study
provided information about blinding, and as there was no placebo control group blinding
would likely only be possible for independent outcome assessors, and there was no
indication that any were involved in these trials.
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Attrition occurred in the Zhang (2005) trial only and available case analysis was
carried out in this study. There was no indication that participants in the Wang et al (2005)
study did not adhere to treatment protocol. Additionally, there was no evidence of
selective outcome reporting in either of the trials. All outcomes measured and reported in
the methods of both studies at the onset of the trial were reported for all time points.
However, the research protocols were not available, so it is unknown whether other
outcomes were measured but not reported.
5.5.3 Excluded studies
Eight studies were excluded from the review. Three studies (Liu, Liu and Liang 2004;
Ye et al. 2006; Wu and Liu 2008), had no adequate control group (i.e. no placebo or
standard care). In four studies anxiety levels of the participants were assessed but did not
meet a pre-defined threshold definition so it could not be established that all participants
had anxiety upon entry into the trial (Morrison et al. 1998; Mok and Pang 2004; Li 2005;
Rorsman and Johansson 2006). In addition three studies (Morrison et al. 1998; Kimura,
Tateno and Robinson 2003; Li 2005) were not randomised control trials. One study
(Morrison et al. 1998), was a quasi-experimental cohort study design using retrospective
controls, and in another study participants acted as their own controls. The criteria for
entry into one study (Kimura, Tateno and Robinson 2003) was depression, and a subset
analysis on cases with co-morbid depression and GAD was conducted. A summary table of
the excluded studies can be found in Appendix B.
5.6 Discussion
5.6.1 Completeness and Applicability of evidence
The scope of this review was deliberately broad as it was suspected the completed
research on interventions used to treat anxiety after stroke was not as established as some
other post-stroke psychological conditions. Very little information was provided about the
populations from which the participants were selected, hence the findings of this review
may not even be generalisable to the stroke population from which they were drawn let
alone stroke populations in other locales. Another concern was that the inclusion criteria
for both studies required participants to have co-morbid anxiety and depression according
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to the CCMD-3. This would result in stroke patients with anxiety only being ineligible for
inclusion into the trial. As a result there is no evidence as to whether any of the
interventions described would be effective for stroke patients who only had anxiety and not
depression. It should be noted that while the HAM-A is widely used in pharmaceutical
studies of anxiety, it is not appropriate as a diagnostic or screening instrument. The HAM-A
focuses primarily on the phobic and autonomic arousal symptoms of anxiety, and gives little
weight to the psychological symptoms. Given the physical consequences of stroke, it would
be misleading to attribute all physical symptoms solely to anxiety.
5.6.2 Quality of the evidence
Clear conclusions about the evidence cannot be drawn as many of the quality indices
were not adequately described, and study sample size was small in both included trials. No
study provided information on the length of time that had passed between stroke and
participant enrolment into the trial and no information was provided about the setting from
which participants were recruited (e.g. hospital, or community based). This could influence
prevalence of anxiety as patients in hospital or rehabilitation settings may have different
levels of mood disturbance. Another issue is that neither study described what was
involved in the routine or standard care groups which were used as the control comparison.
Lastly, all studies inadequately reported their methodological indices such as allocation
concealment or blinding of participants and outcome assessors.
5.6.3 Potential biases in the review process
To the extent possible, there was minimal bias in the review process. An extensive
literature search guided by the Cochrane Stroke Group methodology was carried out, and
key researchers in the field were contacted to obtain information about studies with a focus
on post-stroke anxiety. Additionally, the findings were not limited to English-only papers.
Two individuals independently decided whether studies should be included and data were
extracted independently by two review authors.
5.6.4 Implications for clinical practice and research
Currently there is insufficient evidence to guide practice in treating anxiety after
stroke. The pharmaceutical therapies evaluated indicate that medication may be an
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effective approach for reducing anxiety symptoms in stroke patients with co-morbid anxiety
and depression when compared with standard care. The clinical significance of this
decrease is unclear as the authors did not provide any information about the proportion of
study participants no longer meeting the anxiety criteria. However, research has indicated
that a reduction of more than 50% on the Hamilton Anxiety Scale is indicative of obvious
improvement in the level of anxiety (Ye et al. 2006).
Given the high prevalence of anxiety after stroke, placebo controlled trials are
needed to identify effective treatments for this condition, as it can have a negative impact
on other aspects of life. Future research evaluating interventions to treat poststroke anxiety
should assess outcomes such as quality of life and caregiver burden as the trials in this
review provided no information on these outcomes. Additionally, researchers should
ensure that patients with anxiety only are also recruited into trials. Lastly given there is
moderate, albeit non-significant advantage for some psychological therapies in treating
anxiety versus depression (Roshanaei-Moghaddam et al. 2011), a trial investigating the
effectiveness of psychological interventions would be useful for informing clinicians. This
would also be in keeping with current guidelines that recommend that the option of
psychological therapy be available for patients.
5.7 How does this review compare with other Cochrane reviews on
psychological problems that occur after stroke
5.7.1 Cochrane review for treating depression after stroke
It would be difficult to conduct a review on anxiety after stroke without discussing
interventions used to treat depression after stroke, given the two conditions are so closely
linked. A Cochrane systematic review of 12 randomised control trials (13 interventions) of
pharmaceutical therapy in 1121 stroke patients with depression found that overall there
was some evidence of significant benefit for drug therapy in treating depression (i.e.
remission of symptoms) after stroke (Hackett et al. 2008).
Seven of these studies looked at the effect of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs), two evaluated tricyclic antidepressants (TCA s) and the remainder looked at other
individual antidepressant drugs which included deanxit, aniracetam, reboxetine and
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trazodone. There was evidence of significant adverse events associated with drug therapy,
as increased incidence of central nervous system problems such as confusion, sedation or
tremors and gastrointestinal effects in intervention group relative to the controls was
observed. In terms of other outcomes assessed in this review there was no evidence of
benefit in terms of cognitive functioning, activities of daily living, or improvement in
neurological functioning.
Unlike the anxiety review, the depression review (Hackett et al. 2008) found four
psychologically based therapies in 445 stroke participants with depression. The following
interventions had been administered: Motivational interviewing delivered by nurses and
non-clinical psychologists, cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT); problem-solving therapy
with counselling delivered by social workers; and a supportive psychological therapy with
education delivered by special personnel. None of these trials demonstrated any evidence
of benefit (albeit motivational interviewing showed some trend favouring the intervention
that failed to meet clinical significance) in terms of treating or reducing depression
symptoms. Neither were they effective in reducing psychological distress or improving
activities of daily living. It should be noted that in the systematic review, motivational
interviewing included findings only from depressed individuals recruited into the trial, of
which there were significantly less in the intervention group relative to the control. This
discrepancy between the two groups likely explains why the intervention was not found to
be effective, when it was found to be effective in significantly reducing depression in the
overall study population. However unlike the drug therapy trials the incidence of adverse
events was not higher in the intervention groups. Additionally there was less (although non-
significant) loss-to follow-up in the intervention groups relative to the control, perhaps
indicating increased treatment tolerance.
There was substantial heterogeneity between studies, hence the findings from this
review should be interpreted with caution. Study populations were extremely mixed. For
example there was large disparity in timing of recruitment into trials of patients ranging
from several days to more than two years post stroke. Additionally the criteria for
enrolment were quite restrictive in several trials in that patients with communication
problems, cognitive loss, or previous psychological illness were ineligible to participate.
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These types of exclusions affect the generalisability of findings, as clinically it is impossible
to preclude these types of patients from presenting in clinic.
The last criticism is that of trial methodology itself. While psychologically based
interventions were not found to be effective for treating depression after stroke, one needs
to consider that generally those receiving psychological care tend to be referred from
primary or community care services. It is possible that individuals referred to psychological
care would chose to engage more with treatment, as opposed to individuals within a trial
who are simply randomly assigned to an arm of a trial, and for whom treatment preference
has not be taken into account.
5.7.2 Integrating post-stroke anxiety and depression intervention findings
In comparison to the review on anxiety, the body of evidence for pharmaceutical
effectiveness in treating depression after stroke is greater. With the exception of one trial
that used aniracetam, (a drug that at the time of writing this thesis is not currently
recommended for treating anxiety in the UK), presence of co-morbid anxiety presence was
not assessed. So while there is significant overlap in appropriate interventions that can be
used to treat anxiety and depression, findings from the depression review should be
interpreted with caution when dealing with anxiety, because there are etiological and
phenomenological differences between the two conditions, and successful treatment of
depression would not necessarily result in resolution of anxiety in instances of co-morbidity.
5.7.3 Reviews of other interventions
There have been few reviews examining the effectiveness of interventions on
psychological outcomes after stroke. No interventions thus far have shown to be effective
in reducing anxiety levels. A systematic review on information provision after stroke found
some statistically significant but clinically small benefit in reducing anxiety levels (Smith et al.
2008). However systematic reviews looking at physical fitness (Saunders et al. 2009),
speech language therapy (Kelly, Brady and Enderby 2010), and the use of stroke liaison
workers (Ellis et al. 2010), all found none of these interventions were effective in reducing
anxiety. One of the main criticisms of these reviews is that there is significant heterogeneity
amongst the interventions evaluated, and many interventions used in trials have been
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atheoretical in their approach. Hence more consideration should be given to how an
intervention may work prior to investigating whether it works. This may increase the
likelihood of identifying effectiveness, as there would be a greater understanding of the
underlying mechanisms of the intervention which then could inform study design and
outcome assessment.
5.8 Conclusion
Currently there is insufficient evidence from randomised trials to guide practice in
treating anxiety after stroke. The pharmaceutical therapies evaluated indicate that drugs
may be an effective approach for reducing anxiety symptoms in stroke patients with co-
morbid anxiety and depression when compared with standard care. The clinical significance
of this decrease is unclear as the authors did not provide any information about the
proportion of study participants no longer meeting the anxiety criteria. However, research
has indicated that a reduction of more than 50% on the Hamilton Anxiety Scale is indicative
of clinically significant improvement in the level of anxiety (Ye et al. 2006). Additional
research is warranted in this area. However, while it is sufficient to say that additional trials
are required, investigation into the theoretical constructs that may serve as determinants of
an interventions failure or success is also needed. For example, anxiety is viewed as being
more amenable to being treated with a psychological intervention, whereas depression is
seen to have more of a biological aetiology and more likely to benefit from drug therapy
(Edwards et al. 2007; Prins et al. 2008). This link between anxiety and psychology is what
led to the investigation of illness representations and their possible association with anxiety
after stroke. The methods and results of that work are described in the following chapters.
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6 Chapter Six: Study 3- Methods
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methods used in the empirical study of this thesis. It
provides a rationale for and description of the study design. The main tools used to assess
anxiety symptoms, illness representations, and functional impairment are described. The
final section provides detail of the statistical approach used to describe the study population
along with the regression analysis and structural equation modelling techniques employed
for the predictive analyses.
6.2 Purpose of Study
The research surrounding illness representations and psychological outcomes within
the stroke population have been largely limited to cross-sectional studies (Ford 2007).
While such studies are useful for establishing association, they do not allow for inference of
a temporal relationship between constructs. When a longitudinal approach has been
employed, anxiety has not been a primary outcome of interest, or the researchers have not
used the Leventhal Common Sense Model (CSM) of illness representations (Twiddy, House
and Jones 2012; Morrison, Johnston and Mac Walter 2000). There is a paucity of
longitudinal data assessing the course of anxiety after stroke, and its predictors.
Understanding the illness representations held by stroke survivors will shed light on
whether illness representations are associated with psychological outcome after stroke, and
could prove useful for clinicians in helping them develop interventions tailored at treating
anxiety after stroke.
6.3 Primary Research Aims
1. To assess and compare the prevalence and severity of anxiety at two time-points
after stroke.
2. To assess illness representations and changes in illness representations in stroke
patients.
3. To determine whether illness representations and/or clinical factors, are associated
with anxiety after stroke.
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4. To assess whether illness representations and/or clinical factors are predictive of
anxiety at follow-up after stroke.
6.4 Design
A prospective, longitudinal, repeated measures design was used to assess anxiety
(and depression) symptoms, illness representations, and functional impairment in activities
of daily living. Measurements were obtained at baseline (time 1), which ranged from less
than one month to six months post-stroke. A follow-up assessment (time 2) was obtained
three months after the baseline assessment. The main advantage of a longitudinal design is
that both change and predictors of change over time can be assessed.
6.5 Setting
6.5.1 Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust is located in the South Yorkshire region of
England and was the main site for patient recruitment. Approximately 224,000 people
reside in Barnsley and it has traditionally been an area with little ethnic diversity as
approximately 98% are white British (Barnsley Council). There are close to 400 new strokes
in Barnsley each year and about 5000 individuals living with some form of stroke related
residual disability (Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust). The outpatient stroke clinic
where recruitment occurred is integrated with other stroke services in the area and the
majority of stroke patients will have at least one follow-up visit after discharge from the
hospital stroke unit, inpatient rehabilitation, or early supported discharge (Figure 6-1).
Table 6-1 provides a description of the study sites.
This clinic conducts follow-up appointments with the majority of stroke and TIA
patients in the region after they have been discharged into the community from either the
acute stroke unit, or inpatient rehabilitation. Patients receiving early supported discharge
(ESD) and those referred by their GP with suspected TIA are also seen in the outpatient clinic.
Prior to study commencement, it was estimated that the outpatient clinic saw
approximately 50 stroke patients per month (personal communication). Stroke patients
residing within the Barnsley catchment area are generally seen at this clinic approximately
six weeks after discharge from the stroke unit. Patients who are not admitted to the stroke
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unit or do not present to hospital at the time of stroke (i.e. minor TIAs) also receive follow-
up appointments to the outpatient stroke clinic. Clinics were held on two afternoons per
week. One of the clinic days received a varied case-mix of patients with long-term
conditions (e.g. Parkinson’s disease), while the other saw exclusively stroke patients. The
stroke clinic was led by either a stroke consultant or stroke nurse specialist. On a few
occasions, when neither the consultant nor the nurse were available, a medical registrar
was responsible for seeing patients at their appointment.
6.5.2 Sheffield Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
Within the first few weeks of recruitment at the Barnsley site it became apparent
that it would be difficult to recruit a sufficient sample within the six months timeline
specified in the project work-plan. As a result it was decided to expand the research site to
Sheffield. Sheffield is located in South Yorkshire and is one of the largest cities in England
with a population of 555,000 (Sheffield Director of Public Health Report 2008). Hospital
based stroke appointments are provided at two teaching hospitals (Intercollegiate Stroke
Working Party 2010). It is more ethnically diverse with approximately 10% of the population
self-identifying as belonging to a minority ethnic group. Each year in Sheffield about 1150
individuals have a stroke and another 500 have a TIA (Sheffield Director of Public Health
Report 2008). Generally speaking the overall pattern of patient referral is similar to that
described in Barnsley. There were several outpatient follow-up clinics for stroke patients
each week, however many of them were attended by patients with other long-term
conditions (e.g. Parkinson’s disease, dementia). Recruitment occurred from one outpatient
clinic that ran weekly and saw exclusively with stroke patients.
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Figure 6-1 Integrated stroke care pathway
Table 6-1 Description of Study sites
Barnsley Sheffield
Total population 224,000 550,000
% Ethnic Minority 1 9.5
No. of Stroke & TIA per years 400 1600
No. of beds used for pre-post 72 hours stroke care 19 22
No. beds for post 72 hour stroke care only 24 64
Availability of Specialist Early Supported Discharge teams YES YES
Availability of Long-term specialist community rehabilitation
teams
NO NO
Source: National Sentinel Stroke Audit 2011,
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6.6 Measures included in the questionnaire package
The following section describes the measures and the rationale for their inclusion in
the participant questionnaire package (Appendix C). Information about reliability and
validity is also provided.
6.6.1 Assessing anxiety: The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond and Snaith 1983) is a
self-report questionnaire consisting of seven anxiety and seven depression items which
form two separate subscales. Scores on each subscale range from 0-21, with higher scores
reflecting greater levels of anxiety or depression. Patients choose one of four answers to
each question, indicating how they have been feeling in the past week. Originally designed
for use in hospital patients, it was developed to overcome two common problems of
assessment in this group; the first being to circumvent confounding of symptoms of physical
illness and mood disorder, and the second to develop a short, easy to use tool that
distinguishes anxiety and depression, and is not simply a general measure of psychiatric
distress. As a result the HADS asks only about psychological symptoms of anxiety such as
worry, restlessness, and feelings of panic and reduces the possibility of inflated anxiety
prevalence estimate based on attributing the physical symptoms of stroke to anxiety. Its
intended use was as a screening measure to detect clinical cases of anxiety and depression.
As highlighted in chapter two, there are different underlying assumptions of diagnostic and
symptom rating severity metrics, however both of these functions are often given the same
term, “anxiety”. The term anxiety as applied to the results of this empirical study refers to
symptom severity and not diagnosis.
6.6.1.1 Rationale for using the HADS
The criteria used for selecting an anxiety rating scale in this study were that the scale
would measure both anxiety and depression, have simple response categories for
participants to select, and would not be excessive in length. Additionally when selecting
screening tools for assessing mood, Bennett et al (2006) argued that it is important that the
rating scale is both sensitive and specific and that the optimum cut-offs are known for
stroke patients rather than just in the general population (Bennett et al. 2006). The review
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of assessment scales in chapter two showed that the HADS is the only validated scale
meeting these criteria.
The psychometric properties of the HADS when measuring both anxiety and
depression have been validated in the stroke population (Chapter 2). Additionally as
observed in the systematic review on the prevalence of anxiety after stroke (Chapter 4), the
HADS is the most widely used anxiety screening measure in stroke, and with its short
administration time (<5 minutes), is generally well accepted by patients (Herrmann 1997).
Relative to other commonly used mood scales it is easier to use in stroke patients (O'Rourke
et al. 1998). It was also thought that the use of the HADS would allow for comparison
between this study and the existing published literature such as those studies included in
the prevalence systematic review.
6.6.1.2 Reliability of the HADS
Reliability testing has shown satisfactory or good item-total correlations within both
the anxiety and depression subscales, and good internal consistencies ranging from 0.80-
0.93 on both subscales (Herrmann 1997). Retest reliability findings show a high correlation,
(r>0.80 after two weeks), which decreases to about 0.70 with longer intervals of time
(Herrmann 1997). Hence unlike many instruments that measure mood state, the HADS is
stable enough to withstand situational influences on mood scores. Additionally, the two
factor model of anxiety and depression assessed in the HADS has been consistently
supported (Herrmann 1997). While the anxiety and depression sub-scales often correlate
very highly, this is likely due to the real coincidence of anxious and depressed symptoms
found in many patients, rather than being an inadequacy of the instrument.
6.6.1.3 HADS validity and scoring
An issue that confounds the use of symptom rating scales is that some anxiety
disorders involve persistent symptoms of anxiety, such as General Anxiety Disorder (GAD) or
post –traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), whereas other disorders are episodic or situational,
such as specific or social phobia. Hence using the same scale to rate anxiety symptoms that
are episodic as opposed to persistent is problematic. In any case Zigmond and Snaith (1983)
advise that a score of 8 or more is indicative of a possible anxiety disorder, and 11 or more
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as a probable disorder. Within the field of stroke, it has been proposed that anxiety rating
scales should have a sensitivity of ≥0.80 and specificity of ≥0.6 (Bennett and Lincoln 2006). 
Two studies, (O'Rourke et al. 1998; Sagen et al. 2009) validated the HADS anxiety
subscale against the DSM-IV criteria for anxiety. From their findings they recommend using
HADS-A cut-off scores that range from 4 to 7. At these levels sensitivity ranged from 0.78-
0.83, and specificity ranged from 0.65-0.72. Despite the findings from the validation studies
the rationale for the above mentioned sensitivity/ specificity threshold suggestions has not
been provided. Additionally, the overview of validation studies described in chapter two
highlights the risk of increased misclassification when lower HADS-A threshold scores are
used.
The evidence to abandon the scoring criteria proposed by scale authors is
inadequate. Findings from the prevalence review of anxiety after stroke (chapter 4) in which
a lower HADS-anxiety subscale threshold was used in some studies did not yield results that
were substantially different from the ones prescribed by the scale authors. An anxiety case
in the empirical research of this thesis was defined as having a score of >=11 on the anxiety
subscale of the HADS which is in keeping with the guidance of Zigmond and Snaith (1983).
Use of the higher threshold increases the positive predictive value of the scale. An
endorsement of as few as two questions on the anxiety subscale could result in labelling an
individual as anxious, were a lower threshold applied. The use of the prescribed anxiety
criteria meant that findings obtained in this study could be placed in context with the
extensive body of literature already available that used the recommended cut-offs. Even
though a conservative approach to defining an anxiety case has been used, it is
acknowledged that an individual could have a very low score but still feel tremendously
anxious. Likewise a high score is not necessarily indicative of an anxiety disorder.
6.6.1.4 Licensing
A research license for the HADS was obtained from GL Assessment. The qualification
and access-code are attached in (Appendix D).
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6.6.2 Assessing Illness Representations: The Revised Illness Perception
Questionnaire (IPQ-R)
The conceptualisation of illness representation has its roots in fear communication
studies. Leventhal’s original work sought to understand the illness experience by
conducting a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews. From this it was found that
several constructs were consistently observed across a wide range of conditions (Leventhal,
Nerenz and Steel 1984; Savage and Clarke 1998). However while in-depth interviews can
yield valuable information, they are time consuming and it is difficult to compare findings
between studies.
The Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ)(Weinman et al. 1996) was the first
attempt to systematically assess the core cognitive facets of illness representations and was
developed across several illness groups (Weinman et al. 1996). The IPQ, consisted of five
cognitive components (identity, consequences, timeline, control/cure, and cause) of
individual illness representations. While the establishment of the IPQ encouraged
additional research in the area of self-regulation and health, problems with the internal
consistency of the control and timeline subscales became apparent (Moss-Morris et al.
2002). Additionally it lacked capacity to fully describe the illness response, as it did not
include emotional representations, which are an important concept in the Leventhal self-
regulatory model.
The Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ-R)(Moss-Morris et al. 2002) was
subsequently developed to address the limitations of its predecessor the IPQ. New
symptoms were added to the core identity subscale list. Patients are asked if they had
experienced a set of symptoms since the onset of their disease or condition, and if so
whether they attribute these symptoms to their illness (i.e. the stroke). The scale authors
encourage the addition of other symptoms to the core identity list of 14 items that may be
related to the disease of interest. The identity subscale score comprises the sum of the
attributed stroke symptoms. Evaluating the symptoms ‘attributed’ to stroke rather than
symptoms ‘experienced’ avoids potential somatisation of symptoms and instead taps into
the concept of illness identity (Moss-Morris et al. 2002). The IPQ-R was also extended to
include measures of illness coherence and emotional representation of illness, and there
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were improvements in the reliability and validity of the timeline domain. In the IPQ-R the
acute/chronic component of illness representation is separated from cyclical timeline
aspects that may be associated with certain conditions. The addition of the cyclical timeline
domain is particularly relevant for investigation into diseases such as stroke which may, or
may not be captured on a simple acute/chronic dimension. Care was also taken to ensure
that the emotional representation scale was not just a reflection of affective disposition.
However, there is some overlap between negative affect and the emotional representation
sub-scale, in that negative affect accounts for approximately 29% of the variance in the
emotional upset generated by the illness. Causal items were extended from 10 to 18, and
exploratory factor analysis can be conducted to establish underlying causal factors where
sample size is sufficient. Excluding the identity and causal sections, the IPQ-R consists of 38
items which generate seven illness domains that accounted for 64% of the variance in its
test population of 711 individuals from eight different illness groups (Moss-Morris et al.
2002).
6.6.2.1 Rationale for using the IPQ-R
The illness representation hypothesis uses a common sense approach to explaining
the phenomenon of ill health. However the underlying concepts that can interpret or
explain health behaviour or perception are complex and multilevel. Several questionnaires
have been developed to assess illness representations (Partridge and Johnston 1989; Evers
et al. 2001; Browne et al. 1988), however they were not designed for the purpose of
measuring the domains defined by Leventhal. As such the IPQ-R is currently the best
available tool for investigation into the phenomenon of illness representations. The IPQ and
IPQ-R are also the most popular questionnaires used to assess illness representations
(Hagger and Orbell 2003).
6.6.2.2 IPQ-R Domains
The illness identity scale is the first domain on the IPQ-R. In line with previous
research (Twiddy 2008) the version used in this study contained an additional 10 items not
part of the author derived core list. The identity domain shows the label ascribed to an
illness and concrete signs and symptoms ascribed to the condition. The appraisal of
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perceived symptoms is an important cue to guide health behaviours, such as adherence to
treatment, self-diagnosis or help-seeking behaviours.
The remaining seven domains are:
1. Timeline (acute/chronic)- evaluates perceptions of the likelihood that the condition
will be chronic in nature
2. Consequences- deals with beliefs about illness severity and its impact on physical,
social, and psychological functioning
3. Personal control- assesses beliefs about personal control over the illness
4. Treatment control- assesses beliefs about whether the illness can be cured through
treatment
5. Coherence- gauges how much an individual understands or comprehends their
illness
6. Timeline (cyclical)- evaluates the perceptions of the likelihood that symptoms
associated with the condition will vary over time
7. Emotional- deals with the perception of negative emotions and feelings arising as a
result of the condition
6.6.2.3 Scoring the IPQ-R
With the exception of the identity scores, the domains of the IPQ-R are scored on a
five point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ’strongly disagree’. High scores on
the timeline, consequences, and cyclical dimensions reflect strongly held beliefs about the
chronicity and negative consequences of the condition, or indicate strongly held beliefs that
the condition is cyclical in nature. Higher scores on the personal control, treatment control,
and coherence sub-scales reflect strongly held beliefs that the illness is controllable with
either personal effort or treatment, and that the respondent has a greater personal
understanding of their condition. High scores on the emotional domain indicate that the
condition has significant negative emotional consequences.
The scale authors have developed a website with instructions for scoring the IPQ-R
(http://www.uib.no/ipq/). Illness identity is calculated by summing the ‘yes’ responses to
the experience of symptom attributed to stroke. Responses on the other sub-scales are
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scored accordingly (‘strongly disagree’= 1,’disagree’= 2, ‘neither agree nor disagree’ =3,
‘agree’ =4, ‘strongly agree’ =5). As per author instruction, items IP1, IP4, IP8, IP15, IP17,
IP18, IP19, IP23, IP24, IP25, IP26, IP27, and IP36 are reverse coded (1=5, 2=4, 4=2, and 5=1).
The respective subscales are calculated by summing the following items:
1. Timeline (acute/ chronic): IP1- IP5 + IP18
2. Consequences: IP6-IP11
3. Personal Control: IP12-IP17
4. Treatment control: IP19-IP23
5. Illness coherence: IP24-IP28
6. Timeline (cyclical): IP29-IP32
7. Emotional Representations: IP33-IP38
Authors indicate that for subscales with six items, a maximum of 2 missing items are
allowed. One missing item is allowed for each of the remaining subscales.
6.6.2.4 Reliability and validity of the IPQ-R
Perhaps, because of the novelty of the scale, test-retest reliability of the IPQ-R has
not been studied extensively. Moss-Morris et al (Moss-Morris et al. 2002) assessed it within
a subset of rheumatoid arthritis patients and found good stability over three weeks with
correlations ranging from 0.60 to .88 for all domains, except personal control which was
lower at .46. The stability of representations was somewhat lower when measured over six
months but all were still relatively high with all correlations over 0.5. Reliability testing
carried out in a small convenience sample of stroke patients found correlations ranging
between 0.6 and 0.8 over two months (Twiddy 2008). Unlike conditions where a definitive
diagnosis is necessary for classifications, illness representations are likely to fluctuate with
time.
Selecting a criterion upon which to validate the IPQ-R is challenging as its aim is to
measure a theoretical construct. However, discriminant validity testing conducted to
determine whether the IPQ-R domains were not simply a reflection of positive or negative
affect, were for the most part non-significant (Moss-Morris et al. 2002). However, the
emotional and consequential representations did show some association with affect.
144
6.6.3 Assessing Impairment in Activities of Daily Living: The Barthel Index (BI)
The Barthel Index (BI) is a 10 item scale used extensively within rehabilitation and
stroke populations (Quinn, Langhorne and Stott 2011). It was developed to measure a
person’s daily functioning ability, specifically the activities of daily living (ADL) and mobility.
The items include feeding, mobility, grooming, toileting bathing, walking, and continence.
Its aim is to assess what a person actually does rather than what they can do. The original
version used a rating system whereby patients received a score ranging between 0 and 100,
with lower scores representing greater dependency (Mahoney and Barthel 1965). Individual
questions were given weighting scores between 5 and 15.
A modified version of the BI used in this study (Gompertz, Pound and Ebrahim 1994)
asks the same 10 questions found in the original version with a simplified weighting scheme
and total possible scores ranging from 0-20. Lower scores are indicative of higher levels of
dependence. As the 100 point and 20 point versions are equivalent in content, the change
in scoring does not have an effect on the clinimetrics. There is no general consensus on how
scores should be interpreted, however one suggestion is that a score <4 indicates total
dependence, 5-11 some dependence, and ≥12 independence (Gupta 2008).   
The BI is not a continuous scale and a one point change at the top of the scale does
not equate to the same degree of change at the bottom of the scale (e.g. a change in score
from 10-18 is not equal to the same change from 2 to 10). Another weakness is that the BI
is not sensitive to change at extremes of ability. These “floor” and “ceiling” effects mean
that it is less discriminating in patients with severe or mild disabilities. The Barthel also
omits other aspects, such as social, domestic or role functions related to quality of life and
focuses solely on functional ability. However despite its limitations, the BI is one of the
briefest assessments of ADL and is recommended by the UK Royal College of Physicians for
routine use in assessment (Royal College of Physicians 2008).
6.6.3.1 Rationale for using the BI
The biggest strength of the BI is that it is fast and easy to administer, and takes only
a few minutes at most to complete. Originally designed as an interviewer administered
scale, the postal version has also shown good reliability (Gompertz, Pound and Ebrahim
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1994) (Yeo, Faleiro and Lincoln 1995). The BI is also one of the most prevalent functional
outcome scales used in stroke and rehabilitation research (Quinn, Langhorne and Stott
2011), and has been translated into several languages. It facilitates comparison with much
of the existing research. Also no licensing fee was required for its use.
6.6.3.2 Reliability and validity of the BI
Internal consistency of the BI is generally described as good to excellent (α = 0.80-0.93) 
(Quinn, Langhorne and Stott 2011) and the level of inter-observer reliability is considered
one of the strengths of the scale (Yeo, Faleiro and Lincoln 1995). In terms of validity, the BI
was originally formulated for individuals with neurological and musculoskeletal disease,
hence it is intuitive that it would be a valid measure for stroke. Close correlation between
the BI and clinical data such as the extent of motor loss or nursing time, indicate good
concurrent validity (Quinn, Langhorne and Stott 2011). Its construct validity is suggested by
close association with other measures of activity, and the BI is so widespread that it is often
used as the gold standard comparator in studies of novel ADL scales. The BI is also sensitive
to change over time, with a two point difference (BI score 0-20) deemed to be clinically
significant (Quinn, Langhorne and Stott 2011).
6.7 Exploring acceptability of research
Prior to carrying out the main study, questionnaire acceptability was evaluated using
a convenience sample of interested stroke survivors who were known to the researcher and
attending a local stroke club. Six individuals volunteered to review the contents of the
questionnaire package that participants would receive. The primary purpose of involving
these stroke survivors was to determine whether there were any concerns in filling out the
illness perception questionnaire as it had not been used extensively in the stroke population.
Upon completion, respondents were asked the following questions about acceptability:
1. What was their overall impression of the survey?
2. Were the questions what they expected given the topic?
3. Were they able to complete the survey on their own, and if not if they were able
to obtain help?
4. Were the questions easy to read and understand?
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5. Were any questions confusing?
6. Which questions were most difficult to understand and why?
7. Were there any questions they thought should be on the survey that were not?
Overall the response was positive. Individuals reported that they could understand all
questions. One individual indicated that the Illness Perception section of the questionnaire
was a bit long but they were still able to complete it.
6.8 Research approvals and considerations
Ethical approval for the project was granted by the Leeds East NHS Research Ethics
Committee on February 21, 2011 for access to patients attending the Barnsley outpatient
stroke clinic (Appendix G). Amendments for access to clinics in Sheffield was submitted on
April 7, 2011 and approval received on April 21, 2011. A subsequent amendment of
notification regarding change in the lead supervisor was submitted on July 5, 2011, and
agreement received on July 14, 2011.
The process of obtaining informed consent needed to adhere to the principles of the
Mental Capacity Act (2005). All stroke patients eligible for study participation were
presumed to have mental capacity. Care was taken to minimise the burden of data
collection for participants as the questionnaire pack was estimated to take 25-30 minutes to
complete.
Data protection was another key issue that had to be considered. During the initial
screening in the outpatient clinics personal details including name, address, and telephone
number were collected from individuals who agreed to participate in the study. This
information was assigned a unique reference ID number and all subsequent information
collected from the participants (i.e. the questionnaire pack), was also assigned the same
reference ID. Personal details and questionnaire responses were kept separately, and only
linked during the analysis phase. Additionally, participants were instructed not to record
their name or address details on the freepost envelope when returning the questionnaire
pack.
The potential exists that in asking someone about their mood this may elicit
unexpected negative emotional responses. In this study the Hospital Anxiety and
147
Depression Scale (HADS), was administered. Participants were made aware of their rights to
refuse to answer any of the questions in the patient package if they so wished. The HADS
assesses mood and so there was a possibility of discovering patients scoring within the
clinical range for a possible mood disorder. However, given the research mandate of the
protocol, confidentiality was not breached by relaying the findings back to the patient’s
stroke consultant or clinical care team. Stroke participants were routinely screened for
mood during clinic appointments; as such they were not contacted if they had a high score
on the HADS. If however, during the course of the screening process or during any other
correspondence with the participant, it became apparent that they were seriously
contemplating or planning to do harm to themselves or others (e.g. disclosure of planned
suicide) this information would have been shared immediately with the clinical team
responsible for patient care and the patient would have been made aware that such a
notification had been made.
6.9 Research and Development
In addition to obtaining ethical approval for this study, all research conducted on
NHS premises involving human participants, their tissue, or data must also receive research
and development (R&D) governance approval (Department of Health 2005). An NHS wide
coordinated approach to obtaining R&D approval has been established, however at the time
of study initiation only studies that were adopted by the National Institute of Health
Research (NIHR) portfolio system could obtain R&D approval using this coordinated
approach across sites. This study was not a portfolio study and as a result individual R&D
approvals needed to be obtained from each participating trust site.
The Barnsley Hospital Foundation Trust research governance committee granted
access to Barnsley stroke sites on March 4, 2011. This was within two weeks of them
receiving full documentation and a letter of access was granted allowing access to Barnsley
clinics. Patient recruitment commenced at this site on March 21, 2011.
The process was less straightforward in Sheffield. Although approval for an honorary
contract was approved on July 1, 2011, staffing turnover, and a multitude of administrative
miscommunications resulted in not receiving R&D approval to access the site until
September 1, 2011. The Sheffield clinic ran on the same day as the Barnsley clinic.
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Recruitment in Barnsley ended on September 15, 2011. The commencement of other
studies meant that recruitment at the Sheffield site was ended on November 24, 2011. In
all, patient recruitment occurred between March 21- and November 24, 2011. This was two
months longer than the original six months timeline estimated in the PhD work-plan
(Table 6-2).
Table 6-2 Timeline of events for research ethics, R&D approval, and recruitment
Feb
2011
Mar
2011
Apr
2011
May
2011
Jun
2011
Jul
2011
Aug
2011
Sep
2011
Oct
2011
Nov
2011
Ethics
approval
received
Barnsley
R&D
approval
Barnsley
recruitment
1st REC
amendment
to include
Sheffield
1st REC
amendment
approved
Sheffield
R&D
approval
Sheffield
recruitment
2nd REC
amendment
(New
supervisor)
2nd REC
amendment
approved
6.10 Research Participants
All stroke patients presenting at the Barnsley or Sheffield Royal Hallamshire
outpatient stroke clinics were eligible to participate in the study provided they met the
following criteria :
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6.10.1 Inclusion criteria
 Received a clinical diagnosis of first-ever ischaemic stroke or TIA.
 Were at least 18 years of age.
 Were less than five months post-stroke at the time of recruitment.
 Attended a stroke clinic in Barnsley or Sheffield, Yorkshire.
6.10.2 Exclusion criteria
 Had poor prognosis for survival to three months after the initial contact as determined by
clinical opinion.
 Had more than one stroke at the time of initial contact (as it was thought that illness
perceptions may differ from those that had survived multiple strokes).
 Non English speaking background or first language other than English.
 Had global aphasia at the time of initial contact.
 Had other significant terminal illnesses or conditions of neurological impairment such as
dementia, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease, or significant co-morbidities as judged
by clinicians, as to make participation in research inappropriate.
 Were unable to provide informed consent, as determined under the Mental Capacity Act.
Previous history of anxiety or depression was not considered a reason for ineligibility.
6.11 Sample Size
It was originally intended that recruitment would be carried out over six months
from the Barnsley site. Preliminary findings from the literature indicated that prevalence of
anxiety would be approximately 15% (Burvill et al. 1995; Sturm et al. 2004). In order to
obtain a generalisable sample size, the following formula was used:
n=Z2pq/e2
Where
Z= the confidence level at 95%
P= the proportion of the sample with anxiety
Q= 1-P
e= level of error (estimated at 7-8%)
The required sample size corrected for sampling from a finite study population of
approximately 300 stroke survivors was 61-75. Based on previous research the postal
response rate was estimated at 80%, and fully completed questionnaire rate at 70% (Murray,
Forster and Young 2007). Consequently an additional 27-33 stroke survivors needed to be
recruited to ensure an adequate sample size. As this was an exploratory study a power
calculation was not conducted, however the sample was of sufficient size to conduct
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planned regression analysis whereby there would be a ratio of at least 5 cases per predictor
variable (Peduzzi et al. 1996).
6.12 Participant recruitment and follow-up
Individuals were recruited in-person on their visits to the outpatient stroke clinics. At
the start of every clinic patient files were reviewed by the chief investigator (ACB) to
determine which patients were potentially eligible for study inclusion. A list of names was
prepared and provided to either the consultant or stroke nurse specialist seeing patients on
that day as a reminder for them to inform the patients about the study. In line with the
research protocol and the principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Department of Health
2008), the attending clinician did not make any decisions about a patients capacity to
participate, however if the individual had significant co-morbidities or were in a state as to
make participation impractical (e.g. patients with dementia) they were not referred to the
researcher for potential recruitment into the study. At the end of the clinic appointment
patients meeting the study eligibility criteria were referred to the chief investigator at which
point they were provided with a brief explanation of the study and a participant information
sheet (Appendix E). At this point the referred patients had the opportunity to ask questions
or seek clarification about the study. Written informed consent from those agreeing to
participate was obtained at this time (Appendix F). Individuals who required additional time
to think about participating, were provided with a consent form and freepost envelope to
return should they decide they wanted to be part of the study at a later time. Those
agreeing to participate were given a questionnaire pack to complete at home, along with a
first-class freepost envelope for its return. All participants who agreed to participate in the
study were sent the same package three months after recruitment into the study.
If completed questionnaire packs were not returned within two weeks of having
been provided, participants were contacted by telephone. If they could not be reached by
telephone they were sent a reminder letter. Those who had been reached by phone, but
did not return the questionnaire within one week after the first follow-up call were
subsequently sent a reminder letter as well. This method of contacting patients has been
found to be the most effective at maximising participation in research using postal
questionnaires (Nakash et al. 2006).
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6.13 Data collection
Demographic information that consisted of recording participants’ age, sex, living
status (alone or not), and ethnicity, was collected (Appendix H). The pathological and
clinical classification of stroke type were also recorded if they were available in the
outpatient clinic file, and participants were asked if they had any history of anxiety or
depression, and if yes, what sort of treatment they had received. Documentation of
significant medical co-morbidities was obtained using the Katz co-morbidity questionnaire
(Katz et al. 1996).
Additionally, during the recruitment process the brief Six Item Cognitive Impairment
Test (6CIT) was administered to describe the study sample, but was not used to make
decisions about participant eligibility. The Six Item Cognitive Impairment Test (6CIT)
(Katzman et al. 1983) is a short test that screens for cognitive impairment and possible
dementia. It consists of one memory, two calculation and three orientation questions. The
test asks the participant what month and year it currently is, the approximate time of day,
to count backwards from 20 to 1, to list the months of the year in reverse order, and to
repeat and recall a short memory phrase. The 6CIT correlates very highly with the Mini-
Mental State Exam (MMSE) (Folstein, Folstein and McHugh 1975) (Brooke and Bullock 1999)
which is regarded as the gold standard in screening for cognitive impairment in the general
patient population and which is widely used in clinical practice. Several studies have found
the validity of the MMSE less than optimal for stroke survivors (Nys et al. 2005; Blake et al.
2002), and have suggested that the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (Nasreddine et al. 2005)
or the Addenbroke’s Cognitive Examination-Revised (Mioshi et al. 2006) tests are more
appropriate measures by which to screen for cognitive impairment because they are more
sensitive. However, the average time for administration of theses tests range from 10-20
minutes making their use impractical in a busy outpatient clinic. While the 6-CIT hasn’t
been validated in stroke, it has also been found to be more sensitive than in a sample of
older patients (Brooke and Bullock 1999). The average administration time needed for the
6-CIT is also much shorter at only five minutes
Responses to the 6CIT are scored based on a weighted sum of the number of errors,
with a score of 8 and above indicative of probable cognitive impairment. Recent validation
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studies indicate that a score of 11 or more may be a more appropriate cut-off score for
identifying possible cases of cognitive impairment to take into account differential
educational levels evident in a clinical sample of older patients (Tuijl et al. 2011). Despite its
ease and brevity in administration, the 6CIT is only recently starting to garner interest as a
screening tool or means of describing cognitive impairment in stroke research. It was
recently used in the Longer Term Unmet Needs After Stroke Trial, one of the largest ever
clinical trials in stroke rehabilitation (Stroke Research Programme 2012). Additionally, the
6CIT is now recognised by the Royal College of General Practitioners as a method of
screening for cognitive impairment and its usage continues to increase (Royal College of
General Physicians 2010). It is important to highlight that in this study the 6CIT was not
used as a primary measure, rather it was administered to patients who agreed to participate
as a proxy measure for describing the cognitive status at the time of recruitment (Appendix
H).
6.14 Data storage and handling
Study participants were given a researcher assigned reference identification number
upon agreeing to take part in this study. Questionnaires were marked with this code and
participants identified by it. Participant data were stored on a secure password protected
university computer drive that was only accessible to the chief investigator. All returned
questionnaires were stored in a locked filling cabinet in the School of Healthcare at the
University of Leeds in accordance with the storage guidelines specified by the Research
Council UK Code of Conduct on the Governance of Good Research Conduct.
6.15 Statistical Analyses
The following section provides a general overview of statistical methods and
techniques used throughout the study.
6.15.1 Data exploration and missing data
Error checking of data occurred by running frequency distributions for all variables to
verify that values were valid. Where suspect or incorrect values were found, the original
questionnaire was referenced and necessary changes made. The level of missing data
across individual variables was also assessed as this can influence the validity and reliability
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of results. As a general rule any variable containing missing data on 5% or fewer of cases
can be ignored.(Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) All missing variables were cross-checked with
the original questionnaire to verify that they were not caused by data entry error.
Both the Shapiro-Wilkes test (Shapiro and Wilk 1965) and quintile-quintile (q-q) plots
were used to examine the univariate normality of continuous variables. Outliers in data
were examined with a z-score. A z-score (Data point - Mean score of the data point)/
Standard deviation) greater than 3.29 was considered significant (Tabachnick and Fidell
2007), and analysis was re-done excluding the outlier(s).
6.15.2 Baseline cross-sectional analyses
Univariate descriptive analyses (e.g. means, median, frequency distribution) were
conducted for key demographic and clinical variables of interest. Differences between
groups (i.e. responders vs. non-responders OR anxious vs. non-anxious) at baseline were
assessed using studentized t-tests, Chi-square, or Mann-Whitney U test depending on the
distribution. A p-value <.05 was used for evaluating significance.
6.15.2.1 Internal Reliability of the IPQ-R
As the IPQ-R had not been used extensively within the stroke population, tests for
internal reliability were conducted and compared with findings in other stroke populations.
The IPQ-R evaluates individual illness perceptions by asking multiple questions about each
of the eight domains. This is advantageous for several reasons. First, individual questions
may be unreliable and are subject to considerable random measurement error. However
the effect of this error averages out when individual scores are summed to obtain a total
score. Second an individual item can generally only categorise people into a small number
of groups and cannot discriminate among fine degrees of an attribute; as such it can lack
precision. Lastly individual questions lack scope, making it difficult for them to fully
represent a complex theoretical concept or specific attributes. The internal consistency of
the IPQ-R domain scores were evaluated by calculating Cronbach alpha statistics.
Cronbach’s alpha (α) assesses whether the items included within a domain tap only the 
intended dimension.  Cronbach alpha scores range between 0 and 1, with a score of ≥0.70-
0.80 considered acceptable, >0.80-0.90 good, and >0.90-1.00 excellent (Bland and Altman
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1997). The IPQ-R values from a stroke study, and the original test population for the IPQ-R
were included for comparison purposes. The internal reliability coefficients for the HADS
and the Barthel Index were also examined even though they have been used extensively in
stroke.
6.15.2.2 Correlations
Bivariate Spearman rho correlations (range 0 to 1) were calculated to assess inter-
relationships between the illness representation domains. As several of the variables in the
correlation matrix were to be entered into the regression model, coefficients with values
larger than 0.9 were deemed significant (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007), and a decision would
have been taken as to which variable should be entered into the regression model.
6.15.2.3 Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) and Discriminant analysis
Given the published research has largely separated post-stroke anxiety and
depression, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) was
conducted to assess differences in illness perceptions between participants with anxiety,
depression, or neither. A hierarchical approach was used to categorise individuals into
either the anxious or depressed group. Hence, if an individual had co-morbid anxiety and
depression they were classified as depressed. All eight of the individual illness
representations were entered into the MANOVA as dependent variables. MANOVA allows
for simultaneous comparison between the groups and reduces the chance of Type one error
(i.e. concluding groups are significantly different when they are not). Essentially, MANOVA
produces one composite variable score which determines whether there is a difference
between the individual group means, after taking into account the correlations that exist
between the test variables. The significance of the composite score was assessed using the
Pillai’s trace F-test.
MANOVA assumptions were assessed using the following tests:
1. Assumption of Normal Distribution of dependent variables: The Shapiro-WIlks
test in the data exploration phase indicated that the individual IPQ-R domain
scores were normally distributed
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2. Assumption that the error variance of the dependent variables is equal across
the three groups: The Levene’s F tests were used. If the test was significant at
p<.05 then the conclusion would be that the variances were significantly
different
3. Assumption of equality of covariance which examines the extent to which the
covariance of the dependent variables are similar for each of the groups: The
Box-M test was used. As this test is highly sensitive, it is suggested that a value
of p<.01 be used to determine significance (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).
A separate post-hoc analysis with a Bonferroni correction significance set at p<.01
was carried out to identify which individual IPQ-R domain scores the groups differed.
Additionally, it is advised that a significant MANOVA analysis be followed up with a
discriminate analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). The methods associated with
discriminant analyses are more complex, and as such they have been described in detail in
their respective results section in chapter seven.
One of the primary aims was to identify illness perceptions and clinical factors that
were associated with, and predictive of, anxiety at baseline and over time. A multi-stage
approach was necessary. This section provides a brief overview of the techniques used.
Specific details of the models and tests used are described in the relevant sections in the
results chapter.
6.15.2.4 Regression analysis
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was carried out to identify predictors of baseline
anxiety levels. In the first step, age, sex (0=male, 1= female), history of anxiety or
depression (0=no, 1=yes), and the Barthel Index score were entered into the model. The
individual IPQ-R domain scores were entered into the second step. The adjusted R-square
value was used to assess the proportion of variance explained by the model at each step.
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to evaluate the level of statistical
multicollinearity. A VIF <5 was considered acceptable (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). The
distribution of regression residuals along with the Shapiro-Wilks test were used to
determine whether the regression residuals were normally distributed. An absolute value
of three was used to identify outliers in the residuals (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Normal
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probability plots were used to evaluate linearity of the residuals, and scatterplots to assess
homoscedasticity (constant variance) of the observations in the dataset. Finally, data points
that could be inserting undue influence on the regression coefficients were examined by
investigating the Leverage values. Leverage values above the critical cut-point of 3p/n
where (p=number of predictors, and n= number of observations) were considered
significant. For this data set the critical Leverage value was 0.513. If any observations had a
Leverage value above the critical value, they would be removed and the regression analysis
subsequently rerun to see whether there would be changes in regression results.
6.15.3 Longitudinal analyses
Univariate analyses were carried out to test for differences between individuals lost
to follow-up and those who returned time two questionnaires. Chi-square, t-tests, and
Mann-Whitney U tests were used to assess significance. Simple change scores for anxiety,
depression, and the Barthel Index were calculated by subtracting scores at time 1 from
scores at time 2. As the data collected were from repeated measures in the same group,
paired statistical tests were used. These included McNemar’s and Wilcoxon signed rank
sum tests, and paired t-tests.
A repeated measures MANOVA was conducted to compare IPQ-R domain scores at
baseline with scores at follow-up. Illness representation data were collected on more than
one occasion, hence there was an opportunity to conduct cluster analysis which could
classify individuals into subgroups according to their change in illness representations from
baseline to three-month follow-up.
6.15.3.1 Cluster analysis
Cluster analysis is a descriptive statistical technique that is used to identify groups of
similar individuals. It has value as a means of analysing illness representations that take into
account an individual’s entire illness schema (Clatworthy et al. 2007). Evaluating an illness
profile may be more meaningful and easily interpreted than assessing individual IPQ-R
domains. Additionally, cluster analysis is useful when carrying out regression analyses in a
small sample as it reduces the number of variables that need to be entered into the model.
Cluster analysis was carried out to assess changes in overall illness schema over time, and to
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assess whether these illness beliefs were associated with anxiety at follow-up. The methods
associated with the cluster analysis are described in detail in chapter eight.
6.15.3.2 Structural Equation Modelling & Regression Analysis
For the longitudinal analysis an ANCOVA adjusting for baseline anxiety using the
same approach described in section 6.15.2.4 and structural equation modelling, were
conducted to identify predictors of anxiety at follow-up. ANCOVA analysis is useful for
understanding the role that individual covariates have on an outcome variable.
Additionally, this was an exploratory study and it was thought there may be other important
associations that existed between the predictor variables that were of interest but would
not be apparent if only the ANCOVA was conducted. Subsequently, both an ANCOVA and
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) were carried out with the aim of the former to identify
predictors of anxiety at follow-up. The latter SEM also has the ability to predict anxiety at
follow-up, however it can also uncover other potentially important associations between
the regression model covariates in their pathway to predicting anxiety that would only be
possible by conducting multiple ANCOVA analyses. SEM and its assumptions are described
below.
SEM is a relatively new and powerful multivariate technique. The primary goals of
SEM are to understand the patterns of correlation and covariance between a set of variables,
and to explain as much of their variance as possible with the model that is specified (Blunch
2008). Factor analysis, path analysis, and regression all represent special cases of SEM. The
advantages of SEM are that it is flexible and allows for relationships between multiple
independent and dependent variables to be examined within one model. Observed and
unobserved variables can be included, and it recognises that variables are measured with
error and takes this into account when calculating parameter estimates. In traditional
regression, variables entered into a model are assumed to have been measured without
error. This section provides a general overview of the SEM approach that was used in
chapter eight.
To start, the language used in SEM is different from that of traditional regression.
Within SEM independent variables are known as exogenous variables, while dependent
variables are called endogenous variables. The exogenous and endogenous variables can be
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measured directly or as latent constructs. A Latent construct variable is a hypothetical
variable¬ that is not directly measured but rather assumed to be directly related to the
observed variables (e.g. personality). Disturbance, another term used within SEM is defined
as the unspecified cause(s) of an endogenous variable and is akin to an error or residual in a
prediction equation. Finally, the graphical language associated with SEMs allows for a
pictorial display of complex relationships between variables which is transformed into a set
of equations. The set of equations are solved simultaneously to test model fit and estimate
parameters. Table 6-3 shows the common symbols used in SEM diagrams.
Table 6-3 Common symbols used in SEM
Compared to traditional regression techniques, SEM is more flexible in its assumptions
and allows both confirmatory and exploratory modelling. Hence it is suited to both theory
testing and theory development. It is able to model mediating variables, and the flexibility
of SEM allows for simultaneous comparison of models making different assumptions
regarding causal association.
Disentangling the differential association between multiple illness representations with
anxiety was the primary goal of the empirical study. To start, anxiety is highly correlated
with depression. SEM was considered because, unlike regression, multiple correlations
between independent variables could be evaluated within one model. Additionally, other
indirect relationships that may occur within the model but which cannot be assessed using a
regression model could also be evaluated. Figure 6-2 provides a graphical example of a
SEM. In this figure independent variables (IV) 1-3 predict dependent variable anxiety and
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depression. Furthermore the indirect effect of the three independent variables on anxiety
as mediated by depression, could also be specified.
Figure 6-2 Example of modelled relationships using SEM
Similar to regression analysis, model parameters are determined by model
estimation. Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation is the default for estimating model
parameters. The estimates are assumed to be population values, hence ML seeks to
maximise the probability that the data were drawn from the population. Maximum
likelihood estimation is also appropriate for non-normally distributed data and small sample
sizes. The fundamental question in SEM is how well the model derived from the data fits
with the actual sample data. It does this by assessing whether the observed covariance
matrix from the sample data fits or is similar to the estimated (proposed model) covariance
matrix, and this is done by using the Chi-square test which assesses the deviation between
the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix. Chi-square is
considered a “badness of fit” test. This is because a non-significant Chi-square is desired
because it suggests that the reproduced and observed covariance matrices do not differ
significantly and that the data fit the proposed model structure. The Chi-square statistic is
sensitive to sample size and will often be significant in large samples (Iacobucci 2010). As a
result, other fit indices are used in conjunction with the Chi-square test to inform the
relative fit of a model. Table 6-4 provides a summary of commonly reported fit indices.
The first of these fit indices is the Comparative fit index (CFI). The CFI is based on the
ratio of the Chi-square of the tested model and the independence (null) model. The
independence model assumes there is no correlation among any of the variables in the
IV1
IV2
IV3
Anxiety
Depression
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model. It represents the extent to which the model of interest is better than the
independence model. Values that approach 1 indicate acceptable fit. CFI is not sensitive to
sample size.
The Normative fit index (NFI) is another fit index with values that range between 0
and 1, where 1 is ideal. The NFI is equal to the difference between the Chi-square statistic
of the independence model and the Chi-square of the model of interest, divided by the Chi-
square statistic of the independence model. For example, and NFI of .90 indicates that the
model of interest improves the fit by 90% relative to the independence model. The NFI is
sensitive to sample size and may be underestimated where sample size is small, and can be
overestimated if the number of model parameters is increased. The Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)
is similar to the NFI except that it will penalise (i.e. yield a lower estimate) more complex
models with more parameters, but is relatively independent of sample size. Generally
values over .90 or .95 are considered acceptable.
Other fit indices include the Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The
RMSEA evaluates the extent to which the model of interest fails to fit the data per degree of
freedom. It generally will favour more complex models. RMSEA values <.05 are considered
good, <.08 acceptable, and >.1 not acceptable. Finally the Akaike information criterion (AIC)
is considered when testing alternative models with the same data that are not nested or
hierarchically related. The absolute value of the AIC is irrelevant, however models with the
lowest value are optimal. It reflects the extent to which the observed and predicted
covariance matrices differ from each other, however unlike the RMSEA it penalises more
complex models.
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Table 6-4 Summary of common SEM fit indices
General rule for acceptable fit
Absolute fit index
Chi-square (X2) Ratio of X2 to df ≤ 2 or 3 good
Comparative fit indices
Comparative fit index (CFI) Range between 0 and 1. Represent the extent to which the model of
interest is better than the independence model. Not sensitive to
sample size. ≥0.95 is acceptable 
Normed fit index (NFI) Range between 0 and 1. Estimates how much proposed model
improves the fit relative to the independence model:  ≥0.95 is 
acceptable. Underestimated when sample size is small
Tucker- Lewis Index (TLI) Similar to NFI, values over .90 considered acceptable
Other indices
Root Mean Square Error
Approximation (RMSEA)
Evaluates the extent to which a model fails to fit the data
Values <.05 good, <.08 acceptable, >0.1 not acceptable
Akaike information criterion (AIC) Penalises more complex model, but not sensitive to sample size. Good
for model comparison
6.15.4 Statistical Software
All analyses were performed using PASW Statistics v.18 (SPSS, Inc, 2009 Chicago, IL).
AMOS (Arbuckle 2006) was used to conduct the structural equation modelling.
6.16 Summary
The general design and methods used for the empirical study have been described,
including the measurement of anxiety, illness representations, and functional and cognitive
impairment. Analysis techniques have been described, and an overview of structural
equation modelling provided.
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7 Chapter Seven: Study 3- Results Baseline analysis
7.1 Introduction
The empirical study results have been divided into two parts. Part one provides
descriptive information about individuals recruited into the study, and demographic and
clinical variables of interest. The reliability of the instruments used were evaluated, and
scores on the IPQ-R domains compared with a stroke study, and the original IPQ-R test
sample. The prevalence of anxiety along with impairment in activities of daily living and
cognitive impairment at time of recruitment were assessed. Statistical significance tests of
key variables, stratified by anxiety status have also been presented. Finally, a multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) along with a discriminant analysis to test for differences
between anxious and non-anxious participants explained, and a multivariate linear
regression model predicting anxiety at baseline is provided.
7.2 Participation
Recruitment into the study occurred over a period of eight months between March
2011 and November 2011. During this eight month recruitment period, a total of 298
individuals were scheduled for clinic appointments. Approximately one-third of patients
were attending for reasons other than stroke (n=97), and over 10% (n=38) had previously
had a stroke or had severe co-morbidities such as dementia or Parkinson’s disease (n=8). A
total of 155 stroke patients were potentially eligible for participation in this study, of which
104 (67%) patients were recruited and 80 (77%) returned the baseline questionnaire.
Overall 52% (80/155) of the eligible population participated in the study (Figure 7-1).
Patient non-attendance at clinic appointments was the leading reason for exclusion
(n=16). Other reasons for exclusion included refusal to participate (n=13), or presence of
severe communication difficulties (n=3). There were occasions when clinicians did not refer
patients to the researcher (n=9); however this only occurred during the early stages of the
study when there was some turnover in staff running the clinic. Additionally on four
occasions reminder tags that were attached to the patient files as referral reminders fell off,
resulting in these patients being missed.
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Figure 7-1 Participant recruitment flow diagram
Total patients in clinic (n=298)
Total number of stroke (n=201)
Total Eligible (n=155)
Recruited into study (n=104)
Completed baseline questionnaire (n=80)
Baseline questionnaire not returned (n=24)
Did not attend (n=16)
Missed by researcher (n=5)
Missed by clinician (n=9)
Administrative error (n=4)
Communication problems (n=3)
Other (n=1)
Refused (n=13)
Previous Stroke (n=9)
>6 months post-stroke (n=29)
Severe co-morbidity (n=8)
Not stroke (n=97)
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7.3 Responders compared with non-responders at baseline
To evaluate whether there were differences between those patients that responded
compared with those that did not, a series of univariate descriptive analyses using chi-
square and Mann-Whitney tests were conducted (Table 7-1).
7.3.1 Demographic and clinical variables
The mean age of the total recruited sample was 69 years (SD=12.7), of which 55
(53%) were male. Non-responders did not differ significantly on any demographic factors,
however they were on average younger than responders (64 years vs. 70 years), and
differential response rates were observed for those under 65 years of age as compared to
those who were 65 years or older (37% vs. 84%, X2= 4.75, p=0.03). In terms of clinical
variables non-responders had significantly higher mean scores on the 6-CIT cognitive
impairment test (range 0-28) administered at recruitment than those that responded (9.7 vs.
6.0, p=.004). Two individuals (one with a stroke and the other with a TIA) had extremely
high scores of 28 on the 6-CIT. The difference between responders and non-responders
remained significant even after excluding these two individuals from the analysis (U=546,
p=0.01). Non-responders had had more time past since their stroke (12 weeks vs. 9 weeks),
and were more likely to have a history of anxiety or depression (37% vs. 19%) relative to
those that responded. The response rates were similar for the two recruitment sites (76%
Barnsley vs. 80% Sheffield). Classification according to the Oxfordshire Community Stroke
Classification system was only available for 43 patients, with half (n=22) recorded as having
a left hemisphere stroke. Analysis by ethnicity was not conducted as all but two individuals
recruited into the study self-identified as White British.
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Table 7-1 Characteristics of responders vs. non-responders
Total
(n=104)
Non-
responders
(n=24)
Responders
(n=80)
Significance
Demographic
Age in years
Mean (SD) 68.9 (12.7) 64 (15.6) 70.3 (11.4) U=752, p=.11
Median 72 62.5 73
<65 years: n(%) 35 (34) 13 (54) 22 (28)
Sex: n(%)
Female 49 (47) 10 (42) 39 (49) X2= .37, p=.54
Male 55 (53) 14 (58) 41 (51)
Live Alone: n(%)
No 67 (64) 15 (63) 52 (65) X2= .39, p=.82
Yes 36 (36) 9 (37) 27 (34)
Recruitment location: n(%)
Barnsley 79 (76) 19 (79) 60 (75) X2= .18, p=.68
Sheffield 25 (24) 5 (21) 20 (25)
Clinical Factors
Type of Stroke: n(%)
Cerebral Infarction 58 (56) 12 (50) 46 (57) U=848, p=.32
TIA 41 (39) 9 (38) 32 (40)
Intracerebral hemorrhage 4 (4) 2 (8) 2 (3)
SAH 1 (1) 1 (4) 0
Hemisphere location: N=43
Right 21 6 15
Left 22 5 17
6CIT
Mean (SD) 6.8 (5.5) 9.7 (6.1) 6.0 (5.1) U=569, p=.004
Median 6 8 5.5
IQR 2-10 6-12 2-10
History of anxiety or depression: n(%)
No 80 (77) 15 (63) 65 (81) X2= .3.66, p=.06
Yes 24 (23) 9 (37) 15 (19)
Smoking status: n(%)
No 75 (72) 15 (63) 60 (75) U=804, p=.38
Yes 11 (11) 6 (25) 5 (6)
Ex-smoker 14 (14) 2 (8) 12 (15)
Number of co-morbidities: n(%)
0 42 (40) 10 (42) 32 (40) U=941, p=.88
1 40 (39) 9 (38) 31 (39)
2 16 (15) 4 (16) 12 (15)
3 6 (6) 1 (4) 5 (6)
Time post-stroke at recruitment (weeks)
Mean (SD) 9.9 (7.4) 12 (7.3) 9.2 (7.3) U=716, p=.06
Median 7.0 10.5 7.0
IQR 4-16 5.5-18 3.5-13
X2- Chi-square, U- Mann Whitney test
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7.4 Instrument reliability analysis-
This section presents findings of the Cronbach alpha coefficients that were
calculated to examine the internal consistency of the IPQ-R, the HADS, and the Barthel Index
that were used in this study (Table 7-2).
7.4.1 Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ-R)
Cronbach alpha coefficients were calculated for the individual IPQ-R domains and
compared with data from an unpublished stroke study that assessed the association
between illness representations and depression (Ford 2007) , and also with the original test
sample for the IPQ-R that consisted of a diverse group of over 700 individuals with various
long-term conditions (Moss-Morris et al. 2002).
All domains showed good reliability. Alpha was slightly lower for the personal
control domain however the level observed in this study was still acceptable. On the
timeline (acute/chronic) alpha improved from 0.80 to 0.87 after removing the following
three questions: 1) My stroke symptoms will last a short time, 2) The effects of my stroke
will pass quickly, and 3) My stroke symptoms will improve in time. Additionally the
coherence domain alpha scores improved slightly from 0.84 to 0.86 when the questions “I
have a clear picture or understanding of my stroke” was dropped. However as results from
this study will be compared with the existing literature, the total composite sub- scale
scores on these two domains were used in all subsequent analyses. Overall the alpha scores
observed in this study were similar to those seen in the large sample on which the IPQ-R
was originally tested.
7.4.2 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)
Both the anxiety and depression subscales of the HADS demonstrated good internal
reliability. The reliability coefficient for the anxiety subscale was 0.86 and was 0.83 for the
depression subscale. The reliability coefficient for the overall scale was 0.90.
7.4.3 Barthel Index
The reliability coefficient was lower for the Barthel index at 0.68. However no
improvement was observed by deleting any of the items in the scale.
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Table 7-2 Cronbach alpha's for the IPQ-R, HADS, and Barthel Index
Scale
(Number of questions)
Present Study
n=80
Ford Stroke
study (2007)
n=40
Original IPQ-R
test sample
n=711
IPQ-R
Identity (22) 0.87, - -
Timeline- acute/ chronic (6) 0.80/
0.87 (3)†
0.86 0.89
Timeline- cyclical (4) 0.84 0.52 0.79
Consequences (6) 0.84 0.81 0.84
Personal Control (6) 0.72 0.54 0.81
Treatment Control (5) 0.80 0.49 0.80
Coherence (5) 0.84/
0.86 (4)†
0.83 0.87
Emotions (6) 0.85 0.84 0.88
HADS
Anxiety subscale (7) 0.86 - -
Depression subscale (7) 0.83 - -
Barthel Index (10) 0.68 - -
†- Improved Cronbach alpha score after the removal of select questions. Number in brackets indicate
number of questions contributing to modified scale score.
7.5 Study population
The following section describes the 80 participants who completed questionnaires at
baseline. These individuals will be referred to throughout as the study sample.
All study participants were diagnosed with stroke confirmed by computer
tomography scans (CT ) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The nature of the stroke
varied across participants. Forty-eight had a cerebral infarction, while 32 individuals had a
TIA. Another two individuals (2%) had an intra-cerebral haemorrhage.
Amongst those that responded, 28 (35%) individuals indicated they needed
assistance to complete the questionnaire. Having someone read the questions to them was
the most frequently cited means of help (n=24), followed by someone discussing questions
with them (n=3), someone ticking the boxes on their behalf (n=1), and reasons not specified
(n=1).
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7.5.1 Activities of Daily Living and cognitive impairment
Impairment in activities of daily living as assessed by the Barthel Index (BI) (0 to 20
scale), with higher scores indicative of less impairment found that the mean BI score was
17.1 (SD= 3.3), range 6 to 20 (Figure 7-2). The distribution of the BI scores were negatively
skewed, indicating the study sample had lower levels of impairment. Close to a third (n=26)
of the study sample obtained the maximum score of 20.
The 6-CIT scores (0 to 28 scale) were positively skewed, indicating low levels of
possible cognitive impairment at recruitment in the study sample, with 85% (n=69) having a
score of less than 11 (Figure 7-3).
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Figure 7-2 Distribution of Barthel Index scores at baseline
Figure 7-3 Distribution of 6-CIT scores at baseline
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7.5.2 Anxiety prevalence and symptom severity
 The prevalence of anxiety (HADS-A ≥11) at baseline is shown in Table 7-3 In total
30% (n=24) of the study sample was classified as having anxiety, (either alone or co-morbid
with depression), and 5% (n=4) had depression alone (HADS-D≥11).  Of those with anxiety 
42% (n=10) had co-morbid depression.
Table 7-3 Prevalence of anxiety at baseline (n=80)
Frequency (%) Mean HADS-A
Score (SD)
Mean HADS-D
Score (SD)
No anxiety or depression 52 (65.0) 4.7 (3.1) 4.2 (3.1)
Anxiety only 14 (17.5) 11.9 (1.0) 7.4 (1.9)
Anxiety + Depression 10 (12.5) 14.0 (1.0) 13.4 (2.0)
Depression only 4 (5.0) 4.8 (3.7) 11.8 (0.5)
Total 80 (100) 7.1 (4.6) 6.3 (4.3)
The severity of anxiety (and depression) symptoms were also assessed by examining
the mean and standard deviation scores for both HADS subscales (0 to 21 scale). Anxiety
symptom subscale scores ranged from 0 to 16, and the mean anxiety symptom subscale
score was 7.1 (SD= 4.6). Scores on the depression subscale also ranged from 0 to 16, with a
mean score of 6.3 (SD=4.3) (Figure 7-4). A paired sample t-test showed that anxiety
subscale scores were significantly higher than depression subscale scores at baseline (t=2.13,
df=79, p=0.04)
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Figure 7-4 Distribution of HADS-A and HADS-D scores at baseline (n=80)
Table 7-4 shows univariate testing stratified by anxiety status at baseline (HADS-A
≥11 vs. HADS-A<11).  Impairment in activities of daily living as measured by the Barthel 
Index, was significantly greater amongst anxious participants than the non-anxious, and a
greater proportion of younger stroke survivors were anxious, however the difference was
not significant at p<.05. Additionally, the proportion of individuals with a pre-stroke history
of anxiety or depression was greater in the anxious group relative to the non-anxious group
(29% vs 14%), however this difference did not reach statistical significance. Amongst those
who indicated they had a pre-stroke history of anxiety or depression, 40% claimed they had
not received any form of treatment for those episodes, and 60% indicated they had taken
some form of drug therapy. None indicated they had received any psychological therapy.
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Table 7-4 Characteristics of participants with and without anxiety
No Anxiety
(n=56)
Anxiety
(n=24)
Significance
Age (in years)
Mean (SD) 71.4 (11.3) 67.8 (11.4) U=542, p=0.17
Median 73 69.5
<65 yrs, n(%) 12 (21%) 10 (42%) X2= 3.45, p=0.06
Sex X2= 0.40, p=0.53
Female 26 (46%) 11 (46%)
Male 30 (54%) 13 (54%)
History of Anxiety or Depression Fisher, p= 0.13
No 48 (86%) 17 (71%)
Yes 8 (14%) 7 (29%)
Lives Alone X2= 0.32, p=.57
No 36 (64%) 17 (71%)
Yes 20 (36%) 7 (29%)
6CIT U=553, p= 0.30
Mean Score 5.83 (5.6) 6.25 (3.7)
Median 4 6
Range 0-28 0-13
Number of Comorbidities U=599, p=0.42
0 23 (41%) 9 (38%)
1 23 (41%) 8 (33%)
2 8 (14%) 4 (17%)
3 2 (4%) 3 (12%)
Smoking Status U=565, p=0.53
No 42 (75%) 18 (75%)
Yes 3 (18%) 2 (17%)
Ex-Smoker 10 (5%) 2 (8%)
Type of Stroke X2= 0.78, p=0.77
Stroke 33 (59%) 15 (63%)
TIA 23 (41%) 9 (37%)
Barthel Index Score U=444, p=0.01
Mean (sd) 17.8 (2.4) 15.4 (4.2)
Median 18 17
Range 10-20 6-20
Time Post-Stroke at recruitment
(in weeks)
U=642, p=0.75
Mean (SD) 9 (7.1) 11 (8.2)
Median 7 8
Range 1-29 1-33
Time Post Stroke Questionnaire
Completed (in weeks)
U=612, p=0.53
Mean (SD) 9.7 (7.2) 11 (8.2)
Median 7.5 8
Range 2-32 1-34
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7.6 Illness representations at baseline
The following section describes illness representations observed in the study sample
at baseline.
7.6.1 Frequency and attribution of illness symptoms
Participants were given a list of 24 illness identity symptoms and asked to indicate
(i.e. Yes/ No) whether they had experienced any of them since having their stroke, and if so
whether they believed they were related to their stroke.
Table 7-5 shows fatigue was the most commonly reported symptom experienced by
participants at baseline, with 73% endorsing it. Forgetfulness, loss of strength, and stiff
joints were also prevalent and reported in close to two-thirds of the study sample.
Symptoms commonly associated with anxiety such as difficulty breathing, headache,
sleeping problems, dizziness, and tingling in extremities were experienced by about half of
all respondents. Less than 25% reported experiencing sore throat, wheeziness, or upset
stomach. Close to one-third of participants said they had experienced symptoms of
emotionalism (e.g. feeling upset or weepy), and 15% of the study sample reported paralysis.
Participants reported experiencing multiple symptoms at baseline (mean= 9.0, median=9,
range= 0 -21).
Participants did not always attribute the symptoms they were experiencing to their
stroke. For example, more than a quarter of participants with fatigue did not believe that it
was related to their stroke, and close to half of those with pain did not attribute the pain to
their stroke. On the other hand, virtually all individuals who reported speaking problems,
paralysis or feeling upset or weepy, attributed these symptoms to their stroke. Hence while
participants experienced an average of nine symptoms post stroke, the mean number
attributed to stroke was six (Table 7-6).
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Table 7-5 Frequency of illness (identity) symptoms experience post stroke and believed to
be associated with stroke at baseline
Experienced symptom
since stroke (%)
Experienced symptom and
attributed it to stroke (%)
Pain 34/80 (43) 19/34 (56)
Sore throat 11/80 (14) 2/11 (18)
Nausea 22/80 (28) 13/22 (59)
Breathlessness 40/80 (50) 16/40 (40)
Weight loss 26/80 (33) 17/26 (65)
Fatigue 58/80 (73) 42/58 (72)
Stiff joints 50/80 (63) 23/50 (46)
Sore eyes 23/80 (29) 15/23 (63)
Wheeziness 17/80 (21) 7/17 (41)
Headache 40/80 (50) 27/40 (68)
Upset stomach 16/80 (20) 8/16 (50)
Sleeping problems 36/80 (45) 24/36 (67)
Dizziness 35/80 (44) 28/35 (80)
Loss of strength 50/80 (63) 40/50 (80)
Forgetfulness 48/80 (60) 39/48 (81)
Reading problems 21/80 (26) 16/21 (76)
Seeing problems 21/80 (26) 16/21 (76)
Speaking problems 23/80 (29) 23/23 (100)
Writing problems 18/80 (23) 15/18 (83)
Clumsiness 30/80 (38) 28/30 (93)
Tingling or numbness 36/80 (45) 29/36 (81)
Weakness 45/80 (56) 40/45 (89)
Paralysis 12/80 (15) 12/12 (100)
Upset or weepy 23/80 (29) 21/23 (91)
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7.6.2 Description of illness representations
Table 7-6 shows the mean and standard deviations of the baseline illness
perceptions domain scores in the study sample. Participants held strong beliefs about their
personal ability to control their stroke symptoms, the ability of treatment to control stroke
symptoms with 75-80% of participants reporting scores above the domain midline.
Additionally, strong beliefs about the consequences of the stroke, and its emotional impact
were also observed as half of the participants scored above the midpoint on theses domains.
Table 7-6 Mean and standard deviation of IPQ-R domains
IPQ-R Domain Possible range
of scores
n=76
Mean (SD) Above median score
Identity 0-22 6.5 (5.0) -
Timeline- acute/chronic 6-30 16.0 (4.3) 23%
Timeline- cyclical 4-20 11.3 (3.2) 33%
Consequences 6-30 18.6 (5.1) 50%
Personal control 6-30 21.1 (3.5) 80%
Treatment control 5-25 17.8 (3.0) 75%
Coherence 5-25 14.9 (3.8) 42%
Emotional 6-30 18.4 (5.0) 53%
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The sample size was not sufficient (n<100) to conduct factor analysis to identify
patterns of causal belief for stroke (e.g. lifestyle, environment, biomedical). Questions
about causal beliefs were located in the last section of the IPQ-R questionnaire pack and
item non-response was high. Between 5% and 10% of the individual questions about
possible causes of stroke were left blank, and complete case data about causal factors was
only available for 84% (n=67) of the study sample. Figure 7-5 shows the percent who agree
or strongly agree that the various factors asked about were possible causes of stroke.
Nearly half of the study sample thought that age was a possible cause. Additionally stress/
worry, and bad luck were endorsed by a third of respondents as factors they believed could
have caused their stroke.
Figure 7-5 Causal attributions for stroke
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7.7 Correlations between Illness Representations, Anxiety, Depression,
Clinical, and Demographic variables at baseline
Bivariate Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients (rs) were calculated to assess the
level of association between illness representation domains with each other, with anxiety
and depression, and also with other clinical and demographic variables of interest
(Table 7-7). These correlations were also used to identify statistical multicollinearity
amongst predictor variables that would be entered in the regression model in section 7.9.
Anxiety and depression were strongly correlated with each other (rs= .71, p<.001), and the
association between emotional representations and anxiety was also strong (rs= .62, p<.001).
Inter-relationships between illness representation domains were generally weak (i.e. rs<.50),
and supported some of the logical trends observed in previous research (Hagger and Orbell
2003). For example, identity had a significant positive correlation with the timeline and
consequence domains, and was negatively, albeit non-significantly, associated with the
personal and treatment control domains. Additionally, perceiving stroke to be more chronic
(timeline), and unpredictable (cyclical) was positively and significantly correlated with
perceptions about consequence.
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Table 7-7 Correlation between clinical, demographic, and IPQ-R variables (n=76)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Age 1.00
2 HADS-A -0.09
3 HADS-D 0.01 .71**
4 HADS-T -0.04 .93** .91**
5 IR- Identity -0.10 .58** .63** .66**
6 IR- Timeline -0.10 .34** .35** .37** .56**
7 IR-Cyclical 0.13 .34** .35** .37** .51** .33**
8 IR-Consequence -.27* .44** .43** .47** .53** .41** .29*
9 IR-Personal Control -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 -0.13 -.32** -.25* 0.10
10 IR-Treatment control 0.13 -0.15 0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -.31** -0.16 0.06 .44**
11 IR-Coherence -0.06 -.25* -0.14 -0.21 -0.21 -0.12 -0.21 -0.10 .28* 0.16
12 IR- Emotional -0.06 .62** .43** .56** .39** .25* .30** .34** -0.15 -0.21 -.32**
13 Barthel Index -0.13 -.26* -.40** -.36** -.32** -.25* -.28* -.35** 0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.04
14 6 CIT 0.16 0.18 .25* .24* 0.18 0.22 .37** 0.16 -.29* 0.03 -0.12 0.07 -0.13
15 Sex (female) .25* 0.22 0.13 0.20 0.10 -0.01 0.17 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 0.01 -0.21 -0.04
16 Living alone 0.13 0.04 0.22 0.13 0.14 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.10 0.06 -0.13 0.21 0.03
17 Comorbidities .48** 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.08 .28* 0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.21 0.18 -0.06 0.20 .22* 0.15
18 Stroke Type (Stroke) 0.09 0.13 .34** .24* .31** 0.16 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.07 0.14 0.10 0.15
19 Time post stroke (weeks) 0.04 0.15 .32** .24* .40** .36** 0.20 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.15 .36**
20 Pre-stroke anx or dep (YES) -0.05 .27* .28* .29* 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.14 0.18 -0.04 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.06
IR- Illness Representation domain
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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7.8 Research Question 1: Are there any differences in illness
representations between anxious and non-anxious stroke survivors at
baseline?
Due to the high frequency of co-morbid anxiety and depression, it was determined
that prior to testing a multivariate regression model for factors predictive of anxiety at
baseline, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) test should be undertaken to
determine whether there were differential patterns observed between those with anxiety,
those with depression, or those with neither anxiety or depression, as having depression
could result in a differential patterns of illness belief. For the MANOVA analysis the study
sample was categorised into three groups:
1) No anxiety or depression (i.e. HADS-A and HADS-D score <11),
2) anxiety (i.e. HADS-A ≥11 and HADS-D not ≥11), and  
3) depression (i.e. HADS-D≥11).   
Individuals with co-morbid anxiety and depression were classified as depressed, in
keeping with the hierarchical diagnostic nature of depression generally having priority over
anxiety in clinical settings. Each of the individual IPQ-R domain scores were entered as
dependent variables.
The MANOVA revealed a significant overall effect (F[16, 134]=2.60, p=0.001, partial
ε2= 0.24, power= 0.99) (Table 7-8). The Box-M test was non-significant (Box’s M= 112.69,
p=.19) indicating that the null hypothesis of equal covariance of the dependent variables
across the groups, could not be rejected. Additionally, the Levene’s tests for equality of
variance were non-significant for each of the IPQ-R domain variables (Appendix I)
Findings from the MANOVA analysis showed there were some significant differences
in patterns of illness representations between those defined as anxious or depressed
relative to those without mental health distress. Post-hoc multiple comparison tests
adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni correction significance set to p<.01,
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found that participants who were anxious viewed their stroke symptoms as less predictable
(i.e. more cyclical) in nature (p=.03), as having a greater life consequence (p=.02), and they
had a higher level of emotional response to their stroke (p=.01) relative to those without
any mental health problems. However none of the mean IPQ-R domain scores were found
to differ significantly between those defined as anxious or depressed (Table 7-8).
Table 7-8 MANOVA comparisons of the illness perceptions (IPQ-R) between anxious and
non anxious patients
MANOVA
IPQ-R Domain Possible
range
None
n=50
Mean (SD)
Anxiety
n=12
Mean (SD)
Depression
n=14
Mean (SD)
F ε2
Identity 0-22 4.9 (4.2) 8.7 (4.7) 10.9 (5.1) 11.12** .23
Timeline 6-30 15.4 (4.1) 16.2 (4.0) 17.2 (5.4) 0.98 .03
Cyclical 4-20 10.7 (2.9) 13.3 (3.0) 11.9 (3.9) 3.87* .10
Consequences 6-30 17.2 (4.9) 21.2 (3.9) 21.4 (5.0) 6.25** .15
Personal Control 6-30 21.4 (3.8) 21.8 (2.9) 19.6 (2.8) 1.55 .04
Treatment control 5-25 17.8 (3.0) 17.9 (2.6) 17.8 (3.0) 0.04 .001
Coherence 5-25 15.7 (3.5) 13.3 (3.1) 13.9 (4.5) 2.82 .07
Emotional 6-30 17.0 (4.5) 21.8 (3.0) 20.3 (5.9) 6.78** .16
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
7.8.1 Discriminant analysis for significant MANOVA
A discriminant function analysis was performed because the finding from the
MANOVA was statistically significant. Discriminant function analysis (DA) supports a greater
understanding of the data set by providing insight into the meaning of a significant
MANOVA, and identifies the combination of score variables which led to the significant
MANOVA. For the MANOVA analysis to work, predictor variables are entered as dependent
variables. DA is essentially the reverse of MANOVA. This reversal of labelling is a
consequence of the aim of MANOVA being to test differences between means, while the
aim of discriminant function analysis is to assess whether members of different groups (i.e.
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those with anxiety or depression) can be identified on the basis of their scores on a set of
variables (i.e IPQ-R domains). DA also determines which of the independent variables
account for most of the differences in the average score profiles of the respective groups.
The key assumptions for deriving the discriminant function are multivariate
normality of the independent variables (this was observed in this sample), and unknown
(but equal) dispersion and covariance matrices for the groups. When data do not meet the
normality assumption there are problems in the estimation of the discriminant function, in
which case logistic regression is suggested as an alternative. However the small sample size
meant that logistic regression was inappropriate as the predictor to variable ratio would not
be achieved. A minimum ratio of 10-20 observations for each predictor variable has been
suggested for logistic regression, however as in this case, such a large sample size was not
achievable. DA is also sensitive to the ratio of sample size to the number of predictor
variables. However it has been determined in DA that the smallest group size just has to
exceed the number of predictor variables in the equation. The smallest group size required
from this study was 8 cases, making the sample size sufficient. The sample size requirement
for logistic regression on the other hand is more stringent whereby the minimum number of
cases is equal to: [ 10*(# of predictors)/ smallest of the proportions for dependent groups].
For such analysis a sample size of 445 would have been required.
10 * (8 IPQ variables)/ 0.18 the proportion with anxiety
In DA variable scores are combined in so that a single new composite variable, the
discriminant score, is produced. A primary function of DA is to validate the likelihood that a
respective observation will be correctly classified according to the derived discriminant
function or to determine the most parsimonious way to distinguish between persons who
vary on a given attribute of interest (e.g mental health status). Given the overlap between
anxiety and depression, this could lend insight into what (if any) aspects are different
between these two groups.
In most instances of DA the sample is divided into two subsamples, one used for
estimating the discriminant function (the analysis sample), and the other for validation
purposes (the holdout sample). This method of validating the discriminant functions is
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referred to as the split-sample or cross validation approach. In the event the sample size is
not large enough to split (i.e. n<100) then the compromise is to develop the discriminant
functions on the entire sample and then use the functions to classify the same group used
to develop the function. However a limitation of this approach is that it gives an inflated
idea of the predictive accuracy of the function.
The DA was carried out to predict whether stroke participants would have anxiety,
depression, or no mental health distress. Predictor variables were the eight IPQ-R domain
scores. Significant mean differences were observed for identity, emotional, consequence
and timeline cyclical domains (Table 7-10). The Box M test which assesses whether the
variances across the dependent variable groups is similar was not significant (Box M= 112.69,
F (72, 3019)=1.15, p=.19). In DA the number of discriminant function comparisons is always
one less than the number of groups in the dependent variable. In this case two discriminant
functions differentiated mental health status (anxiety vs depression vs none) and accounted
for 78% and 22% of the variance respectively. The Wilks’ lambda was statistically significant
for the combined functions [X2 (16)= 38.99, p=0.001], but was not significant when the first
function was removed [X2(7)= 9.50, p=0.22] (Table 7-9). This means that the two
discriminant functions are statistically significant, however function 2 is not statistically
significant on its own.
Table 7-9 Wilks' Lambda
Test of Function(s) Wilks’ Lambda Chi-square Df Sig.
1 through 2 .57 38.99 16 .001
2 .87 9.50 7 .22
The standardised discriminant function coefficients are like that in multiple
regression. Table 7-10 shows the importance of each predictor similar to the standardised
regression coefficients in multiple regression. The sign indicates the direction of the
relationship. The illness identity variable was the most highly correlated with function 1 at
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(r=.75), followed by illness consequences (r=.57) and emotional representations (r=.55).
These three variables stand out as those that strongly predict allocation to mental health
status group (i.e. anxious, depressed or no mental health distress). The second function
maximally distinguished the anxious group from the other two groups and loaded most
strongly with the cyclical timeline score (r=.46). Function 2 also distinguished the depressed
group from the other two groups and on the personal control domain (r=.42). The F values
in Table 7-10 were only significant for some of the illness representation domains, indicating
the mean scores on theses variables were not significantly different across the three groups.
Table 7-10 Results of discriminant analysis of predictors associated with anxiety or
depression in stroke patients at baseline (n=76)
Predictors Standardised discriminant function
coefficient
(Pearson correlations)
F (2, 73)
Function 1 Function 2
Identity .72 (.75) -.65 (-.18) 11.12***
Consequence -.40 (.57) .02 (.12) 6.25**
Emotional -.05 (.55) .72 (.41) 6.78**
Coherence .40 (-.36) .01 (-.24) 2.82
Timeline (acute/ chronic) -.33 (.22) .73 (-.13) .98
Treatment control .31 (.05) -.04 (-.01) .04
Timeline (cyclical) -.18 (.38) -.31 (.46) 3.87*
Personal control .37 (-.18) .41 (.42) 1.55
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Unstandardised discriminant function coefficients are used to create the
discriminant function equation and it operates like a regression equation. In this case it is:
D(function 1)=(.16*Identity)-(.09*Timeline)-(.02 * cyclical)+(.08*consequence)-
(.09*Personal)+.10*Treatment)-(.05*Coherence)+.(08*Emotional)-1.53
D(Function 2)= -
(.14*Identity)+(.01*Timeline)+(.23*cyclical)+(.001*consequence)+(.21*personal)-
(.01*Treatment)-(.08*Coherence)+(.09*Emotional)-6.269
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These equations indicated the partial contribution of each variable to the discriminate
function controlling for all other variables in the equation. They can be used to assess each
predictors unique contribution to the discriminant function and provide information on the
relative importance of each variable.
The last step in evaluating the DA is to describe each group in terms of its profile
using the group means of the predictor variables. These group means are called centroids.
In this study, on function 1 those with no mental health distress had a mean of -.50, those
with anxiety a mean of .79, and those with depression 1.13 (Table 7-11).
Table 7-11 Functions at group centroids table
Groups Function 1 Function 2
No mental health distress -.50 -.04
Anxiety .79 .75
Depression 1.13 -.51
This analysis is displayed graphically in (Figure 7-6 & Figure 7-7). The boxplots of
function 1 show that there is substantial overlap between anxiety and depression, but less
in comparison to those with neither anxiety or depression. Function 2, which is not
significant in the absence of function 1, shows that the differentiation between anxiety and
depression improves, but there is substantial overlap between those with depression and
no mental health distress.
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Figure 7-6 Box plot illustrating the distribution of function 1 discriminant scores by group
Figure 7-7 Box plot illustrating the distribution of function 2 discriminant scores by group
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The discriminant analysis based on these data did not differentiate between
individuals defined as anxious or depressed. This was confirmed by the findings from the
classification results, whereby only 60% of the cross-validated grouped samples were
correctly classified (Table 7-12). Correct classification of those without mental health
distress was high (82%), whereas correct classification of patients with either anxiety or
depression was much less accurate at 8% for those defined as anxious and 29% for those
defined as depressed. This is less than the 33.3% that would be expected by chance alone.
These findings support the notion that those defined as anxious did not differ statistically
from those defined as depressed in this study sample. All subsequent analyses were
conducted with anxiety as the outcome of interest, with adjustment made for depression
scores.
Table 7-12 Discriminant analysis classification table results
Classification Resultsb,c
Occurrence of
Emotional
Distress
Predicted Group Membership
N (%)
None Anxious Depressed TOTAL
ORIGINAL None 43 (86.0) 5 (10.0) 2 (4.0) 50
Anxious 6 (50.0) 4 (33.3) 2 (16.7) 12
Depressed 6( 42.9) 2 (14.3) 6 (42.9) 14
CROSS-VALIDATED None 41 (82.0) 5 (10.0) 4 (8.0) 50
Anxious 8 (66.7) 1 (8.3) 3 (25.0) 12
Depressed 7 (50.0) 3 (21.4) 4 (28.6) 14
* Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is
classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case.
b. 69.7% of original group cases correctly classified
c. 60.5% of cross-validated group cases correctly classified
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7.9 Research Question 2: Are illness representations at baseline associated
with anxiety levels at baseline?
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the extent to
which illness representations and other potentially relevant variables predicted baseline
anxiety score. Age, sex, the Barthel index and pre-stroke history of mental health problems
(i.e. anxiety or depression) were entered in the first block, cognitive illness representations
were entered in the second block, and the emotional representation domain in the third
block (Table 7-13).
In the first block baseline score on the Barthel index (β= -.38, p=0.02) and having a 
pre-stroke history of anxiety or depression (β=2.70, p=0.03) were significant predictors of 
anxiety. The variables entered into the model at this step explained 16% of variance in
anxiety scores. Once cognitive representations were entered into the model, illness identity
was the only variable found to be a significant predictor of anxiety (β=.35, p=0.004).  
Baseline Barthel score, and pre-stroke history of anxiety or depression were no longer
significant predictors of anxiety at this stage. The proportion of variance explained by the
model increased significantly to 36%. The final step involved including emotional
representation into the regression model. Emotional perception of stroke was a significant
predictor of anxiety score (β =.40, p<.001) and illness identity representations remained the 
only other variable that was a significant predictor of anxiety score (β =.29, p=.01).  Overall, 
the final model explained 49% of the variance in anxiety scores.
Muliticollinearity amongst predictors was within acceptable levels as the variance
inflation factor (VIF) did not exceed 5 for any of the variables in the model. A histogram of
the regression standardised residuals show that they were normally distributed. This was
confirmed statistically by a non-significant Shapiro-Wilk test (W=.98, df=76, p=.41).
Inspection of the normal probability plot showed that the residuals met the assumption of
linearity, while a scatter plot of standardised residuals versus predicted residuals indicated
there was constant variance across each level of the predicted value (i.e. homoscedasticity).
There were no outliers amongst the standardised residuals as none had a value >3. Finally,
there were no observations exercising undue influence on the regression coefficients as
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none had a leverage value greater than the critical value of 0.513. The regression diagnostic
plots are in Appendix I.
Table 7-13 Regression analysis predicting anxiety at baseline
Step Variables Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients t Sig. R2
Adjusted
R2
F change
in R2B Beta
1 (Constant) 16.207 4.01 <.001 .20 .16 4.45**
Barthel Index -.38 -.27 -2.48 .02
Pre-stroke anx or
dep [YES] 2.7 .23 2.16 .03
Age -.05 -.14 -1.30 .20
Female 1.47 .17 1.51 .14
2 (Constant) 2.77 .43 .67 .46 .36 4.33**
Barthel Index -.03 -.04 -.22 .83
Pre-stroke anx or
dep [YES] 1.89 .19 1.67 .10
Age -.002 -.03 -.05 .96
Female 1.45 .17 1.61 .11
Identity .36 .38 3.00 .004
Timeline .02 .02 .17 .87
Cyclical -.03 -.03 -.17 .87
Consequence .21 .21 1.78 .08
Personal .06 .05 .45 .66
Treatment -.11 -.06 -.61 .54
Coherence -.19 -.14 -1.49 .14
3 (Constant) -2.48 -.41 .68 .58 .49 17.01***
Barthel Index -.03 -.09 -.21 .83
Pre-stroke anx or
dep [YES] 1.43 .15 1.41 .16
Age -.01 -.04 -.18 .86
Female 1.45 .17 1.81 .08
Identity .30 .32 2.77 .01
Timeline .04 .03 .33 .74
Cyclical -.10 -.08 -.69 .49
Consequence .10 .09 .91 .37
Personal .07 .05 .53 .60
Treatment .06 .04 .35 .73
Coherence -.07 -.05 -.63 .53
Emotional .40 .43 4.21 <.001
**p<.01, ***p<.001
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7.10 Summary of findings at baseline
 There was little difference observed between responders and non-responders with
the exception that the latter had significantly higher cognitive impairment screening
scores than former. Otherwise the two groups did not differ significantly on any
other variable.
 The study sample had low levels of residual impairment in activities of daily living
and cognitive impairment.
 One third of study participants were found to be anxious at baseline and of these,
42% also had co-morbid depression. Furthermore, anxiety symptom severity scores
were significantly higher than depression symptom severity scores.
 Having depression in addition to anxiety did not result in differential illness
representation scores.
 After adjusting for age, sex, history of anxiety or depression, and baseline Barthel
index score, illness identity and emotional representations were the only two
domains of illness representation found to be significantly associated with anxiety at
baseline. The regression model explained 49% of the variance in anxiety scores
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8 Chapter Eight: Study 3- Results Longitudinal analysis
8.1 Introduction
The following chapter extends upon results that were reported in the chapter seven
baseline cross-sectional analysis. The population lost to follow-up is described. A cluster
analysis used to identify overall illness schema, and for data reduction is explained. Changes
in the level of anxiety, and illness representations were examined. Linear regression and
structural equation models developed to predict anxiety at follow-up are presented.
Changes in the causal attribution of stroke over time were also examined.
8.2 Study population at follow-up
Eighteen (22%) individuals were lost to follow-up at time two. Additionally, three
(5%) participants indicated they had experienced a recurrent stroke. Longitudinal analysis
was conducted for 62 participants with data available from both time points.
A series of univariate tests were conducted to identify differences between those
lost-to follow-up, and those who returned questionnaires at time two (Table 8-1). Those
lost to follow-up had significantly higher baseline depression, and greater impairment on
activities of daily living relative to those who returned the follow-up questionnaires. There
was no significant difference observed between the groups on baseline illness
representations or on any other factor assessed.
The level of impairment in activities of daily living remained constant. There was no
significant change on the median Barthel index score from baseline to follow (18, IQR 15-20
vs. 19, IQR 15-20, W=.18, p=0.86).
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Table 8-1 Comparison between participants lost to follow-up and those responding at
time two
Lost to
follow-up
n=18
Returned
Time 2 data
n=62
Significance
Age in years U=436, p=.16
Median 64.5 73
<65 years: n(%) 9 (50) 13 (21)
Sex: n(%) X2=.17, p=.79
Female 8 (44) 31 (50)
Male 10 (56) 31 (50)
Live Alone: n(%) X2= .27, p=.60
No 11 (61) 42 (68)
Yes 7 (39) 20 (32)
Type of Stroke: n(%) X2= .01, p=.91
Cerebral Infarction 11 (61) 37 (60)
TIA 7 (39) 25 (40)
6CIT U=442, p=.40
Median 4 6
History of anxiety or depression: n(%) Fisher exact p= 1.00
No 15 (83) 50 (81)
Yes 3 (17) 12 (19)
Smoking status: n(%) U=393, p=.10
No 16 (88) 45 (73)
Yes 1 (6) 12 (19)
Ex-smoker 1 (6) 5 (8)
Number of co-morbidities: n(%) U=483, p=.35
0 9 (50) 23 (37)
1 6 (33) 25 (40)
2 2 (11) 10 (16)
3 1 (6) 4 (7)
Time post-stroke at recruitment (weeks) U=415, p=.10
Median 6 7.5
Recruitment location: n(%) Fisher exact p=.76
Barnsley 13 (72) 47 (76)
Sheffield 5 (28) 15 (24)
HADS score: mean (sd)
Anxiety subscale 8.2 (4.8) 6.8 (4.5) t(78)= 1.14, p=.26
Depression subscale 8.7 (4.8) 5.7 (3.9) t(78)=2.44, p=.02
Barthel Index
median 15.5 18.0 U=332, p=.01
Illness representations at baseline:
Mean (SD)
Identity 7.6 (6.2) 6.1 (4.6) t (78)= 1.11, p=.27
Timeline (acute/ chronic) 15.6 (4.0) 16.1 (4.4) t(76)=-.48, p=.63
Timeline (cyclical) 12.1 (2.7) 11.1 (3.3) t(76)= 1.06, p=.29
Consequence 20.8 (4.5) 18.0 (5.1) t(76)=2.13, p=.04†
Personal control 20.8 (4.6) 19.0 (4.8) t(76)=-.44, p=.66
Treatment control 17.7 (3.7) 17.8 (2.8) t(76)= -.11, p=.91
Coherence 14.6 (4.8) 15.0 (3.5) t(76)= -.36, p=.72
Emotional 19.1 (6.0) 18.2 (4.6) t(76)= .67, p=.50
U- Mann Whitney test, X2- Chi-square, †-not significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple testing
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8.3 Research Question 3: Does the prevalence of anxiety and anxiety
symptom severity change over time?
The mean HADS-A score was 7.3 (SD= 4.9) at three month follow-up. Figure 8-1
shows that overall anxiety scores increased by 0.6 (SD= 3.9) from baseline, however this
increase was not statistically significant (t=1.20, df=59, p=.23). The range of anxiety change
scores ranged from -11 to +13. The mean HADS-D score was 5.5 (SD= 4.0) at three month
follow-up. Mean depression scores decreased by -0.2 (SD= 3.5), but this decrease was not
statistically significant (t=-.34, df= 59, p=.74). Depression change scores ranged from -9 to
10 between baseline and follow-up.
Table 8-2 shows that overall the proportion of stroke survivors with anxiety (HADS-A
≥11) was unchanged at follow-up compared to baseline (28% vs. 27%, W= -.26, p=.80).  Of 
the 43 participants with no mental health distress at baseline, 7 (16%) were found to be
anxious at follow-up. Five of these individuals were defined as anxious only, while two had
co-morbid anxiety and depression. The baseline HADS-A scores of these newly anxious
individuals, was 8 or 9 for six of the seven individuals. One person who was anxious at
follow-up had a baseline HADS-A score of zero. The baseline depression scores for these
newly anxious individuals was more varied in that HADS-D scores ranged from 0-9 with no
clear pattern emerging.
Of the 16 participants who had anxiety at baseline (i.e. anxiety only or co-morbid
anxiety and depression), 9 (56%) remained anxious at three month follow-up (Table 8-2).
Anxiety symptom severity was significantly higher amongst those with anxiety at baseline
and follow-up. Their mean anxiety level at baseline was 12.67, SD=2.1 (t=7.11, p<.001) and
increased to 14.44, SD=3.1 (t=7.06, p<.001) three months later.
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Figure 8-1 Anxiety and depression change scores from baseline to 3-month follow-up
Table 8-2 Number (%) of participants who had anxiety and/or depression at baseline and 3
month follow-up
Mental Health Status
at follow-up
Mental Health Status at Baseline
No anxiety or
depression Anxiety Depression
Anxiety &
Depression TOTAL
No anxiety or
depression
36 (84) 3 (30) - 4 (67) 43 (72)
Anxiety 5 (12) 4 (40) - - 9 (15)
Anxiety & Depression 2 (4) 3 (30) 1 (100) 2 (33) 8 (13)
TOTAL 43 10 1 6 60
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8.4 Research Question 4: Do stroke survivors change their illness
representations over time?
The following section tests the hypothesis that stroke survivors do not self-regulate
their illness beliefs and no change in illness representations would be observed between
baseline and three month follow-up.
8.4.1 Change in Illness Representation domains over time
A repeated measures multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) showed that on
the combined illness representation variables, change over time did not reach statistical
significance,[ F (8, 44)= 1.49, p=.19, Pillai’s Trace= .214, partial ε2= 0.19]. This was supported
by paired t-test that showed that with the exception of treatment control and personal
control cognitions, there was no significant change in individual illness representations
between baseline and follow-up (Table 8-3). Over time participants views became more
negative about the ability of personal actions or treatment to have an impact on their stroke
symptoms.
Table 8-3 Change in illness perceptions between baseline and 3-month follow-up (n=62)
Illness Perceptions Range Baseline
Mean (SD)
Follow-up
Mean (SD)
Mean
Difference
t Sig
Identity 0-22 6.3 (4.6) 6.5 (4.7) 0.2 .57 .57
Timeline 6-30 16.1 (4.4) 16.8 (4.8) 0.7 1.25 .22
Cyclical 4-20 11.1 (3.3) 10.8 (3.1) -0.3 -.87 .39
Consequence 6-30 17.9 (5.1) 17.8 (5.0) -0.1 -.19 .85
Personal 6-30 21.2 (3.5) 20.0 (2.8) -1.2 -2.54 .01
Treatment 5-25 17.8 (2.8) 16.3 (3.2) -1.5 -3.15 .003
Coherence 5-25 15.0 (3.5) 15.0 (3.7) 0.02 .18 .86
Emotional 6-30 18.2 (4.6) 18.1 (4.4) -0.1 -.20 .84
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8.4.2 Change in causal beliefs
McNemar test of paired proportions found that causal beliefs remained constant
over time, as no significant change from baseline was observed for any of the items at
follow-up (Table 8-4). Age, stress, and chance or bad luck remained the items that
participants endorsed most frequently as possible causes of stroke.
Table 8-4 Proportion of participants who agreed or strongly agreed item is a possible
cause of stroke
% who agree item is possible
cause of stroke at follow-up
(n=62)
% Change
from Baseline
Sig.
Stress 47.5 25.0 .31
Hereditary 23.7 3.0 .57
Germ or virus 5.1 155.0 .68
Poor diet 26.3 -9.3 .91
Chance or bad luck 33.9 5.9 .95
Poor medical care in past 8.5 -5.6 .88
Pollution in environment 5.1 27.5 .68
Own behaviour 26.7 2.7 .06
Mental attitude 5.4 -50.9 .75
Family problems or worries 17.2 7.5 .51
Overwork 23.7 7.7 .75
Emotional state 26.7 -4.6 .29
Ageing 58.7 19.8 .07
Alcohol 13.3 20.9 .23
Smoking 23.7 -16.8 .96
Accident or injury 5.1 -16.7 .43
Personality 5.1 -37.5 .74
Altered immunity
5.1 155.0
.68
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8.4.3 Illness representation clusters
Cluster analysis is a descriptive technique used to identify groups of similar people.
Within the context of illness representations, it would take into account an individuals
entire illness schema and identify groups of people that shared similar illness beliefs. It
would also provide a major practical advantage for regression analyses designed to predict
anxiety at follow-up. Using cluster analysis as a grouping mechanism reduced eight
individual domain scores into one variable, and ensured that the regression model would
not be oversaturated. The method of cluster analysis used has been validated in research
into illness representations and long-term conditions (Clatworthy et al. 2007) and is
described below.
8.4.3.1 Cluster analysis methodology for illness perceptions
To start simple change scores (follow-up score minus baseline score) of each of the
eight IPQ-R domains were calculated. All change scores were then standardised to z scores
prior to clustering. The number of groups that will emerge from a cluster analysis in a study
sample is generally not known beforehand. A two stage process of analysis was conducted.
Ward’s method was used to determine the number of clusters, and this was followed by k-
means clustering.
Each individual in the data set is assumed to be a separate cluster (i.e. there are as
many clusters as cases). Statistical software then combines clusters sequentially, hence
reducing the number of clusters at each step until only one cluster is left. The clustering
method uses the dissimilarities or distances between objects when forming the clusters. A
hierarchical tree called a dendrogram, is produced to show the linkage points and the
clusters are linked at increasing levels of dissimilarity. The goal of the clustering algorithm is
to join objects together into successively larger clusters, using a measure of similarity or
distance. As a result, more and more objects are linked together and join larger and larger
clusters of increasingly dissimilar elements. In the last step, all objects are merged together
as one cluster. For each node in the graph, where a new cluster is formed, a criterion
distance can be read, at which the respective elements are linked together into a new single
cluster.
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The squared Euclidean distance is the most straightforward and generally accepted
way of computing distances between objects. The Ward method is the most commonly
used method of measuring these distances. This method is distinct from other methods in
that it uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters and
is generally very efficient. Cluster membership is assessed by calculating the total sum of
squared deviations from the mean of a cluster. The criterion for fusion is that it should
produce the smallest possible increase in the error sum of squares.
The Ward method is good for getting a sense of the total possible number of clusters
and the way they merge, as seen from the dendrogram. The second step is to validate the
findings from the Ward method, by k-means clustering. K-means clustering can be viewed
as a validation of the findings from the Ward method. At this stage a chosen number of
clusters can be requested, and all cases will be placed in one of the clusters (i.e. k-means
clustering).
8.4.3.2 Determining number of clusters
Standardised change scores from all eight domains were included for analysis. The
Ward method produced an agglomeration schedule table to assist in selecting the ideal
number of clusters in the data (Table 8-5). The raw SPSS output provides a solution of every
possible number of clusters (or number of cases in the data set). The table presented is a
re-formatted abridged version of SPSS output. The two columns in the middle provide
coefficient estimates at a given level of clusters, and what the coefficient estimate would be
at the next level of cluster. The ‘change’ column is used to determine the optimum number
of clusters. In this dataset two clusters appear to be most appropriate, as it is at this point
where there is a clear demarcation in the change in coefficient value. The dendogram
supports the agglomeration table in that it shows two clear clusters (Figure 8-2). The K-
means clustering selecting for two clusters was run to produce two clusters.
198
Table 8-5 Re-formed agglomeration table
No. of
Clusters
Agglomeration
last step
Coefficient at
this step Change
2 406.403 336.005 70.40
3 336.005 299.477 36.53
4 299.477 271.672 27.81
5 271.672 246.019 25.65
6 246.019 222.099 23.92
7 222.099 202.893 19.21
8 202.893 187.600 15.29
9 187.600 173.492 14.11
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Figure 8-2 Dendogram after two-stage cluster process
Cluster 2
Cluster 1
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Analysis revealed that individuals in cluster one generally held more negative
representations about their stroke than those in cluster two. The mean number of
symptoms attributed to stroke increased, as did perceptions about illness chronicity,
unpredictability of symptoms, and consequences for those in cluster one. The opposite
trend was observed for those in the positive cluster, and the difference between the two
groups was statistically significant on these six illness representation domains. Those in
cluster one did not differ significantly from those in cluster two on how they understood
their stroke symptoms. Lastly, those in the negative group reported their stroke elicited less
of an emotional response, while those in the positive cluster indicated an increase. The
difference in coherence, and emotional representations were not significantly different
between the two clusters (Table 8-6).
Table 8-6 Mean change in IPQ-R domain score, mood, and Barthel Index stratified by
illness cluster
Negative
(Cluster 1)
Mean (SD)
n=45
Positive
(Cluster 2)
Mean (SD)
n=14
F Sig
IPQ-R domains
Identity 0.9 (3.0) -2.1 (3.9) 9.38 .003
Timeline 2.1 (3.2) -3.6 (3.8) 31.13 <.001
Cyclical 0.4 (2.6) -2.8 (3.4) 13.27 .001
Consequence 0.8 (3.3) -3.1 (4.8) 11.79 .001
Personal -2.0 (3.1) 1.1 (3.0) 10.54 .002
Treatment -2.3 (2.9) .93 (3.5) 12.38 .001
Coherence 0.01 (3.9) -0.1 (3.2) .01 .93
Emotional -0.4 (3.5) .90 (4.9) 1.27 .27
The mean anxiety scores decreased over time for those in the positive cluster, while
they increased for those in the negative cluster, however the difference between the two
clusters was not statistically significant (-0.50 sd=3.1 vs. 0.97 sd=4.3, F(1,56)=1.44, p=.24)
(Figure 8-3). The mean depression scores also decreased for those in the positive cluster,
however were unchanged for those in the negative cluster. The difference in depression
scores was not significantly different between the two clusters (0.001 sd=3.7 vs. -0.85
sd=3.0, F(1,56)=.63, p=.43) (Figure 8-4). Analysis also showed that the proportion of
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individuals with anxiety (HADS-A ≥11) was greater in the negative cluster compared to the 
positive cluster (68% vs. 30%, Fisher exact test, p=0.09), but the difference was not
significant.
Figure 8-3 Mean anxiety score at baseline and follow-up stratified by cluster
Figure 8-4 Mean depression scores at baseline and follow-up stratified by cluster
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8.5 Research Question 5: Do illness representations predict anxiety at
follow-up?
The following section presents the regression analyses that were conducted to
determine whether illness representations predicted anxiety after stroke at follow-up.
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine whether age,
gender, having a history of anxiety or depression, impairment in activities of daily living,
illness representation cluster, and anxiety at baseline predicted anxiety at three month
follow-up.
In the first step none of the five variables (age, sex, pre-stroke history of anxiety or
depression, Barthel index score, illness representation cluster) that were entered into the
model were significant predictors of anxiety at follow-up. These five variables explained 9%
of the variance in anxiety score at follow-up.  Only anxiety at baseline (β=.62, p<.001) was a 
significant predictor of anxiety at follow-up (Table 8-7).
Table 8-7 Regression analysis predicting anxiety at follow-up
Step Variables Unstandardised
coefficient
Standardised
coefficient
t Sig Adjusted
R2
F
change
in R2
B Beta
1 Constant 14.11 2.20 .03 .09 2.59*
Age -.08 -.24 -1.33 .19
Female 1.32 .15 .99 .33
Prestroke anx or
dep
3.23 .30 1.92 .06
Barthel T2 -.19 -.07 -.82 .42
Negative cluster 1.2 .08 .81 .42
2 Constant 8.12 1.49 .14 .38 8.02**
Age -.05 -.15 -1.07 .29
Female .37 .04 .33 .75
Prestroke anx or
dep
1.30 .16 .90 .37
Barthel T2 -.15 -.01 -.79 .44
Negative cluster 1.33 .09 1.09 .28
Anxiety (Baseline) .62 .58 5.00 <.001
*p<.05, **p<.001
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Multicollinearity amongst predictors was within acceptable levels as the variance
inflation factor did not exceed 1.45 for any of the variables in the model. A histogram of the
regression standardised residuals show that they were normally distributed. This was
confirmed statistically by a non-significant Shapiro-Wilk test (W=.97, df= 56, p=.20).
Inspection of the normal probability plot showed that the residuals met the assumption of
linearity, while a scatter plot of standardised residuals versus predicted residuals indicated
there was constant variance across each level of the predicted value (i.e. homoscedasticity).
There also were no outliers amongst the standardised residuals as none had a value >3.
8.5.1 Structural Equation Modelling
A structural equation model (SEM) to predict anxiety at follow-up was carried out. A
direct path between illness representation cluster, baseline barthel index score, baseline
level anxiety, depression, and history of anxiety or depression was specified. A direct path
between barthel score and illness cluster was specified, as were direct paths between
barthel index score, and history of mental health problems with baseline anxiety and
depression. An autocorrelation effect was specified between baseline anxiety and baseline
depression.
Several fit indices were assessed to determine model fit. The chi-square tests the
hypothesis that the model fits the data, in which case non-significance is indicative of good
model fit. The chi-square test is sensitive to sample size, therefore three additional fit
indices were examined. The comparative fit index (CFI)and the normative fit index (NFI)
have values ranging from 0 to 1 and a general rule of thumb is that values larger than 0.90-
0.95 are indicative of good fit (Blunch 2008). The Tucker Lewis index (TLI) was also
examined, and values greater than 0.95 are considered acceptable. The root mean square
error approximation (RMSEA) is another indicator of fit.  By convention RMSEA ≤.05 refers 
to close fit, ≤.08 mediocre fit, and >.10 poor fit (Kelley and Lai 2011).   The Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC) is the final of the fit indices. While not a specific measure of fit,
it can help with model selection.
204
Two models are presented. The first (full) model showed that chi-square was not
significant (X2= 13.47, df=14, p=.49) supporting the hypothesis that the model fits the data
could not be rejected. Other fit indices supported the chi-square findings ( CFI= 1.00, TLI=
1.02, NFI= .89. The Root Mean Square error approximation (RMSEA) was 0.001(90%CI 0-.12,
p=.63). The Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) was 73.47. After taking into account
autocorrelation between anxiety and depression (r=.75), baseline anxiety was the only
significant predictor of anxiety at follow-up, with the model explaining 43% of the variance
of anxiety scores at follow-up (Table 8-8 and Figure 8-5).
Model trimming was carried out by removing the non-significant paths from the
model depicted in Figure 8-6. Fit indices show that the trimmed (simpler) model did not
improve model fit: [X2= 21.08, df=22, p=.52], CFI=1.00, TLI= 1.02, NFI= .83. The
RMSEA= .001 (90%CI 0-.10, p=.68), AIC= 65.08.
Overall the SEM found that anxiety at baseline was the only significant predictor of
anxiety at follow-up.
Table 8-8 SEM- Full Model and trimmed model predicting Anxiety at follow-up
Unstandardized (SE) Standardized Sig R2
Full Model .43
Baseline barthel index .09 (.21) .05 .65
Age -.05 (.04) -.11 .29
Sex (female) .78 (.96) .08 .41
History of mental health problem 1.27 (1.3) .10 .32
Negative cluster 1.22 (1.1) .11 .28
Baseline Anxiety .64 (.12) .60 <.001
Trimmed Model .42
Illness perception cluster over time 1.55 (1.2) .14 .18
Baseline Anxiety .69 (.11) .63 <.001
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Figure 8-5 SEM Full Model
*p<.05, **p<.01
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Figure 8-6 SEM Trimmed Model
*p<.05, **P<.01
207
8.6 Summary of longitudinal analysis
 Individuals lost to follow-up had higher levels of baseline depression and increased
impairment on activities of daily living compared to those who returned their follow-
up questionnaire, however they did not differ in their illness representations
 There was a non statistically significant increase in the level of anxiety symptoms,
while the level of depression remained constant over time. Over half of individuals
with anxiety at baseline remained anxious at follow-up. Additionally 16% of
individuals not anxious at baseline became so at follow-up
 Overall stroke participants did not change their illness representations over time,
however participants became more negative in their perceptions about the ability of
treatment or personal actions to control their stroke symptoms
 Two distinct clusters of illness representations were observed, those in cluster one
held more negative beliefs about their stroke, will those in cluster two had more
positive beliefs
 Linear regression analysis showed that anxiety at baseline was the only significant
predictor of anxiety at follow-up, these findings were supported by a structural
equation model.
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9 Chapter Nine: Discussion
9.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the findings from the empirical study, and looks to
contextualise this work within the larger context of research into illness representation.
Limitations of the methodology are examined, and implications for clinical practice and
future research explored. Concluding remarks bringing the findings from all three studies
together is included.
9.2 Overview of findings
This is the first known study that has examined illness representations using the IPQ-R
and explored its association with anxiety in stroke survivors. It assessed the prevalence of
anxiety, and the illness representations held in a sample of community stroke survivors
residing in the UK. The results of this study found that 30% of the study sample experienced
significant levels of anxiety symptoms within the first six months after stroke. This is slightly
higher than the overall pooled estimate of anxiety symptoms reported in the systematic
review of anxiety prevalence after stroke (Campbell Burton et al. 2012). There are several
reasons why this may have been the case. To start, the studies included in the meta-
analysis were carried out in a variety of settings, in patient groups with differing levels of
healthcare and used various tools and methods to assess the presence of anxiety. The aim
of the prevalence review was to quantify the extent to which anxiety after stroke occurs.
Any attempt to make a direct comparison regarding the frequency of anxiety observed in
this study with the findings from the prevalence review would be difficult. Comparison with
individual studies may be more insightful. For example, a community based UK study that
assessed anxiety one month post-stroke in a sample of 84 stroke survivors and used the
same HADS-A threshold to define anxiety as the empirical study in this thesis, found the
prevalence of anxiety to be 26% (95%CI 17%-36%) (Lincoln et al. 1998). Another study
conducted in four stroke rehabilitation centres in Europe found that individuals from the UK
site had anxiety prevalence rates of 30%-37% two to four months post stroke (De Wit et al.
2008). While those findings are not directly comparable with this study because of the
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different patient populations and HADS-A cut-off score used to define anxiety, the authors
note that rehabilitation programs have been found to be less intensive in the UK compared
to some other European countries which has resulted in less favourable motor and
functional recovery. Such factors are also likely to be associated with levels of anxiety. The
higher prevalence could also be attributed to a possible cohort effect discussed in section
2.9, whereby anxiety prevalence has been found to increase across generations. Causes for
this generational shift are unclear but changes in social trends such as increasing divorce
rates and a perception of decreased social cohesion have been cited as possible reasons
(Twenge 2000). Studies included in the meta-analysis on the prevalence of anxiety post-
stroke, carried out assessments in stroke survivors as far back as 1981. Current stroke
survivors have likely experienced different social circumstances which may have contributed
to the higher prevalence of anxiety that was observed in this sample relative to those in the
past.
Another explanation for the higher prevalence could be the inclusion of individuals
with TIA, who comprised 40% of the study sample. Worry about having a “full” stroke in the
future may have led to higher levels of anxiety. Stratifying studies in the anxiety after stroke
prevalence systematic review on the basis of whether or not they included patients with TIA
was not part of the planned analyses, hence further studies would need to be carried out to
validate this hypothesis.
Another finding of interest is that the majority of individuals with anxiety (58%) did
not have co-morbid depression. By follow-up two thirds of individuals who had co-morbid
depression at baseline indicated they were no longer experiencing mental health distress at
follow-up, however only a third of individuals with anxiety only at baseline indicated respite
of their anxiety symptoms at follow-up. A possible explanation for this finding is that
depression may garner more clinical attention and attempts may have been made to treat it.
In so doing the anxiety that was also present may have been addressed unintentionally. In
terms of chronology of mental health distress, a third of individuals who only had anxiety at
baseline were found to have co-morbid depression at follow-up, and provides some
support for the hypothesis that anxiety often precedes depression (Michael, Zetsche and
Margraf 2007). However this finding should be interpreted with caution, as cell sizes were
very small and estimates may not be stable.
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Unadjusted univariate analysis found that impairment in activities of daily living was
the only factor that was significantly different between individuals defined as anxious
compared to those who were not anxious. Recovering to pre-stroke levels of functioning is
likely a goal for many patients, and if they are unable to attain these goals this could lead to
experiencing increased levels of anxiety. Although not statistically significant, a larger
proportion of individuals under 65 years of age or those with a history of anxiety or
depression, were found to have anxiety at baseline. No other variables (gender, living status,
type of stroke, number of co-morbidities, score on cognitive screening test administered at
recruitment) investigated in the univariate analysis was associated with anxiety. These
results appear to follow the trends identified in the studies collated in the correlates section
of the prevalence systematic review whereby no consistent association was observed
between gender and anxiety, and only 25% of studies found an association between anxiety
and age. There was an even split amongst studies examining the relationship between
impairment in activities of daily living and anxiety, whereby half the studies reported an
inverse correlation, and the other of half reported no association.
Few studies have used the IPQ-R previously, so it was important to assess the internal
reliability of the scale. Overall the reliability of the individual domains in the scale was
found to be good. With the exception of the personal control domain, all of the IPQ-R
subscales had values above 0.80. The personal control domain was found to be 0.72, which
is still considered acceptable. A similar finding was also observed in two other small stroke
studies (Ford 2007; Twiddy 2008). Lower internal reliability on the personal control domain
could imply that stroke survivors do not view personal control as a singular construct or are
unclear about the role they may play in managing symptoms associated with stroke.
Another possibility is that quantitative questionnaires may not be an adequate method from
which to assess beliefs about illness. The original work by Leventhal and colleagues sought
to elicit individual illness representations by conducting in-depth qualitative interviews, and
adopted a quantitative approach mainly for the purpose of having the ability to generalise
findings. The lower level of internal reliability could also be due to the study samples that
were investigated. All three of these studies used clinical samples or had significant non-
response from the eligible population and may not necessarily reflect the stroke population
in general.
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Overall, participants reported an average of six illness identity symptoms they felt
were attributed to their stroke. Fatigue was the most commonly reported symptom,
however weakness, tingling or numbness in extremities, loss of strength, forgetfulness and
dizziness were also frequently endorsed as being attributed to stroke. The impact that
these symptoms could have on the post-stroke experience is immense. For example, post
stroke fatigue has been found to interfere with the rehabilitation process and may increase
the risk of depression (Morley, Jackson and Mead 2005; Hackett and Anderson 2005).
Dizziness is associated with an increased risk of falling. A case-control study that matched
60 older adults with chronic dizziness with healthy controls found that nearly half in the
dizzy group reported a fear of falling, while only 3% of the healthy controls expressed a
similar fear (Burker et al. 1995). Additionally, symptoms such as unilateral weakness and
sensory symptoms have been found to be the most commonly reported symptoms during a
stroke (Hankey 2002). Fear of stroke re-occurrence is also common. It is possible that
individuals who experience the illness identity symptoms will seek to give them some sort of
meaning. That they are not actually having another stroke, yet still experiencing the
ambiguous symptoms that are associated with the stroke event, could contribute to an
increased level of anxiety.
In terms of the other domains of illness representations held, beliefs about personal
control and treatment control were strong. Finding relevant comparative data for this study
was challenging because much of the existing literature is based on the original version of
the IPQ, employed a different method of scoring than prescribed by the IPQ-R authors, or
was not available for detailed examination (Aalto et al. 2005; Kaptein et al. 2006; Evans and
Norman 2009; MacLeod, Abdullah and Wilkinson 2010). However, one large scale Canadian
study assessed illness representations in cardiovascular patients with myocardial infarction,
unstable angina, congestive heart failure, percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI), or
coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG) and their association with depression (Grace et
al. 2005). Relative to this group, stroke patients in this study thought the symptoms of their
stroke would be significantly less chronic in nature, and have less of a consequence on their
life. This could be due to the fact that 40% of the individuals in this study sample had a TIA,
and they may have interpreted their health threat as something that would resolve
relatively quickly. There is still a prevailing belief that TIAs are less serious than stroke, and
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patients are sometimes told they have only had a ‘mini-stroke’ or ‘not a full stroke’. On the
other hand, although a significant proportion of participants in this study held strong views
about personal control and treatment control, those in the cardiovascular group had
significantly stronger beliefs in this regard. Perhaps this is a function of there being a more
established framework for secondary prevention measures for heart disease whereby
patients are encouraged to make lifestyle modifications or take certain drugs to reduce their
risk of recurrence, although similar advice is provided to stroke survivors as well.
In terms of causal beliefs about stroke, age was the factor most frequently identified
by participants as a possible cause of stroke. However only 50% of the study sample said
that they believed this to be the case. Other factors, such as diet, smoking and alcohol
consumption, were identified less often as possible causes of stroke. That these factors
were not more readily recognised as risk factors for stroke highlights the need for health
education. Stroke survivors are provided with information packs about their stroke which
include a wealth of information, however there may be some incongruence between
information that is provided, and what is being understood by stroke survivors. Additionally,
overwork and personal behaviour were endorsed by roughly 25% as causal factors of stroke.
Previous studies have noted that a feeling of fear associated with the possibility of having
another stroke will drive a search for a cause and if the perceived cause is associated with
bad life habits, it could support the use of active compensation strategies, such as adopting
health behaviours (Rochette et al. 2006). In this regards an awareness of illness beliefs
could further support the development of targeted individualised information about stroke
to empower survivors with knowledge about modifiable factors they could use to help
prevent another stroke or improve their overall health.
On a whole, the patterns of relationships among illness perceptions showed logical
trends similar to those observed in a meta-analysis of 45 studies in which illness
representation domain inter-correlations were examined (Hagger and Orbell 2003). Illness
identity was significantly and positively associated with chronic timeline, cyclical timeline,
and consequences. However, no significant negative correlations between illness identity
and the control domains, or consequence and control domains were observed in this study.
Emotional representations were significantly and positively associated with identity,
timeline (chronic and cyclical), and consequence domains, and negatively associated with
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coherence. A similar pattern of inter-correlations has been reported in a small study of
stroke patients (Ford 2007). This study also found significant associations between
individuals who attributed a higher symptom burden to their stroke with the tendency to
believe that the stroke symptoms would have a longer duration and more serious
consequences on their lives. The study also found that coherence only had significant
associations with personal control and emotional representations. Individuals had a
significant positive correlation with personal control beliefs and a significant negative
correlation with emotional representations. However inter-correlations observed in the
validation study of the IPQ-R showed significant negative correlations between emotional
representations and personal and treatment control domains, which were not found in this
study. This may simply have occurred because the patient population used to validate the
IPQ-R was likely had a different illness experience. The validation sample included
individuals with diabetes, asthma, chronic pain and rheumatoid arthritis. However they did
include cardiovascular patients, but stratified inter-correlations were not provided for this
sub-group of patients.
9.2.1 Are there differences in illness representations between anxious and non-
anxious stroke survivors
The multivariate analysis of variance showed that those with anxiety had higher
illness identity symptom burden, felt that their stroke symptoms were less predictable,
would have greater consequences, and had a greater emotional representations relative to
those without any mental health distress. This study also provided the opportunity to
assess whether there would be differential patterns of illness representations between
individuals with anxiety and depression. No difference in illness representations were
observed, except that those defined as depressed had an even higher illness identity burden
than those defined as anxious. The finding of there being no significant difference in illness
representations between the anxious and depressed individuals has not been examined in
other stroke patient groups. However, a cross-sectional study in 108 patients with
tuberculosis whereby 46% had depression and 47% had anxiety, as defined by a score of
greater than 11 on the HADS-A and HADS-D sub-scales, found that the correlation between
the individual IPQ-R domains were the same for both those defined as depressed and those
with anxiety (Husain et al. 2008). This finding could be interpreted in several ways. It has
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been suggested that anxiety may be a precursor to depression, such that those defined as
anxious, will ultimately become depressed and it is just that they have been picked up at an
earlier stage in their mental health trajectory. The data in this study suggest that this is
possible, as a significant positive correlation was observed between time post-stroke and
depression but not anxiety. Another possibility that could be considered is to interpret the
findings through the tri-partite theory of anxiety and depression. The tri-partite theory
purports that both share a common component of negative affect and are differentiated
only by the low positive affect in those with depression, while those with anxiety have high
physiological arousal (Clark and Watson 1991). Due to the way the data were stratified,
71% of those defined as depressed for the purpose of the analysis also had anxiety. The
higher symptom burden noted by these “depressed” individuals could represent the added
attention to physical symptoms that would occur in individuals who are anxious.
9.2.2 Are illness representations associated with anxiety at baseline
The full regression model showed that after controlling for clinical and demographic
variables, illness identity and emotional representations were the only factors that were
significant predictors of anxiety. Overall the full model explained 49% of the variance in
anxiety scores. Illness identity accounted for 20% of the variance, and emotional
representations contributed 13%. One cross-sectional study of 168 individuals with
multiple sclerosis that conducted a multiple regression analysis, found that illness identity
was a significant predictor of anxiety, as identified on the HADS-A subscale (Jopson and
Moss-Morris 2003). However they also found that increasing symptom cyclicality and
having a greater understanding of their condition, were also predictive of anxiety. While
that study provides useful comparative information with another neurological condition, it
suffers from several methodological limitations which may limit the validity of the findings
as it was only able to recruit 40% of the eligible patient population. Non-responders may
have had significantly different illness beliefs and levels of anxiety than those who
participated. Furthermore, as this was a cross-sectional study, the direction of the
relationships between the illness representation domains and anxiety cannot be established
(Jopson and Moss-Morris 2003). The study in multiple sclerosis patients also adjusted for
different variables than the empirical study in this thesis and did not take into account the
role of emotional representations.
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Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration is that emotional
representations have been found to have a weak to moderate correlation with affective
dispositions (Moss-Morris et al. 2002). In this study a strong correlation was observed
between anxiety and emotional representations (rs= 0.62), hence the regression model that
includes this domain of the CSM could be measuring a personality trait tendency, such as
having high tendency of anxiety or depression. High trait anxiety has been found to
moderate levels of state anxiety which arise as a result of situational events (Eysenck and
Eysenck 1980; Spindler et al. 2009; Tang and Gibson 2005). However, the questions used to
assess emotional representations of a health threat were not designed to measure trait
disposition, so such an assertion cannot be made with any certainty.
9.2.3 Does the prevalence of anxiety and anxiety symptom severity change over
time
In this study, 9 (56%) individuals who were anxious at baseline remained anxious at
follow-up. Anxiety symptom severity was higher in this group of participants who were
anxious throughout, and there was a non statistically significant increase in their level of
anxiety during the study period. Additionally, 16% of individuals without anxiety at baseline
were found to be anxious at follow-up. Only one other study has used the HADS-A to
evaluate the time-course of anxiety after stroke (De Wit et al. 2008). This study assessed
the prevalence of anxiety two, four and six months post-stroke in a group of 505 patients
admitted to rehabilitation centres in four European countries. It found that the severity of
anxiety symptoms decreased significantly between four and six months post-stroke, from a
median score of 5 to a median score of 4. The study also found that 41 (40%) stroke
survivors with anxiety at two months post-stroke remained anxious throughout the four
month observation period (De Wit et al. 2008). Additionally, 20% were anxious at two and
four months but not at six months post-stroke, and one third were only anxious at the two
month mark post-stroke. Furthermore 37 (11%) individuals who initially were not anxious at
baseline became so at four months post-stroke, and 54% of them remained anxious at six
months post-stroke. At six months post-stroke 22 (7%) individuals became anxious for the
first time. It is not possible to make a direct comparison between this study and Dewit et al.
2008 because they used a cut-off score of greater than or equal to eight on the HADS-A
subscale to define anxiety, their study population was substantially different and
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assessments were made at different times post stroke. However in all the findings support
the notion that anxiety tends to be chronic and the pattern of prevalence can be complex
even over a short period of time. Whilst this study only had one follow-up period after
baseline assessment, it is possible that a similar trend may have been observed.
9.2.4 Do stroke survivors change their illness representations over time
Overall as a group, the illness representations of the study participants remained
relatively stable over time. Significant changes were only observed in perceptions about
treatment control and personal control, both of which became significantly more negative
over time. These results replicate findings observed in a small study of stroke patients and
carers (Twiddy 2008). That study used the IPQ-R to assess illness representations in a group
of 42 patient-carer dyads at three and six months post stroke and found that views about
personal control and treatment control became significantly more negative over time.
However, nearly a quarter of respondents in that study were unavailable for follow-up
assessment so the reliability of the findings are questionable. Views about controllability
have not been explored in the stroke literature, but perhaps it reflects frustration due to the
plateau in recovery that many stroke survivors experience three to six months post-stroke,
which could lead to feeling there is nothing that will improve their stroke associated
symptoms (Vanhook 2009).
That none of the other domains of illness perceptions changed over time, is in
contrast to what was proposed by Leventhal and colleagues in their seminal investigations
into illness representations (Leventhal, Meyer and Nerenz 1980). However, findings from
this study are congruent with other observational longitudinal studies that have found that
not all domains of illness representations are updated over time. A six year longitudinal
study of 241 osteoarthritis patients found that there were no changes in the identity,
consequence and treatment control domains in the study population as a whole over time
(Kaptein et al. 2010). A smaller study in a group of 87 cardiovascular patients found that
overall, only the cyclicality and personal control domains changed between baseline and
three month follow-up (Fischer et al. 2010). However additional analysis in the
cardiovascular patients revealed that those who held more positive views about the goals
they had achieved from treatment had significantly different patterns of change in their
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illness representations relative to those who held more negative opinions about the goals
they had achieved through treatment (Fischer et al. 2010). This is inline with other
assumptions of the CSM whereby it has been proposed that an individuals appraisal of
events can influence whether or not there are changes in illness representations (Leventhal,
Nerenz and Steel 1984).
Another possible explanation for the lack of change in illness representations could be
the methods used to examine changes in beliefs. Simple change scores only measures
overall group differences, however this method may mask individual level differences.
Cluster analysis, which took into account the overall illness schema of individuals uncovered
two groups of participants. One group held more negative views about their stroke, while
the other group was defined as being more positive. When the overall illness schema was
taken into account, with the exception of coherence and emotional perceptions, significant
changes on all of the other domains were observed. Those in the “positive” cluster group
reported a significant decrease in symptoms attributed to stroke, chronicity of their
condition, symptom unpredictability, and consequence to life. Conversely, this group
reported a significant increase in beliefs about personal actions and treatment to cure
stroke symptoms. Interestingly those in the positive cluster reported an increase in
emotional representations, meaning that with the passage of time the stroke was likely to
make them feel more upset, depressed, or afraid, yet they showed a non statistically
significant decline in their level of anxiety from baseline. The emotional representation of
the stroke for those in the negative cluster decreased, hence these individuals became less
angry, depressed or afraid over time. This finding is contrary to what has been observed in
studies that have used cluster analysis to examine changes in illness representations over
time (Kaptein et al. 2010). Although the difference in emotional representations between
the positive and negative cluster in this study was not significant, it is unclear whether this
trend is a genuine paradoxical consequence of becoming more positive in beliefs about
stroke or simply a phenomenon unique to this study sample. Another interpretation could
be that becoming more emotional is associated with a coping strategy whereby actively
expressing negative emotions towards the stroke is in some ways helpful.
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9.2.5 Do illness representations predict anxiety at follow-up
The longitudinal study design allowed for examination into factors that were
predictive of anxiety at follow-up. After adjusting for baseline anxiety, none of the other
variables entered into the model, including illness representation cluster, were significant
predictors of anxiety at follow-up. No other study has used the common-sense model of
illness representations to predict anxiety longitudinally. One study that assessed beliefs
about locus of control to predict anxiety three years post-stroke found that none of the
other predictor variables (disability in activities of daily living at admission, exercise
frequency, satisfaction with treatment or health beliefs) were significant predictors of
anxiety at follow-up after adjusting for anxiety levels at baseline (Morrison et al. 2005). A
similar finding was observed in a study of Parkinson’s patients whereby baseline anxiety was
found to be the most significant predictor of anxiety at six month follow-up. However in
this case, the personal control domain of the CSM also explained a significant proportion of
the variance in anxiety at follow-up (Evans and Norman 2009). Another study that looked at
illness representations in a sample of patients with angina also found that baseline anxiety
was the only significant predictor of anxiety two years after the onset of coronary heart
disease (Furze et al. 2005). These findings need to be interpreted with caution. To start
there is a paucity of longitudinal investigations into illness beliefs and anxiety, so it is
possible if more studies were available that different trends would be observed. Also, these
studies suffered from several limitations including small sample size, a high proportion of
individuals lost to follow-up and strict restrictions on individuals’ participating in the study.
Additionally they did not always include all domains of illness representations in the
regression model.
A structural equation model (SEM) to predict anxiety at follow-up supported findings
from the regression analysis, in that it also found that baseline anxiety was the only
significant predictor of anxiety at follow-up. The SEM also allowed for examination of
associations between the independent variables. There was no significant association
between age and illness cluster or gender and illness cluster. Additionally, impairment in
activities of daily living was not significantly associated with having a negative belief. This
model needs to be interpreted with caution. To start the sample size at follow-up was
smaller than baseline and as such the parameter estimates may be unstable, as the ratio of
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participants to variable was less than the minimum 5:1 which has been suggested (Fabrigar,
Porter and Norris 2010). Others have suggested a minimum sample as high as 200 is
needed, however this view has been criticised as being overly simplistic as SEM models have
been found to perform well in samples as small as 50 to 100 (Iacobucci 2010). The
consequence of smaller sample size may be less than ideal values on the fit indices, which
was not observed in this study. Additionally, not all relationships could be examined given
the sample size. As with any SEM, an alternate pattern of fit is plausible, hence all these
findings suggest is that the model proposed cannot be rejected, however an improved but
untested model could exist. Ideally, these findings would need to be replicated in a larger
sample of stroke, before drawing conclusions.
9.3 Consideration of methodology
A major strength of this study is that it used a longitudinal follow-up approach to
assess change in the level of anxiety symptoms and illness representations over time. It also
used the HADS-A cut-off score of ≥11 which meant that the individuals defined as anxious 
were more likely to be experiencing clinically significant levels of distress. There were
however several limitations in the methodology that may have had an impact on the
findings. To start, the inclusion criteria excluded individuals lacking proficiency in the
English language, global aphasia, or had significant terminal illnesses. Ideally, all first-time
stroke patients should be approached for inclusion into a study. A researcher could have
assisted in obtaining responses from individuals who would struggle with the take home
questionnaire. Unfortunately, this was not possible in the outpatient clinic setting where
recruitment occurred and there were insufficient resources to support endeavours such as a
researcher travelling to the participants home to administer the questionnaire. The
inclusion criteria in this study is similar to many of those used in the published literature
(see Table 4-2) and is a limitation of much of the research carried out into the non-acute
phase in stroke survivors.
The timeframe post stroke for recruitment into the study was broad (i.e. 0-6 months
post stroke), as such there was likely substantial heterogeneity amongst participants in their
stage of recovery, which in itself may have attenuated any associations examined. Those
that responded at baseline were on average two months post-stroke, while those who did
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not were close to three months post-stroke. This suggests there may be difficulty in
carrying out research into longer term outcomes post-stroke. Individuals may be eager to
participate in research immediately after stroke but due to the challenges of managing life
after stroke may become less willing to do so with the passage of time. Given the many
challenges of life post-stroke, study participants who were lost at follow-up may have been
experiencing higher levels of mental health distress that prevented continuation in the
study and reduced the validity of findings. At baseline, individuals who were lost to follow-
up had similar levels of anxiety as those who responded at follow-up, however those lost to
follow-up were found to have reported higher levels of depression at baseline. The reduced
sample size at time two meant there was a loss of statistical power to detect a difference
between those in the positive and negative illness belief cluster, and may explain why illness
beliefs did not predict anxiety at follow-up.
Another factor to consider is that overall findings may be less applicable to younger
stroke survivors (i.e. those under 65 years of age) as response rates were significantly lower
in this group relative to those over 65 years of age. Whether lack of participation of
younger stroke patients is a widespread issue or unique to this study is unclear. In this study
the mean age of study participants was 70 years, which is similar to the mean age observed
in the studies included in the systematic review of prevalence of anxiety post-stroke. That
approximately 40% of the eligible stroke participants were not recruited into the study for
various reasons including failing to present for clinic appointment, not being referred by
clinic staff or refusing to participate also calls into question the generalisability of the study
findings. Individuals who were not recruited may have varied significantly in their level of
anxiety or in their illness beliefs. However four of five community based studies that
examined anxiety after stroke had similar participation consent rates that ranged from 52%
and 61% (Ahlsio et al. 1984; Bruggimann et al. 2006; Gillespie 1997; Visser-Keizer et al. 2002)
with only one study able to recruit more than 80% of the eligible stroke population (Lincoln
et al. 1998). Future community based stroke studies should consider pilot testing the
recruitment process to identify problematic issues that may arise before commencing the
actual study. Another strategy could be to request permission to contact patients who were
missed in clinic, however this would require further ethical approvals. Additionally,
recruitment only occurred at one site in Sheffield. Individuals attending other stroke clinics
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in the city could not be contacted. While there is no obvious reason to think stroke
survivors attending other clinics differed significantly from those attending the site where
recruitment occurred, the possibility exists that they may have. However the location of
stroke outpatient clinic attendance is based on patient choice and convenience and perhaps
more complicated cases being seen at the teaching hospital, which is where recruitment
occurred.
The MANOVA and discriminant analysis carried out to disentangle the differences in
illness representation between those with anxiety and those with depression post stroke
was less than adequate. Ideally, the study sample should have been separated into four
groups as opposed to three (no mental health distress, anxiety only, depression only, and
co-morbid anxiety and depression). This would have been the best method of quantifying
the additional impact of depression on anxiety however the sample size was too small to
conduct such an analysis. Hence it is likely that the lack of difference observed could be due
to a lack of statistical power to detect a difference, especially given the significant number
of individuals defined as depressed who also had anxiety.
Information about stroke hemisphere lesion location and the Oxford Stroke
Classification was unavailable in the outpatient clinic files of more than half of the
participants (this information would have been recorded elsewhere). Hence no association
between stroke lesion location and anxiety could be examined. Additionally, the study
sample was heterogeneous in that it included individuals with who had a full stroke and
those with a TIA. It is possible that residual deficits and the stroke experience could have
differed between these two groups of stroke survivors. This study was not powered in such
a way as to test for possible differences between those with stroke and those with TIA and
conducting multiple post-hoc analyses would lead to increased likelihood of type one error.
On the other hand, the inclusion of individuals with TIA means that anxiety and illness
representations was obtained from a broader spectrum of stroke survivors.
Due to the sample size, another limitation of this study was that causal beliefs about
stroke were not included in the overall model, hence any impact they may have in
predicting anxiety could not be examined. Scale authors recommend conducting a factor
analysis of causal beliefs, to identify broad categories rather than including only individual
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questions about causal beliefs into a regression model. It is not unusual to see regression
models that have not included all CSM domains for a variety of reasons that include
limitations in sample size, or research interest, and this limitation has occurred in other
studies that have assessed associations between the CSM and outcomes in stroke patients
(Ford 2007). Furthermore, the section in the survey that asked about causal beliefs about
stroke was poorly completed, with some questions having high item non-response. Only
participants who responded to the respective causal question were included in the results.
Item non-response may have changed the pattern of causal attributions of stroke that were
observed. Questions about causal beliefs were at the end of the three part section on
illness representations, and perhaps participants were experiencing questionnaire fatigue at
this stage. The only stroke study to provide information on causal beliefs in stroke survivors
had the IPQ-R administered by a researcher hence their may have been time to take breaks
throughout survey, yet ensure that all questions were complete (Twiddy, House and Jones,
2012).
This study asked about anxiety and depression symptoms in the past week. There is
always some uncertainty regarding the extent to which information obtained from a
questionnaire reflect ‘usual’ levels of mental health distress. The responses provided could
be influenced by a variety of external circumstances, such as the recent loss of a loved one.
A diagnostic interview by a trained psychiatry or psychology professional is the gold
standard for determining the presence of anxiety. Additionally, one third of the
respondents indicated they required help in completing the questionnaire. Having someone
read the questions was cited as the most common source of aid required. Ideally, it would
be best for an individual to complete the questionnaire on their own without any assistance
from others. The extent to which stroke survivors who needed help may have provided
biased responses (e.g. a socially desirable answer such as saying they were not experiencing
anxiety symptoms when they were) because they were in the presence of another party
while completing the questionnaire is unknown. Individuals who were not forthcoming in
all their responses may have impacted the validity of the findings.
Participants were not asked about coping strategies. This was intentional so as to
decrease respondent burden. However coping is a central component of the current
Common-Sense Model. Any meditational influence of coping on the relationship between
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illness representations and anxiety is unknown. However, there is substantial research that
has shown a direct link between illness representations and outcome, which calls into
question the proposed mediational influence of coping and outcome (Hagger and Orbell
2003). Future studies may want to consider using the short version of the illness
representation questionnaire (Broadbent et al. 2006) given the high proportion of
participants who indicated they required some sort of help in filling out the questionnaire.
This could have contributed to the poor item completion in the section about causal beliefs
about stroke, which meant that an in-depth investigation into this aspect of the CSM could
not be carried out. Using a shorter version of the illness representation questionnaire
would lessen the participant burden and provide additional time for investigation into other
factors associated with anxiety after stroke.
Another limitation of this study is that the views of carers were not sought. Other
research has found that the illness representations held by carers can influence the beliefs
of stroke survivors (Twiddy, House and Jones 2012). Additionally, mental health distress
experienced by carers could influence mental health distress experienced by the stroke
survivor.
While the aim of this study was to evaluate the ability of illness representations to
predict anxiety, the presence of anxiety can influence illness representations in several ways
(Cameron 2003). Changes in perceptual processes due to the presence of anxiety can
enhance the detection of attention to illness related symptoms (identity). Additionally it has
been proposed that mood states can facilitate the retrieval of emotional memories, and
anxiety can increase the prominence of the emotional and threatening content of illness
representations (Forgas 2000). None of these relationships were examined in this study.
9.4 Implications for clinical practice
With the exception of illness identity, cognitive representations were found to
contribute little in the way of explaining anxiety symptoms experienced by stroke survivors
in this study. However, given the methodological challenges outlined in section 9.3, it is too
early to dismiss the notion of illness representations being associated with anxiety after
stroke. Illness beliefs may also influence other post-stroke outcomes that were not
evaluated in this study, such as engagement with rehabilitation or re-integration into life
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post-stroke. Also of interest was the large proportion of individuals who had anxiety that
was not co-morbid with depression. This should serve as a reminder that anxious distress is
common and protocols need to be established that adequately address their needs.
When an individual is diagnosed with a health condition, a pattern of illness
representations will develop. These representations may serve as key determinants of
behaviour directed at managing the illness, or may be directly associated with outcomes
arising as a result of the illness, such as anxiety (Petrie and Weinman 2006). Knowledge of
these representations are clinically relevant because they may help to uncover and
understand patient aspirations and expectations throughout the rehabilitation process and
beyond. Furthermore, patient adjustment and recovery have been found to improve when
illness representations were modified from a more negative stance to a more positive
stance (Petrie et al. 2002). Despite this, patients are rarely asked about their views of their
illness (Petrie and Weinman 2006). It is possible that for some stroke survivors, a chance to
share their beliefs about their condition could be seen as empowering and as an
opportunity for them to engage with and influence their rehabilitation process.
Information about illness representations can be obtained informally by way of asking
open ended questions, or through the use of formal assessment tools. The IPQ-R is likely
too lengthy for use in clinical settings such as outpatient clinics of GP clinics. Alternatively,
the brief nine item version of the IPQ-R (Broadbent et al. 2006) could be useful for providing
a snapshot of patient views of their illness and would likely be more appropriate for use in
the fast-pace settings of outpatient clinics. However validation studies of the brief version
of the IPQ-R in stroke survivors would need to be conducted beforehand. Furthermore,
unlike scales such as the HADS that provide some guidance around cut-off score thresholds,
normative data for the IPQ-R has yet to be established. Tracking of illness representations
would need to take a relativist approach, in that comparisons would need to be made over
time to determine whether the views of stroke survivors were becoming more positive or
more negative. This raises another issue in that once a screen has taken place, something
may need to be done. If the appropriate resources are not in place, this calls into question
the aim of screening in the first place. Screening for anxiety has already proved challenging
with a lack of access to trained psychological resources and costs associated with re-
organising the workflow cited as a major limitations (Morris et al. 2012). It is likely that
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similar challenges would exist if screening for illness representations after stroke were
recommended to become part of routine practice. However, there is potential to learn
from some of the national Stroke Improvement Programme case studies that have focused
on improving psychological services for stroke survivors. For example two individualised
mood and cognition screening projects carried out by the Bassetlaw Community Health
Consortium, the Nottinghampshire Healthcare NHS Trust, and the Sherwood Forest
Hospitals NHS Foundatation Trust in acute and community settings found that initiatives
were more successful when they were embedded into routine practice, staff understood the
reasons for screening and there was some flexibility in the measures that were administered
(Stroke Improvement programme 2011a).
9.5 Research gaps and implications for future work
In terms of future research regarding illness representations, stroke and anxiety,
various other possible relationships were not examined but could prove to be of interest
and have some clinical utility. For example, factors and sources of information that
contribute to the development of illness representations were not examined. Having an
understanding of how representations develop is as important as knowing what the
representations are. Investigation into the health economic cost of anxiety after stroke also
needs to be conducted. For example, there is limited information the association between
anxiety after stroke and other outcomes such as quality of life, social reintegration,
returning to work and health service utilisation.
This study used a quantitative survey approach to elicit information about illness
representations in stroke survivors. However the original ethos of the common-sense
model was for participants to be able to use their own words and language to characterise a
threat. Hence a qualitative exploration into illness representations held by stroke survivors
is needed to corroborate information obtained from the IPQ-R, as the language used by
stroke survivors to describe their representations may differ from that of the questionnaire.
Strategies to increase the participation of younger stroke survivors in research are
required. Their experience may be substantively different from older stroke survivors,
however their low participation rate meant that phenomena unique to this group could not
be examined. Strategies to ensure participation amongst individuals from ethnic minority
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backgrounds are also needed as none were included in this study. This was unusual given
that some of the recruitment occurred in Sheffield which is an ethnically diverse city. Future
studies may need to adopt a stratified sampling approach whereby the proportion of
individuals recruited into the study is reflective of the population under investigation.
This study highlighted several other challenges that should be taken into consideration
when conducting observational studies in stroke. To start there was competition from other
local stroke studies in progress which may have increased the difficulty in obtaining the
necessary research governance approvals. Much of the incentives hospitals receive for
participating in research are obtained by allocating staff resources to facilitate recruitment
into randomised control trials. Observational studies, and PhD studies in particular, may
have limited or no funding to offset the costs incurred by hospitals and clinics for allocating
staff resources for research as opposed to clinical care. Lack of such supports for lone-
researchers (as is the case for many PhD projects) increases the difficulty of recruiting
adequate numbers of patients into studies. As outlined in the workplan, the length of time
for recruitment had to be extended by over two months. One strategy that could be utilised
in the UK would be to ensure that the research study is adopted into the National Institute
of Health Research portfolio system. Adoption into the portfolio system enhances the
profile of a study, and it also compensates hospitals for the use of staff resources, which
means that some clinical support can be provided to the researcher to assist with
recruitment and data collection. If this is not possible, the feasibility of conducting this type
of work within the NHS should be seriously considered. If longer term outcomes are of
interest it may be advisable to seek to obtain a study sample from other sources such as
stroke clubs, or by using GP patient lists. However individuals attending stroke clubs may
not be representative of the larger stroke population, and depending on the study inclusion
criteria, a very large number of GP clinics would need to be contacted as on average each
GP sees about five new cases of stroke per year (Lee, Shafe and Cowie 2011).
High quality clinical trials, particularly of psychological interventions used to treat
anxiety after stroke are needed. The Cochrane review found limited evidence of
effectiveness in treating anxiety based on two small drug trials. However the inclusion
criteria for these trials required participants to have co-morbid depression and limitations in
their design, such as a lack of a placebo control arm in both studies, introduced
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methodological bias into the results. Future intervention studies will need to include stroke
survivors with anxiety only. Another limitation of both the empirical study and the
systematic review of the prevalence of anxiety after stroke that will need to be addressed in
future work is that it is uncertain if it is the stroke that has caused the anxiety. The
possibility exists that the anxiety may have been present prior to the stroke. Also anxiety
may serve as a risk factor for stroke. Longitudinal investigation is required to clarify this
matter. Projects such as the NIHR CLAHRC funded South Yorkshire Cohort Study which is
collecting longitudinal information for the next 20 years on a range of long-term conditions
including stroke and anxiety may help clarify the relationship between the two. Such a large
scale cohort study could also facilitate an investigation into illness representations and their
association with anxiety post stroke that would provide more robust information than that
obtained in the empirical study of this thesis.
9.6 Final Remarks
The high quality systematic review of observational studies established that
approximately a quarter of stroke survivors experience anxiety after stroke. Currently there
is insufficient evidence from randomised control trials to guide clinical practice for
interventions to treat anxiety after stroke and none of the trials assessed the effectiveness
of a psychological intervention. A key finding from the empirical study is that associating a
higher number of symptoms to ones stroke, and having more of an emotional reaction to
the stroke were significantly associated with anxiety. It also found that the majority of
participants generally became more negative in their views about stroke, and in so doing
showed an increasing trend in their levels of anxiety. Perhaps of greatest interest was the
large proportion of individuals who were found to have anxiety that was not co-morbid with
depression.
The work carried out in this thesis was novel, in that it provided a high quality estimate
of the prevalence of anxiety after stroke based on a well conducted systematic review and
added to the limited number of empirical studies in which longitudinal changes in illness
representations were assessed. Investigation into anxiety after stroke, falls under the wider
health remit to improve outcomes for individuals with mental health problems (Department
228
of Health 2011), and would contribute to the “no health without mental health” strategic
direction of care provision and research.
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Appendix A
Systematic Review Search Strategy (adapted for different databases)
1. exp Cerebrovascular Disorders/
2. stroke*.mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance word, subject heading word,
unique identifier]
3. (poststroke* or post-stroke* or cva*).mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance
word, subject heading word, unique identifier]
4. ((cerebr* or brain* or cerebellar* or cerebellum* or vertebrobasilar*) adj2 (infarct* or ischemi* or
ischaemi* or thrombo* or emboli* or apoplex*)).mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of
substance word, subject heading word, unique identifier]
5. ((cereb* or brain* or intracereb* or intracrani* or subarachnoid) adj2 (haemorrhag* or
hemorrhag* or bleed*)).mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance word, subject
heading word, unique identifier]
6. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5
7. exp Adjustment Disorders/
8. exp Anxiety Disorders/
9. exp Neurotic Disorders/
10. Mental Disorders/
11. anxiet*.mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance word, subject heading word,
unique identifier]
12. distress*.mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance word, subject heading word,
unique identifier]
13. (neuros* or neurotic*).mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance word, subject
heading word, unique identifier]
14. (depersonalization or depersonalisation or derealization or derealisation).mp. [mp=title, original
title, abstract, name of substance word, subject heading word, unique identifier]
15. fear.mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance word, subject heading word,
unique identifier]
16. (worry* or worri* or apprehens*).mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance word,
subject heading word, unique identifier]
17. (tension* adj2 symptom*).mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance word,
subject heading word, unique identifier]
18. ((avoidanc* or avoidant*) adj2 (behaviour or behavior or symptom*)).mp. [mp=title, original title,
abstract, name of substance word, subject heading word, unique identifier]
19. (autonomic adj2 (arousal* or symptom*)).mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of
substance word, subject heading word, unique identifier]
20. (hyperventilation adj2 (symptom* or syndrom*)).mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of
substance word, subject heading word, unique identifier]
21. 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 18 or 19 or 20
22. 6 and 21
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Summary of studies excluded from the systematic review of anxiety prevalence after
stroke
Study Description
Ma 2005 Design: Case-control
Recruitment: Selected from neurology department (methods not described)
Setting: Hospital
Location: China
Participants: Clinical diagnosis of stroke
Time at assessment: 2-3 weeks post-stroke
Diagnostic/ Screening tool: Self-Rating Anxiety Scale
Zhang 2005 Design: Case-control
Recruitment: All patients admitted to ward
Setting: Hospital
Location: China
Participants: 1st ever stroke diagnosed by CT or MRI
Time at assessment: 1 month post stroke
Diagnostic/ Screening tool: Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL-90)
Lucev 2007 Design: Cohort study
Recruitment: Not described
Setting: Community
Location: Croatia
Participants: Clinical diagnosis of stroke
Time at assessment: 3 and 12 months post stroke
Diagnostic/ Screening tool: Self rating anxiety scale
Lee 2009 Design: Cohort
Recruitment: Consecutive admissions
Setting: Community
Location: Hong Kong
Participants: 1st ever ischaemic stroke patients
Time at assessment: 1 and 6 months
Diagnostic/ Screening tool:
Radziuviene
2009
Design: Cohort
Recruitment: Consecutive discharge records
Setting: Community
Location: Lithuania
Participants: Stroke (not described)
Time at assessment: 1-4 years post stroke
Diagnostic/ Screening tool:
Matuja 1993 Design: Cohort
Recruitment: Consecutive admissions
Setting: Hospital
Location: Tanzania
Participants: 1st ever stroke confirmed by CT
Time at assessment:
Diagnostic/ Screening tool: Psychiatric interview (Present State Examination)
Huang 2009 Design: Case-control
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Recruitment: In hospital recruitment
Setting: Hospital
Location: China
Participants: Stroke confirmed by CT or MRI
Time at assessment: 2 weeks post stroke
Diagnostic/ Screening tool: Hamilton Anxiety Scale
Mcfarlane
1987
Design: Cohort
Recruitment: consecutive admissions
Setting: Hospital
Location: Australia
Participants: Clinical diagnosis of stroke
Time at assessment: 2 weeks, 3 & 15 months post-stroke
Diagnostic/ Screening tool: Middlesex Hospital Questionnaire (contains anxiety
subscale)
Oladiji 2009 Design: Cohort
Recruitment: Not described
Setting: Hospital
Location: Nigeria
Participants: WHO definition of stroke
Time at assessment: Not provided
Diagnostic/ Screening tool: Depression Anxiety Stress Scale
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Appendix B
Names of individuals involved in the Cochrane systematic review
 ACB- Alexia Campbell Burton
 CW- Caroline Watkins
 DG- David Gillespie
 EL- Elizabeth Lightbody
 JH- John Holmes
 JY- Jenni Murray
 PK- Peter Knapp
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MEDLINE search strategy for Cochrane systematic review
1. cerebrovascular disorders/ or exp basal ganglia cerebrovascular disease/ or exp brain ischemia/ or
exp carotid artery diseases/ or exp intracranial arterial diseases/ or exp “intracranial embolism and
thrombosis”/ or exp intracranial hemorrhages/ or stroke/ or exp brain infarction/ or vasospasm,
intracranial/ or vertebral artery dissection/
2. (stroke or poststroke or post-stroke or cerebrovasc$ or brain vasc$ or cerebral vasc$ or cva$ or
apoplex$ or SAH).tw.
3. ((brain$ or cerebr$ or cerebell$ or intracran$ or intracerebral) adj5 (isch?emi$ or infarct$ or
thrombo$ or emboli$ or occlus$)).tw.
4. ((brain$ or cerebr$ or cerebell$ or intracerebral or intracranial or subarachnoid) adj5
(haemorrhage$ or hemorrhage$ or haematoma$or hematoma$ or bleed$)).tw.
5. hemiplegia/ or exp paresis/
6. (hemipleg$ or hemipar$ or paresis or paretic).tw.
7. brain injuries/ or brain injury, chronic/
8. or/1-7
9. anxiety/
10. anxiety disorders/ or agoraphobia/ or obsessive-compulsive disorder/ or panic disorder/ or
phobic disorders/ or exp stress disorders,
traumatic/
11. exp Anti-Anxiety Agents/
12. (anxiety or anxieties or anxious or agoraphobi$ or phobi$ or panic disorder$ or panic attack$ or
(obsess$ adj3 compuls$) or post? traumatic stress$ or PTSD).tw.
13. (feel$ adj5 (apprehens$ or dread or disaster$ or fear$ or worry or worried or terror)).tw.
14. manifest anxiety scale/
15. or/9-14
16. 8 and 15
17. Randomized Controlled Trials as Topic/
18. random allocation/
19. Controlled Clinical Trials as Topic/
20. control groups/
21. clinical trials as topic/ or clinical trials, phase i as topic/ or clinical trials, phase ii as topic/ or
clinical trials, phase iii as topic/ or clinical trials, phase iv as topic/
22. double-blind method/
23. single-blind method/
24. Placebos/
25. placebo effect/
26. cross-over studies/
27. Multicenter Studies as Topic/
28. Therapies, Investigational/
29. Drug Evaluation/
30. Research Design/
31. Program Evaluation/
32. evaluation studies as topic/
33. randomized controlled trial.pt.
34. controlled clinical trial.pt.
35. (clinical trial or clinical trial phase i or clinical trial phase ii or clinical trial phase iii or clinical trial
phase iv).pt.
36. multicenter study.pt.
37. (evaluation studies or comparative study).pt.
38. random$.tw.
39. (controlled adj5 (trial$ or stud$)).tw.
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40. (clinical$ adj5 trial$).tw.
41. ((control or treatment or experiment$ or intervention) adj5 (group$ or subject$ or patient$)).tw.
42. (quasi-random$ or quasi random$ or pseudo-random$ or pseudo random$).tw.
43. ((multicenter or multicentre or therapeutic) adj5 (trial$ or stud$)).tw.
44. ((control or experiment$ or conservative) adj5 (treatment or therapy or procedure or
manage$)).tw.
45. ((singl$ or doubl$ or tripl$ or trebl$) adj5 (blind$ or mask$)).tw.
46. (coin adj5 (flip or flipped or toss$)).tw.
47. (cross-over or cross over or crossover).tw.
48. placebo$.tw.
49. sham.tw.
50. (assign$ or alternate or allocat$ or counterbalance$ or multiple baseline).tw.
51. controls.tw.
52. (treatment$ adj6 order).tw.
53. or/17-52
54. 16 and 53
55. limit 54 to humans
EMBASE search strategy for Cochrane systematic review
1. cerebrovascular disease/ or basal ganglion hemorrhage/ or exp brain hematoma/ or exp brain
hemorrhage/ or exp brain infarction/ or exp brain ischemia/ or exp carotid artery disease/ or
cerebral artery disease/ or cerebrovascular accident/ or exp intracranial aneurysm/ or exp occlusive
cerebrovascular disease/ or stroke/ or stroke patient/ or stroke unit/
2. (stroke or poststroke or post-stroke or cerebrovasc$ or brain vasc$ or cerebral vasc$ or cva$ or
apoplex$ or SAH).tw.
3. ((brain$ or cerebr$ or cerebell$ or intracran$ or intracerebral) adj5 (isch?emi$ or infarct$ or
thrombo$ or emboli$ or occlus$)).tw.
4. ((brain$ or cerebr$ or cerebell$ or intracerebral or intracranial or subarachnoid) adj5
(haemorrhage$ or hemorrhage$ or haematoma$ or hematoma$ or bleed$)).tw.
5. paralysis/ or hemiparesis/ or hemiplegia/ or paresis/
6. (hemipleg$ or hemipar$ or paresis or paretic).tw.
7. brain injury/
8. or/1-7
9. anxiety/
10. exp anxiety disorder/
11. exp anxiolytic agent/
12. (anxiety or anxieties or anxious or agoraphobi$ or phobi$ or panic disorder$ or panic attack$ or
(obsess$ adj3 compuls$) or post? traumatic stress$ or PTSD).tw.
13. (feel$ adj5 (apprehens$ or dread or disaster$ or fear$ or worry or worried or terror)).tw.
14. beck anxiety inventory/ or hamilton anxiety scale/ or “hospital anxiety and depression scale”/ or
self-rating anxiety scale/ or state trait anxiety inventory/
15. or/9-14
16. Randomized Controlled Trial/
17. Randomization/
18. Controlled Study/
19. control group/
20. clinical trial/ or phase 1 clinical trial/ or phase 2 clinical trial/ or phase 3 clinical trial/ or phase 4
clinical trial/ or controlled clinical trial/
21. Crossover Procedure/
22. Double Blind Procedure/
23. Single Blind Procedure/ or triple blind procedure/
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24. placebo/
25. Multicenter Study/
26. experimental design/ or experimental study/ or quasi experimental study/
27. experimental therapy/
28. drug comparison/ or drug dose comparison/
29. evaluation/ or “evaluation and follow-up”/ or evaluation research/ or clinical evaluation/
30. methodology/
31. “types of study”/
32. research subject/
33. Comparative Study/
34. random$.tw.
35. (controlled adj5 (trial$ or stud$)).tw.
36. (clinical$ adj5 trial$).tw.
37. ((control or treatment or experiment$ or intervention) adj5 (group$ or subject$ or patient$)).tw.
38. (quasi-random$ or quasi random$ or pseudo-random$ or pseudo random$).tw.
39. ((multicenter or multicentre or therapeutic) adj5 (trial$ or stud$)).tw.
40. ((control or experiment$ or conservative) adj5 (treatment or therapy or procedure or
manage$)).tw.
41. ((singl$ or doubl$ or tripl$ or trebl$) adj5 (blind$ or mask$)).tw.
42. (coin adj5 (flip or flipped or toss$)).tw.
43. (cross-over or cross over or crossover).tw.
44. placebo$.tw.
45. sham.tw.
46. (assign$ or alternate or allocat$ or counterbalance$ or multiple baseline).tw.
47. controls.tw.
48. (treatment$ adj6 order).tw.
49. or/16-48
50. 8 and 15 and 49
51. limit 50 to human
PsycINFO search strategy for Cochrane systematic review
1. cerebrovascular disorders/ or cerebral hemorrhage/ or exp cerebral ischemia/ or cerebral small
vessel disease/ or cerebrovascular accidents/ or subarachnoid hemorrhage/
2. (stroke or poststroke or post-stroke or cerebrovasc$ or brain vasc$ or cerebral vasc$ or cva$ or
apoplex$ or SAH).tw.
3. ((brain$ or cerebr$ or cerebell$ or intracran$ or intracerebral) adj5 (isch?emi$ or infarct$ or
thrombo$ or emboli$ or occlus$)).tw.
4. ((brain$ or cerebr$ or cerebell$ or intracerebral or intracranial or subarachnoid) adj5
(haemorrhage$ or hemorrhage$ or haematoma$
or hematoma$ or bleed$)).tw.
5. hemiparesis/ or hemiplegia/
6. (hemipleg$ or hemipar$ or paresis or paretic).tw.
7. brain injur$.tw.
8. or/1-7
9. exp anxiety/
10. exp anxiety disorders/ or panic/ or panic attack/ or fear/
11. anxiety management/
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12. state trait anxiety inventory/ or taylor manifest anxiety scale/
13. (anxiety or anxieties or anxious or agoraphobi$ or phobi$ or panic disorder$ or panic attack$ or
(obsess$ adj3 compuls$) or post? traumatic stress$ or PTSD).tw.
14. (feel$ adj5 (apprehens$ or dread or disaster$ or fear$ or worry or worried or terror)).tw.
15. or/9-14
16. 8 and 15
17. random sampling/
18. experiment controls/
19. placebo/
20. (empirical study or treatment outcome clinical trial).md.
21. clinical trials/ or Treatment Effectiveness Evaluation/
22. random$.tw.
23. (controlled adj5 (trial$ or stud$)).tw.
24. (clinical$ adj5 trial$).tw.
25. ((control or treatment or experiment$ or intervention) adj5 (group$ or subject$ or patient$)).tw.
26. (quasi-random$ or quasi random$ or pseudo-random$ or pseudo random$).tw.
27. ((multicenter or multicentre or therapeutic) adj5 (trial$ or stud$)).tw.
28. ((control or experiment$ or conservative) adj5 (treatment or therapy or procedure or
manage$)).tw.
29. ((singl$ or doubl$ or tripl$ or trebl$) adj5 (blind$ or mask$)).tw.
30. (coin adj5 (flip or flipped or toss$)).tw.
31. (cross-over or cross over or crossover).tw.
32. placebo$.tw.
33. sham.tw.
34. (assign$ or alternate or allocat$ or counterbalance$ or multiple baseline).tw.
35. controls.tw.
36. (treatment$ adj6 order).tw.
37. or/17-36
38. 16 and 37
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Summary table of studies excluded from the Cochrane systematic review
Study Description
Kimura 2003 Design: Cohort Design
Allocation: Unclear
Blinding: Double Blind
Participants: Post Stroke with clinical diagnosis of moderate to severe
depression. GAD only patients excluded. This study carried out
secondary analysis on a subset (27/106) participants who had co-
morbid GAD. Intervention: Daily Nortriptyline 20-100 mg for 6 weeks.
Dose escalated to 100 mg over duration of study; Placebo Control
Li 2005 Design: Self controlled Study
Allocation: Not Applicable
Blinding: Unclear
Participants: Post Stroke (all had anxiety levels measured, but did not
necessarily meet any criteria to be defined as anxious)
Interventions: Early functional training which included component of
supportive treatment without anti-anxiety or antidepressant
prescriptions/ No placebo or standard care comparison
Liu 2004 Design: RCT
Allocation: Number list, taking into account age, gender, and patient
condition
Blinding: Double Blinded
Participants: Post Stroke with Anxiety (HAM-A >=14)
Intervention: Group 1 received 0.2 mg alprazolam every 8 hours +
fluoxetine 20mg once daily/ Group 2: alprazolam every 8 hours/ No
placebo or standard care comparison
Mok 2004 Design: RCT
Allocation: random drawing of lots
Blinding: None, one researcher collected all data
Participants: Post stroke (Anxiety assessed using Chinese State-Trait
Anxiety
Inventory, in all participants, but did not necessarily meet criteria to
be defined as anxious)
Intervention: Slow Stroke Back Massage
Morrison 1998 Design: Quasi Experimental Cohort, with Retrospective Controls
Allocation: Not Applicable
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Blinding: Not Applicable
Participants: Post Stroke (Level of Anxiety assessed in all participants,
but not necessarily meeting criteria for anxiety)
Intervention: Self-help workbook aimed at enhancing non-avoidant
coping and increasing personal control over recovery
Rorsman 2006 Design: RCT
Allocation: Yes; Opaque randomised envelopes, numbered
consecutively produced centrally by a computer
Blinding: Yes; Study Coordinator and Evaluators not granted to access
on allocation
Participants: Post Stroke only, (all had anxiety levels measured, but
did not necessarily meet any criteria to be defined as anxious)
Interventions: Group 1 Electroacupuncture, Group 2 Transcutaneous
Electrical Nerve Stimulation
Wu 2008 Design: RCT
Allocation: Process unclear
Blinding: Not indicated
Participants: Post Stroke Anxiety Neurosis (ICD-10)
Interventions: Group 1 received Alprazolam, Group 2 received
Accupunture/ No placebo or standard care comparison
Ye 2006 Design: RCT
Allocation: Unclear (not described)
Blinding: Double Blind (not described)
Participants: 90 stroke survivors with co-morbid anxiety and
depression defined as (>14 on HAM-A & >21 on HAM-D)
Interventions: Group 1 received Paroxetine, Group 2 received
Imipramine, Control group received standard care and rehabilitative
training/ No placebo or standard care only comparison
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Appendix C
Anxiety After Stroke
Assessment Package
Dear Participant
Thank you for taking part in my study. I have included some instructions to help you
complete this package.
Step 1:
This questionnaire is divided into three sections. Please read the instructions at the beginning of
each section.
If you are having difficulty completing the questionnaire, someone can help you by reading the
questions and/or ticking the boxes. However please make sure the questionnaire shows your
thoughts and responses.
The questionnaire should take 30 minutes to complete. If you find yourself losing interest take a
break. It is important that you answer all the questions in this pack.
Step 2:
Please check through this package to make sure you have answered all the questions.
Step 3:
Return this package to me in the Freepost envelope. Do not write your name or address on the
envelope.
If you have any questions or need help with this package, please telephone
Alexia Campbell Burton on 0113 343 7185
THANK-YOU
Alexia Campbell Burton/ Dr Felicity Astin
Lead Researcher/ Supervisor
School of Healthcare, University of Leeds
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SECTION 1
These are some questions about how you feel. Read each statement and tickthe response
which comes closest to how you have been feeling in the past week. Don’t take too long with your
replies; your immediate reaction will probably be more accurate than a long thought out process.
1. I feel tense or wound up:
Most of the time………………………………. 3
A lot of the time………………………………. 2
From time to time, (occasionally)…….. 1
Not at all………………………………………….. 0
2. I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:
Definitely as much……………………………. 0
Not quite so much……………………………. 1
Only a little………………………………………. 2
Hardly at all……….…………………………….. 3
3. I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is about to happen:
Very definitely and quite badly…..……. 3
Yes, but not too badly………………………. 2
A little but it doesn’t worry me………… 1
Not at all………………………………………….. 0
4. I can laugh and see the funny side of things:
As much as I always could………………... 0
Not quite so much now……………………. 1
Definitely not as much now……………... 2
Not at all…………..…………………………….. 3
5. Worrying thoughts go through my mind
A great deal of the time……………………. 3
A lot of the time.……………………………... 2
From time to time but not too often.. 1
Only occasionally…………………………….. 0
6. I feel cheerful:
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Not at all………….………………………………. 3
Not often…………………………………………. 2
Sometimes………………………………..…….. 1
Most of the time….………………………….. 0
7. I can sit at ease and feel relaxed:
Definitely…………………………………………. 0
Usually…………………………………………….. 1
Not often…………………………………..…….. 2
Not at all………………………………………….. 3
8. I feel as if I am slowed down:
Nearly all the time……………………………. 3
Very Often……….………………………………. 2
Sometimes……………………………………….. 1
Not at all………………………………………….. 0
9. I get a sort of frightened feeling like ‘butterflies’ in the stomach:
Not at all………….………………………………. 0
Occasionally…….………………………………. 1
Quite often………………………………………. 2
Very often……………………………………….. 3
10. I have lost interest in my appearance
Definitely…………………………………………. 3
I don’t take so much care as I should.. 2
I may not take quite as much care……. 1
I take just as much care as ever……….. 0
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11. I fell restless as if I need to be on the move:
Very much indeed……………………………. 3
Quite a lot………..………………………………. 2
Not very much…………………………………. 1
Not at all………………………………………….. 0
12. I look forward with enjoyment to things:
As much as I ever did…………….…………. 0
Rather less than I used to…………………. 1
Definitely less than I used to……………. 2
Hardly at all…………………………………….. 3
13. I get sudden feelings of panic:
Very often indeed……………………………. 3
Quite often………………………………………. 2
Not very often………………………………….. 1
Not at all………………………………………….. 0
14. I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV programme:
Often……………………………….………………. 0
Sometimes……………………………….………. 1
Not often…………………………………………. 2
Very seldom…………………………………….. 3
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SECTION 2
Listed below are a number of symptoms you may or may not have felt since your stroke.
Tick ‘YES’next to the symptoms you have experienced since your stroke
Tick ‘NO’next to the symptoms you have not experienced since your stroke
Please also tick Yes or No if you believe these symptoms are related to your stroke.
I have experienced this
symptom since my Stroke
This symptom is related to my
Stroke
Pain Yes No Yes No
Sore Throat Yes No Yes No
Nausea Yes No Yes No
Breathlessness Yes No Yes No
Weight Loss Yes No Yes No
Fatigue Yes No Yes No
Stiff Joints Yes No Yes No
Sore Eyes Yes No Yes No
Wheeziness Yes No Yes No
Headaches Yes No Yes No
Upset Stomach Yes No Yes No
Sleep Difficulties Yes No Yes No
Dizziness Yes No Yes No
Loss of Strength Yes No Yes No
Forgetfulness Yes No Yes No
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I have experienced this
symptom since my Stroke
This symptom is related to my
Stroke
Difficulty reading Yes No Yes No
Difficulty seeing Yes No Yes No
Difficulty speaking Yes No Yes No
Difficulty writing Yes No Yes No
Clumsiness Yes No Yes No
Tingling/numbness Yes No Yes No
Weakness Yes No Yes No
Paralysis Yes No Yes No
Getting upset or
weepy
Yes No Yes No
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We are interested in your own personal views of how you view your stroke.
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about your stroke .
Please tickone box for each question.
VIEWS ABOUT YOUR STROKE
My stroke will last a short time Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke symptoms are likely
to be permanent rather than
temporary
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke symptoms will last
for a long time
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
The effects of my stroke will
pass quickly
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
I expect to have the effects of
my stroke for the rest of my life
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke is a serious condition Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke has major
consequences on my life
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke does not have much
effect on my life
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke strongly affects the
way others see me
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke has serious financial
consequences
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke causes difficulties for
those who are close to me
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
There is a lot which I can do to
control my stroke symptoms
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
273
VIEWS ABOUT YOUR STROKE
What I do can determine
whether my stroke symptoms
gets better or worse
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
The course of my stroke
depends on me
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Nothing I do will affect my
stroke symptoms
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
I have the power to influence
my stroke symptoms
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My actions will have no affect
on the outcome of my stroke
symptoms
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke symptoms will
improve in time
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
There is very little that can be
done to improve my stroke
symptoms
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My treatment will be effective
in curing my stroke symptoms
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
The negative effects of my
stroke can be avoided with
therapy
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My therapy can control my
stroke symptoms
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
There is nothing which can help
my stroke
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
The symptoms of my stroke are
puzzling to me
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke is a mystery to me Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
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VIEWS ABOUT YOUR STROKE
I don’t understand my stroke Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke doesn’t make any
sense to me
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
I have a clear picture or
understanding of my stroke
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
The symptoms of my stroke
change a great deal from day to
day
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke symptoms come and
go in cycles
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke symptoms are very
unpredictable
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
I go through cycles in which my
stroke gets better and worse
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
I get depressed when I think
about my stroke
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
When I thing about my stroke I
get upset
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke make me feel angry Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke does not worry me Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Having this stroke makes me
feel anxious
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My stroke makes me feel afraid Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
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We are interested in what you think may have caused your stroke. As people are very
different, there is no correct answer for this question. We are interested in your personal
views about the factors that you think caused your stroke rather than what others including
doctors or family may have suggested to you.
Below is a list of possible causes for your stroke. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree
that they were the cause for your stroke.
Please tickone box for each question
POSSIBLE CAUSES OF MY STROKE ARE:
Stress or worry Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Hereditary- it runs in my
family
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
A germ or virus Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Diet or eating habits Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Chance or bad luck Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Poor medical care in my
past
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Pollution in the
environment
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My own behavior Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My mental attitude (e.g.
thinking about life
negatively)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Family problems or worries
caused my stroke
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
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POSSIBLE CAUSES OF MY STROKE ARE:
Overwork Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My emotional state (e.g.
feeling down, lonely,
anxious or empty)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Ageing Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Alcohol Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Smoking Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Accident or injury Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
My personality Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Altered immunity Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
Agree
Please list in rank-order the three most important factors that you believe caused your
stroke. You may use any of the items from the table above or you may have additional
ideas of your own.
The three most important causes of my stroke for me are:
1. _________________________________________
2. _________________________________________
3. _________________________________________
**List in order or importance**
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SECTION 3
These are some questions about your ability to look after yourself. They may not seem to apply to
you, but please answer them all. Tickone box only in each group of questions
1. BATHING…In the bath or shower do you:
manage on your own?
need help getting in and out?
need other help?
never have a bath or shower?
need to be washed in bed?
2. STAIRS…Do you climb stairs at home:
without any help?
with someone carrying your frame?
with someone encouraging you?
with physical help?
not at all?
don’t have stairs?
3. DRESSING…Do you get dressed:
without any help?
just with help with buttons?
with someone helping you most of the time
4. MOBILITY…Do you walk indoors:
without any help apart from a frame?
with one person watching over you?
with one person helping you?
with more than one person helping?
not at all?
or do you use a wheelchair independently
(e.g. round corners)?
5. TRANSFER…Do you move from bed to chair:
on your own?
with a little help from one person?
with a lot of help from one or more people?
not at all?
6. FEEDING…Do you eat food:
without any help?
with help cutting food or spreading butter?
with more help?
7. TOILET USE…Do you use the toilet or commode:
without any help?
with some help but can do something?
With quite a lot of help?
8. GROOMING…Do you brush your hair and teeth, wash your face and shave:
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without help?
with help?
9. BLADDER…Are you incontinent of urine?
never
less than once a week
less than once a day
more often
or do you have a catheter manage for you
10. BOWELS…Do you soil yourself?
never
occasional accident
all the time
or do you need someone to give you an enema
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1. Did anyone help you complete this questionnaire?
No
Yes If yes, please answer the questions below
2. How were you helped?
Please tick as many as appropriate
a) Someone read out the questions
b) Someone translated the questions (if English is not your first language)
c) Someone discussed the questions with you
d) Someone ticked the boxes
e) The whole questionnaire was completed on the participant’s
behalf without consulting them
f) Other (please specify):______________________________________________
When was this pack completed (dd/mm/yyyy): __ __/ __ __/ __ __ __ __
Please take a minute to ...
Flick through the booklet
and check that you have answered
all the questions
and return by post to:
Alexia Campbell Burton
School of Healthcare, Baines Wing
University of Leeds
Leeds, UK
LS2 9JT
What happens next?
As part of this study you will be sent another questionnaire in 2-3 months.
Thank you for your time and cooperation
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Appendix D
HADS Licensing Permission
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Appendix E
Participant Information Sheet
Version 1.2, July 1, 2011
Anxiety After Stroke
Invitation
You are invited to take part in a PhD research study about stroke survivors and the
experience of worry and anxiety. This research is being conducted by researchers from the
University of Leeds. Before you decide if you want to take part in this study, please take
time to read this sheet carefully. If you wish please discuss it with your friends, family or GP.
Please ask me if there is anything that you are not clear about, or if you would want more
information. Take as much time as you need to decide if you wish to take part or not.
Why is this research being done?
For many people, having a stroke can be a frightening event. As a result, some people have
a difficult time adjusting to life after stroke. This study wants to learn about the attitudes and
beliefs you have about your stroke, and to see if these attitudes and beliefs are linked to
levels of worry or fear.
Why have I been chosen?
You have been approached because your consultant has indicated that you have had a
stroke. We hope to recruit 90-110 patients into this study over the next few months. It is
expected that the study will include a cross-section of stroke survivors varying in age, gender,
background and so forth who are willing to share their views.
Do I have to take part?
No. You decide if you want to take part or not. If you decide to take part you are free to
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. This will not affect the care or treatment you
receive. Neither will it affect your ability to access any services.
What if I change my mind and decide I don’t want to take part in this study after I gave
consent?
If you have consented to taking part in this study and then change your mind and feel you no
longer want to take part you can contact Alexia Campbell Burton (the Chief Investigator) and
let her know of your decision. You can contact the chief investigator by phone at
01133437185, by email at hccac@leeds.ac.uk , or by writing to address at the end of this
information sheet. When you contact Alexia please remember to let her know if you want
the information you have already provided to be included in the study or if you would like for
it to be removed.
What will I be asked to do?
You will be asked to complete a consent form three questionnaires. The researcher will
conduct the 1st one with you today, and you can take the 2nd one home with you. You will be
asked to return the questionnaire using the FREEPOST envelope within the next TWO
weeks. The last questionnaire will be sent to you in about three months to see how your
views may have changed. You are not required to purchase a stamp to return any of the
questionnaires.
Are there any disadvantages
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The questionnaire will take about 30 minutes of your time.
Are there any risks of taking part?
Some questions in the package ask about your feelings. There is a very small chance that
you may find this hard to deal with. If this happens take a break from answering the
questions. You can start again when you feel better, or move on to another section of the
package. You do not have to answer any questions that you find upsetting.
Advantages of taking part
The information you provide will help us understand the beliefs and attitudes of people after
stroke . It will also help us understand how these beliefs and attitudes are linked to emotions
and worry. Even if you are not anxious or worried the information you provide will still be
valuable. It will be useful for health professionals and the NHS in helping them plan services
for people after stroke.
What will happen to the results of the study?
The results from this study will form a significant portion of a PhD research project being
conducted at the University of Leeds, School of Healthcare. We may also publish an article
in a professional journal, and present findings at health related conferences. A version of
the report for lay people (people who are not healthcare professionals or academics) will be
produced and distributed to local stroke clubs and the UK Stroke Association. A copy of the
lay report can be sent to you if you would like one when it becomes available.
Funding
This research is funded by a PhD Studentship award from the University of Leeds. None of
the researchers on this project is being paid to enrol people into this study.
What do I have to do now?
You will be asked to sign a consent form. This will show that you agree to participate in this
study. After this the researcher is going to ask you a few short questions today. You will be
given a participant package with another questionnaire. Please take it home with you and
complete it in the next two weeks. Mail it back in the freepost envelope you have been
provided.
Contact for further information
CHIEF INVESTIGATOR SUPERVISOR
Alexia Campbell Burton Dr Felicity Astin
School of Healthcare School of Healthcare
University of Leeds University of Leeds
Leeds, UK LS2 9JT Leeds, UK LS2 9JT
Tel: 0113 343 7185 Tel: 0113 343 7558
hccac@leeds.ac.uk f.astin@leeds.ac.uk
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet
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Appendix F
Anxiety After Stroke
Patient Consent Form
Version 1.2
Please initial
the boxes
1. I have read and understand the Information Sheet (Version 1.2 dated July 1,
2011) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that taking part is voluntary and I am not required to answer
any questions I am uncomfortable with. I am free to withdraw at any time
without giving any reason and without my medical care or legal rights being
affected.
3. I understand that even if I withdraw from the above study the data already
collected from me will be used in analysing the study, unless I specifically
withdraw consent for this. I understand that my identity will remain
anonymous.
4. I understand that my name, address, telephone number, and information
about the type of stroke I had will be accessed by a member or my care
team or the chief investigator for the purposes of this research study.
5. I agree for my name, address, telephone number, and information about
the type of stroke I had to be stored at the School of Healthcare, University
of Leeds for the purpose of this study.
6. I understand that a copy of this Consent Form will be stored at the School
of Healthcare, University of Leeds
7. I agree to take part in the above study.
Reference
ID:
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PARTICIPANT:
Participant Name: Date: Signature:
Witness (to be completed if the participant is unable to sign for themselves):
Name of witness:: Date: Signature:
Lead Researcher (Signed by Chief Investigator):
Name of Lead Researcher: Date: Signature:
CONTACT DETAILS:
Researchers: Alexia Campbell Burton/ Dr Felicity Astin
Telephone Number: 01133437185
Email: hccac@leeds.ac.uk
ADDRESS: University of Leeds, Baines Wing Room 3.35, Leeds, UK LS2 9JT
(1 copy for the participant, 1 copy to be stored with the Lead Researcher at the School of Healthcare,
University of Leeds)
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Appendix H
PARTICIPANT DETAILS
The following sheet outlines the baseline data Elements that will be collected directly from
participants or from the participant’s file after consent has been obtained. This information will be
stored on a password protected University of Leeds computer. The hard copy will be stored in a
locked filing cabinet at the University of Leeds.
The Chief Investigator will ask participants to answer the following questions:
Participant Details:
Title
First Name
Last Name
Expected Place of Residence (within the next 3 months)
Address line 1
Address line 2
Postcode
Telephone number (home or mobile)
Sex of Participant:
Male
Female
Date of Birth__________
Did participant live alone before the stroke?
Yes
No
Ethnicity
White- British
Any other White Background
Mixed- White and Black Caribbean
Mixed- White and Black African
Mixed- White and Asian
Any other Mixed background
Asian- Bangladeshi
Asian- Indian
Asian- Pakistani
Black- Caribbean
Black-African
Any other Black Background
Chinese
Other
Not stated
Comorbidities
1. Have you ever had a heart attack? Yes___ No___
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2. Have you ever been treated for heart failure? (You may have been short of breath and the
doctor may have told you that you had fluid in your lungs) Yes___ No___
3. Have you had an operation to unclog or bypass the arteries in your legs? Yes___No_
4. Do you have Asthma? Yes___NO___
If Yes: Do you take medicines for your asthma?
Yes (only with flare ups)___ Yes (takes medicine regularly even when not flaring up)_
5. Do you have emphysema, chronic bronchitis or chronic obstructive lung disease? Yes__No__
If Yes, do you take medicines for your lung disease?
Yes (only with flare ups)___ Yes (takes medicine regularly even when not flaring up)_
6. Do you have stomach ulcers, or peptic ulcer disease? Yes___ NO___
7. Do you have diabetes? Yes___ NO___
8. Do you have problems with your kidneys? Yes___ No___
9. Do you have rheumatoid arthritis? Yes___ No___
10. Do you have cirrhosis or serious liver damage? Yes___ No___
11. Do you have cancer? Yes___ No___
The following information will be retrieved from the patient file
Date of 1st Stroke:__________________
Pathological classification of 1st stroke:
Cerebral Infarction
Primary Intracerebral Haemorrhage
Subarachnoid Haemorrhage
Clinical Classification of stroke symptoms
Total Anterior Circulate Stroke (TACS)
Partial Anterior Circulate Stroke (PACS)
Lacunar Stroke (LACS)
Posterior Circulation Stroke (POCS)
Does patient have history of anxiety or depression (if yes when)___________________________
Is the patient receiving treatment for anxiety or depression? (Describe whether pharmaceutical or
psychological, and when it was started)_________________________________________________
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6CIT
Has the patient given verbal consent for the 6CIT to be conducted, Yes
No
or has verbal carer assent been obtained
Before carrying out this test, make sure that the patient is wearing their glasses and/or their
hearing aid. Check that patient can hear you.
Enter 0 if the patient answered the question correctly. If the patient answered the question
incorrectly then the number or errors will be recorded. Score 1 for each incorrect response.
The maximum number or errors is stated in the table for each question. For questions with
more than one error state the maximum number or errors attained.
Max
error
Score Weight Weighted
Score
1. What Year is it now 1 X 4 =
2. What Month is it
now
1 X 3 =
Memory Phrase- repeat after me
John/Brown,/42/ West Street, / Bedford
3. About what Time is
it? (within 1 hour)
1 X 3 =
4. Count backwards 20
to 1
2 X 2 =
5. Say the months in
reverse order
2 X 2 =
6. Repeat the memory
phrase
5 X 2 =
Reference
ID:
The 6CIT is a test for cognitive impairment. It is assumed that all participants have
capacity to participate in research regardless of the score on the test. It will only be
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Appendix I
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa
F df1 df2 Sig.
Identity .024 2 73 .977
Timeline .564 2 73 .572
Cyclical 1.003 2 73 .372
Consequences .965 2 73 .386
Personal control .528 2 73 .592
Treatment control .374 2 73 .689
Coherence 1.360 2 73 .263
Emotional 1.815 2 73 .170
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.
a. Design: Intercept + Anx_Dep_11
Baseline regression model diagnostic plots
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Longitudinal Regression Diagnostic plots
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